Online Forum on the US/Israel-Iran War and its Implications on the Philippine Energy and Economy

Okay, good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen, to our colleagues and partners from the academe, the media, civil society, and to everyone else who has taken the time to join us this afternoon. We are on Zoom and, of course, we are also live on the Facebook pages of PASCDR and PSSC. I am Laureline Garcia Velarde, and I will be the moderator for this afternoon.

Welcome to our forum, Bato-Bato sa Langit, Ang Tamaan ay Nagalit, reflecting on the U.S.–Iran conflict and its implications for the Philippine energy and economy. This is a timely conversation because we are at a critical moment, as developments in the Middle East continue to shape global security, energy supply, and economic conditions across countries, including our own, the Philippines. This forum is a partnership among the Philippine Academic Society for Climate Disaster Resilience, or PASCDR, the University of the Philippines Resilience Institute, the Philippine Social Science Council, and the Kapisanan ng mga Broadcaster ng Pilipinas.

And together, we hope to bring this high-level discussion from the academic sphere into the public space and deepen understanding of the causes, possible scenarios, and implications of the conflict for the Filipino people. And to formally open the program, let us hear the opening remarks of Dr. Alfredo Mahar Francisco Lagmay, the Executive Director of the UP Resilience Institute. However, he cannot join us live this afternoon, but please allow us to play this prerecorded video message.

Let’s watch the opening remarks from Dr. Alfredo Mahar Francisco Lagmay, the Executive Director of the UP Resilience Institute. We’re just having a bit of technical difficulty, but the video is here already. Let’s hear it.

Okay, we’ll hear the message of Dr. Lagmay later on, so let’s proceed with our program. Now, let’s hear the messages from our partner institutions who have helped bring this conversation together. From the Philippine Social Science Council, let us welcome the Vice Chairperson, John Robert Go.

Okay, thank you very much. Good afternoon, everyone. I would like to extend a warm welcome to everyone participating in this webinar on the U.S.–Iran war and its implications for the Philippine energy sector and economy.

On behalf of the Philippine Social Science Council and our Chairperson, Dr. Elena Pernia, I extend our sincere greetings to our organizers, speakers, guests, and participants. Thank you all for taking the time to join this important and timely conversation. At moments like this, when events in one part of the world quickly ripple across many others, we are reminded that war is never only a matter of military conflict or state strategy.

It is also about its wider consequences on economies, governance, public policy, energy security, and ultimately on the everyday lives of ordinary people. Even countries geographically distant from the conflict, such as the Philippines, are not untouched by its effects. And this is where the social sciences become particularly important.

They help us look beyond the headlines and examine the many layers of such crises, and they enable us to ask the difficult but necessary questions. How do global conflicts affect local communities? How do disruptions in energy markets shape economic life and public welfare? How should states respond to uncertainty, vulnerability, and shifting geopolitical realities? And how do people make sense of these developments in their daily lives?

As a community of scholars, researchers, and practitioners, we value opportunities such as this webinar because they create space for reflection, dialogue, and critical understanding. They remind us that complex global events require not only immediate responses, but also careful analysis grounded in evidence, context, and human experience.

So we hope today’s discussion will deepen our understanding of the broader implications of this conflict, not only for West Asia and the wider international community, but also for the Philippines, particularly regarding our energy concerns and economic stability. We thank the Philippine Academic Society for Climate and Disaster Resilience for taking the lead in organizing this webinar. Together with the University of the Philippines Resilience Institute and the Kapisanan ng mga Broadcaster ng Pilipinas, we in the Philippine Social Science Council are grateful as well for the opportunity to join you as a partner in this important conversation.

We look forward to a meaningful and enlightening exchange, and once again, thank you very much for joining us.

Thank you very much, Dr. John Robert Go, the Vice Chairperson of the Philippine Social Science Council. And now let’s hear a few words from the President of the Kapisanan ng mga Broadcaster ng Pilipinas, Mr. Ruperto Anik Daud, Jr.

Thank you, Laureline.

At magandang hapon po sa inyong lahat. On behalf of the Kapisanan ng mga Broadcaster ng Pilipinas, welcome and thank you for taking the time to be part of this very important conversation. The title of today’s forum, mukhang galing kay Lito, Bato-Bato sa Langit, Ang Tamaan ay Nagalit, feels very appropriate.

Because while the conflict involving the U.S., Israel, and Iran may seem very far from us geographically, the reality is tinatamaan din tayo. Many industries, especially non-essentials, have been greatly impacted, and workers’ jobs might be in jeopardy. We feel it in fuel prices, in the cost of goods, and in the overall uncertainty that affects everyday lives.

Our economy—and certainly the media industry—is affected, as our advertisers are starting to slow down, if not totally cancel, their ad campaigns. For us in the media industry, gatherings like this matter. As broadcasters, we often deal with fast-moving headlines.

But beyond reporting what’s happening, our responsibility is to help people understand what it all means. Ano bang konteksto? Ano ang posibleng mangyari? At higit sa lahat, paano tayo maaapektuhan bilang bansa?

Since the start of what was supposed to be a short incursion—dapat mga four weeks lang daw ito—now it’s more than two months. In our office, we regularly talk about the latest updates about the war and the often confusing developments shaped by the pronouncements of key actors, not the least of which is the U.S. President. Hopefully, our confusion will lead to more clarity in today’s forum.

The KBP truly values partnerships like this with our colleagues from the academe and research community. Salamat, Liz Abanto, our newly minted Deputy Executive Director, for linking our organization with the Philippine Academic Society for Climate and Disaster Resilience, the UP Resilience Institute, and the Philippine Social Science Council. Looking at today’s program, nabasa ko yung credentials ng ating mga speakers.

They have excellent credentials. We are fortunate to hear from these experts who will walk us through the geopolitical context, possible scenarios, and economic implications for the Philippines. I think what’s important is not just understanding the situation, but also being better prepared for what may come next.

The perspectives and analyses of the experts we will listen to today will help enrich public discourse, and that’s something we broadcasters can bring to a wider audience in a more meaningful way. So this afternoon, I encourage our members to listen, engage, and reflect. Because the more we understand, the better we can respond—not just as professionals, but as citizens.

Maraming maraming salamat po, and I look forward to a very insightful discussion ahead. Thank you very much.

Maraming salamat po, President of the Kapisanan ng mga Broadcaster ng Pilipinas, Ruperto Anik Daud, Jr.

Moving on, we call on the President of the Philippine Academic Society for Climate and Disaster Resilience, Dr. Emmanuel M. Luna.

Good afternoon. Welcome to our forum on the U.S.–Israel–Iran war and its implications. As an association of academics working in the field of climate and disaster resilience for the past three years, we are concerned with the safety, well-being, and resilience of individuals, communities, and nations across the region.

While the Philippines has suffered several natural disasters, many of the hardships we face are not entirely of our own making. We witness and experience the disastrous effects of climate change, yet our contribution to global warming in terms of carbon emissions is not as large compared to countries such as China, the USA, and other industrialized nations. Today, we experience a similar situation, where global shocks are penetrating every aspect of our lives.

We seem to be observing events beyond our control. The resolution of this conflict requires more than changes in political events—it is a profound human and economic issue.

We are highly vulnerable. Our vulnerability is aggravated by confusing and sometimes uncoordinated responses that often hurt the poorest members of our society. Our country carries the burden of sustaining itself through these crises.

We need to understand. We need voices that influence. We need actions that create change.

Together with the University of the Philippines Resilience Institute, the Kapisanan ng mga Broadcaster ng Pilipinas, and the Philippine Social Science Council, we have convened today’s forum. We aim to find better ways of understanding, influencing, and identifying meaningful actions that can bring these issues into the public sphere.

Your presence today reflects the concerns we share and the realities we must face.

Again, thank you for joining us, and have a good day.

Thank you. Maraming salamat po, Dr. Luna, and of course, maraming salamat din sa PASCDR for organizing this event and for underscoring the importance of this forum.

Once again, this is Bato-Bato sa Langit, Ang Tamaan ay Nagalit.

To move on to the first major segment of our program, we will focus on Middle East conflicts—context, geopolitical developments, scenarios, and their global implications. The ongoing conflict is more than a distant headline.

Its effects are already being felt through tightening oil flows, uncertainty in global markets, and heightened risk across interconnected systems.

To guide us through this discussion, we are honored to have Dr. Genelito A. Sevilla, Jr.

Dr. Genelito A. Sevilla, Jr. is a professor of West Asian, Middle Eastern, and Philippine external relations studies, and a former dean at the Asian Center, University of the Philippines. He obtained his Ph.D. in International Relations from the University of Tehran, an M.A. in International Relations from Shahid Beheshti University in Tehran, Iran, and a B.S. in International Relations from Mindanao State University, Marawi Campus.

He is the founder and current president of the Philippine Middle East Studies Association, Inc. He has written extensively on the Middle East and Asia and has been published in several local and international journals and books. His research interests include Mindanao–Philippine–Middle East relations, political economy of West Asia, energy security in the Persian Gulf, global power relations in the Middle East, and Middle Eastern communities in the Philippines.

Once again, let’s give a warm welcome to Dr. Genelito A. Sevilla, Jr.

Good afternoon.

Can I share my screen?

Okay, good afternoon. Before I proceed with my presentation, let me thank the organizers of this very important forum on the U.S.–Israel–Iran war, which started on February 28 of this year. This is a very important forum because, as mentioned by previous speakers, it affects our lives as consumers, and we also have many Filipinos working and residing in that part of the world.

My presentation will be brief, focusing on the U.S.–Iran war and the changing geopolitics of the Middle East.

Looking at the current scenario, this war that started on February 28 makes it important for all of us to understand what happened in the past decades, particularly after Iran transitioned from a monarchy to the Islamic Republic in 1979. Even before that, we need to understand aspects of Iranian–U.S. bilateral relations that continue to affect both past and present dynamics.

We can begin with the 1952–1953 oil nationalization led by former Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh, who moved to nationalize the British-Iranian Petroleum Company. We must remember that Mossadegh was a democratically elected leader, yet he was removed through a joint operation by the CIA and MI6 of Great Britain because nationalization was seen as a threat to their interests. This is an important moment in Iranian–U.S. history that must be recalled.

Following this, the former king, Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, was reinstalled. He maintained good relations with the United States and European countries. Despite his record of authoritarianism, corruption, and human rights abuses, the U.S. supported his regime.

This led to growing dissatisfaction among the Iranian people, particularly among religious and traditional groups, which eventually culminated in the 1979 Islamic Revolution.

Before 1979, Iran, Israel, and the United States maintained good relations, as Iran and Israel were part of the U.S. alliance system during the Cold War. However, after 1979, Iran severed its relations with both Israel and the United States.

Since then, there have been numerous claims and counterclaims, particularly between the United States and Iran. The U.S. claims that Iran is developing nuclear weapons, that its government is authoritarian and non-democratic, and that it uses proxies to destabilize the Middle East. As a result, the U.S. imposed economic and political sanctions and froze Iranian assets.

However, from an international relations perspective, one could argue that these claims do not fully reflect realities on the ground. Some interpret this as a double standard in U.S. foreign policy.

For instance, why does the U.S. criticize Iran’s authoritarianism while maintaining strong relations with other authoritarian regimes in the region? From the Iranian perspective, this reflects inconsistency and perceived hypocrisy in U.S. policy.

Moving forward, in 2025, there was a 12-day war initiated by the United States and Israel against Iran. For the past 40 years since 1979, Iran had avoided direct military confrontation with Israel and other U.S.-allied countries in the GCC region.

But the 12-day war of 2025 really pressured Iran to reciprocate, because the issue here is about the country’s national survival, as Iran was being attacked by foreign military forces like the United States and Israel. And so Iran reciprocated, and it lasted for 12 days. The problem, however, is that it was an unfinished war. Although U.S. President Trump said that they were able to dismantle Iran’s nuclear program, this was not true.

And that is the reason why, on February 28, 2026, the same arguments were again put forward by the United States, claiming that Iran is trying to develop nuclear weapons and that Iran is a threat to regional security. But we need to understand that Iran has never attacked any country. It may use proxies, simply because it has many allies within the Middle East region.

However, in the history of Iran since 1979, it has never directly engaged in military confrontation with Arab or non-Arab countries in the Middle East.

Now, we need to understand the domestic and international considerations of this current war. From the U.S. perspective, we have to examine how the Trump administration views Iran. We also need to evaluate how the upcoming national election may be influencing the administration’s decision to engage in war with Iran.

There is also the issue of the Epstein file. And we must understand that from the 1970s until now, the U.S. has been consistent in its policy toward Iran. It has imposed a series of sanctions and has aimed to weaken or remove the Iranian regime, primarily because Iran is not aligned with U.S. interests. At the same time, the U.S. has maintained a consistent policy of support toward Israel.

Within the GCC region, there are countries that host U.S. military facilities. These Arab countries maintain strong strategic relations with the United States and also view Iran as a threat to regional security.

From the Israeli perspective, since the 1940s up to the present, the Israeli government—currently under Prime Minister Netanyahu—has continued to annex Palestinian territories, particularly in Gaza and other areas. This has resulted in the deaths of thousands of Palestinian civilians and widespread destruction of property.

More recently, even during periods of ceasefire, Israeli forces launched attacks in parts of Lebanon, resulting in the deaths of hundreds of Lebanese civilians.

We also need to consider domestic factors within Israel. Prime Minister Netanyahu has faced corruption charges in Israeli courts, and there is also an upcoming national election. Like the United States, Israel has maintained a consistent policy toward Iran.

Some analysts argue that the Netanyahu government aims to draw the United States, as well as U.S.-allied Arab countries in the GCC region, into the conflict.

From Iran’s perspective, its actions are framed as self-defense. It seeks to preserve the Islamic Republic, which it considers reflective of the will of its people—approximately 93 million individuals—compared to opposition groups that are largely based overseas.

We must also recognize that Iran has a civilization spanning over 6,000 years. Its form of Islam is distinct from Sunni Islam, and it combines religion and nationalism as key elements in resisting foreign threats and ensuring national survival.

In short, since 1979, Iranian foreign policy has revolved around resistance and anti-imperialism. Despite this, Iran has also promoted dialogue among civilizations and continues to emphasize diplomacy. Even if relations with the U.S. are strained, Iran has continued to engage in negotiations to resolve ongoing issues.

As a signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Iran maintains that its nuclear program is a legitimate national right and insists that it is not developing nuclear weapons.

Now, in terms of developments since February 28, this trilateral conflict between the U.S., Israel, and Iran has expanded across multiple parts of the GCC region. Iran has responded by launching missiles and drones targeting facilities and U.S. assets, resulting in damage to refineries and contributing to an energy crisis.

As mentioned earlier, this war is highly relevant not only to the Philippines but to the global economy.

Another issue is the inconsistency in statements coming from the U.S. president, which has caused confusion. The war is no longer fought solely on the battlefield but also through narratives—through media influence and information control.

Another development is Israel’s involvement in Lebanon. Fortunately, there are now efforts toward negotiation for a binding resolution.

We also need to discuss the Strait of Hormuz, which has been frequently mentioned in the news. This is a critical waterway through which oil, gas, and other resources from the GCC region pass to global markets.

We also rely on goods coming from China and other regions that pass through these routes. The GCC region supplies around 20% of global oil, much of which supports Asian economies.

Since February 28, despite claims that the war would end within two weeks, it has continued and remains fluid. There is a growing risk of further military escalation, especially after ceasefire efforts—such as those facilitated by Pakistan—were blocked.

Iran also did not send negotiators to the supposed second round of talks with the United States.

The situation is highly complex. One of the most affected aspects is maritime chokepoints, particularly the Strait of Hormuz. Iran considers this part of its territorial waters, but international maritime law also governs its use.

The complication is that Iran signed but did not ratify the relevant convention. The United States and the United Arab Emirates also did not ratify it, while other GCC countries did. This creates legal ambiguity.

If the Strait of Hormuz is closed and military confrontation continues, alternative routes such as the Bab al-Mandab Strait in the Red Sea may be used. However, this route is also geopolitically sensitive, as it is influenced by Houthi forces aligned with Iran.

If both chokepoints are disrupted, oil shipments may be rerouted through the Suez Canal or around the Cape of Good Hope in South Africa before reaching ASEAN economies. This significantly increases transportation costs and, consequently, fuel prices.

Looking at negotiation patterns, initial talks were facilitated by Oman. Iran showed willingness to limit uranium enrichment, but the U.S. launched attacks during this process, raising concerns about trust.

Pakistan later emerged as a potential mediator, given its strong relations with both Iran and the United States. However, Iran has expressed reluctance to engage unless the U.S. changes its approach and tone.

The U.S., on the other hand, seeks to negotiate from a position of strength, aiming to maintain its global standing. This is precisely the condition Iran resists.

Thus, Iran continues to assess whether the U.S. is negotiating in good faith before rejoining talks.

Regarding the Strait of Hormuz, conflicting statements from Iranian leadership and U.S. actions have created uncertainty. This affects economies dependent on GCC oil and raises risks for overseas workers and maritime operations.

Possible scenarios include continued intermittent closure of the Strait, rerouting of oil supplies by countries like Saudi Arabia, escalation of military conflict, or a return to ceasefire and diplomacy.

So these are actually the options, the scenarios that I’m trying to monitor from time to time, and we hope that ceasefire and diplomacy will prevail over other outcomes.

This is the impact of the GCC and the Strait of Hormuz crisis on the global economy, particularly the Asian economy. Asian countries, including the Philippines, are structurally vulnerable to this conflict because we are highly dependent on crude oil.

Our domestic energy sources have not been fully developed. This is also the case for countries like Thailand, which are similarly dependent on gas and oil imports from the GCC region. This will deepen the structural vulnerabilities of these countries, limit their ability to diversify, and affect their fiscal and policy options.

Governments across Asia—from Bangladesh to Pakistan to India—have adopted responses such as limited mobility, hybrid working arrangements, fuel subsidies, rationing, and exploring alternative energy sources.

So the question I would like to pose is: what would be the role of ASEAN in this conflict? Can ASEAN play a crucial or pivotal role in bringing these warring parties to negotiation and helping them arrive at an acceptable solution?

So this is my final slide—an analysis of what I have discussed. The conflict that started on February 28 and continues until today has created implications in geopolitics, in the economies of different countries, and within the GCC or Middle East region. It has also affected norms and institutional management, particularly in how the Strait of Hormuz is governed and what frameworks can be agreed upon by both parties.

Geopolitically, we have seen that the war has exposed vulnerabilities in the United States, particularly in response to Iran’s retaliatory actions. There is also a developing alliance system involving Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Turkey, and Egypt. This alliance is strategic rather than natural, as these countries may not share the same views, but are brought together by necessity.

We also know that NATO, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, has expressed reluctance to participate in the U.S.-led war on Iran. France and other European countries are instead pursuing direct negotiations with the Iranian government.

Another possible development is a stronger alliance between Iran, China, Russia, and North Korea. This is concerning, and I hope this scenario does not materialize.

Meanwhile, GCC countries are beginning to prioritize regional stability and promote diplomacy over conflict. Some have already expressed that they do not want their territories to be used by the United States in launching attacks against Iran, as they also want to protect their own economies.

Economically, there have been reports that vessels passing through the Strait of Hormuz are being required by Iran to pay fees. This raises questions about the future of the petrodollar system—are we witnessing a shift toward alternative systems, possibly even a “petro-Iran” framework? This is something that economists in this forum can explore further.

We are also seeing increasing economic ties between GCC countries and China, including discussions on using alternative currencies for oil and gas transactions.

In terms of norms and institutional management, the relevance of UNCLOS and other legal mechanisms becomes critical. There must be agreement on how the Strait of Hormuz is governed to ensure stability in global energy supply.

GCC countries are also beginning to exercise what can be described as strategic autonomy—engaging with Iran independently of the United States and diversifying alliances to secure their economic and security interests.

So, I think I will stop there. If there are questions about my presentation, I would be very willing to respond. Thank you.

Thank you very much.

Thank you very much for your very insightful presentation. We have received many questions from our attendees this afternoon, including those sent through Zoom.

But before we proceed, may we ask everyone to hold on to your questions and thoughts, as we will have a roundtable discussion later after all the presentations.

For now, I just have one question. Based on history and your analysis of the current situation between the U.S., Israel, and Iran, earlier it was mentioned that this conflict might end in two weeks. However, two weeks ago, President Trump also mentioned that there would be a ceasefire within two weeks.

As of today—Wednesday in the Philippines—it was supposed to be the deadline in the U.S., but it has already been extended. We are still waiting for Iran’s response to U.S. demands.

Based on your analysis, are we looking at a prolonged conflict? Because this has already been ongoing for more than 50 days. And this is not only affecting the Philippines but also the GCC countries, which are actively trying to avoid further escalation.

What scenario are we looking at? Will this conflict continue for a long time, or is a resolution near? And regarding the proposed ceasefire, is it possible that it may not hold?

I don’t want to give a conclusive answer, but I would like to raise a question instead: are both parties willing to compromise?

Iran wants to retain its right to a nuclear program, control over the Strait of Hormuz, and the release of its frozen assets. Are these demands acceptable to the United States?

There are sensitive issues here that the Trump administration may not easily concede. I believe that even if a ceasefire is reached, underlying tensions—security, economic, and legal—will persist for months or even years.

In my earlier interviews, I mentioned that this is not a conflict that will end in two weeks or even a month. It may last for a year or more. If we look at historical cases, such as the Iran-Iraq war, that conflict lasted eight years.

This current war is broader, involving multiple countries beyond the U.S., Israel, and Iran, including those in the GCC. The question then becomes: what legal and counter-legal measures will be pursued alongside diplomatic negotiations?

Ultimately, the key question is whether both sides are willing to compromise to achieve peace and restore global economic stability.

Thank you.

Okay, maraming salamat po, Dr. Sevilla. We will return to you later for the roundtable discussion.

For now, we move on to our next speaker, Dr. Susan Cordly of De La Salle University, who will share her insights on this broader issue.

Dr. Susan Cordly is a Professor of Political Science and Development Studies at De La Salle University, Manila. She earned her PhD in Political Science from Nanyang Technological University in Singapore. Her research focuses on comparative and international political economy and international relations, particularly in the Middle East, North America, and Southeast Asia.

She has received awards and scholarships from several institutions, including the United States Department of State, Qatar University, NTU Singapore, and Global Affairs Canada.

Before pursuing her postgraduate studies, Dr. Cordly worked in economic diplomacy and provided consultation to governments and companies on trade policy and business development. Her co-authored book, The Philippines 2050: Wishes and Reality on Economic Development in the Philippines, will be released this year.

We now call on Dr. Cordly to share her thoughts.

Good afternoon.

Good afternoon, everyone.

Thank you very much, Ms. Velarde, for the introduction. Thank you as well to Professor Sevilla for a very insightful talk earlier, and to the organizers and attendees for your time and participation.

In preparing for today’s talk, I decided to focus on the “context” aspect of the panel—Middle East conflict, geopolitical developments, scenarios, and global implications.

While there has been extensive analysis of military capabilities and economic impacts, there has been less discussion on less tangible factors that still significantly shape the trajectory of this war.

Earlier, I noticed questions about whether the war will continue or lead to regime change. My goal is to provide insight into these questions by examining Iran’s political identity.

I focus on its dominant political identity, shaped by domestic actors, historical events, ideologies—particularly religious ideologies—and its relations with regional and international players.

Understanding this identity helps explain that Iran’s foreign policy is driven by economic growth and policy independence, rather than an inherent inclination toward terrorism, as often claimed.

To begin, I will outline key political, social, and economic actors in Iran. Then, I will discuss major historical events that continue to shape Iran’s decision-making. Finally, I will examine its religious identity and foreign policy priorities.

Next slide, please.

Iran’s political system is unique and complex. At the top is the Supreme Leader, who is responsible for setting the general policies of the Islamic Republic, including foreign, economic, and social policy.

The Supreme Leader controls the armed forces, intelligence services, judiciary appointments, media, and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). He also vets presidential candidates.

Iran has a form of electoral democracy, but candidates must first be approved by the Supreme Leader.

The President is publicly elected for a four-year term, with a maximum of two consecutive terms. The President manages economic policy and works with a cabinet, which must be approved by parliament.

There are also unique political institutions. The Assembly of Experts, composed of 86 clerics, is elected and responsible for selecting the Supreme Leader.

The Council of Guardians, composed of 12 clerics, reviews legislation and vets candidates.

The Expediency Council mediates between institutions and advises the Supreme Leader.

Next slide, please.

Moving to national security, Iran has several key institutions. The Supreme National Security Council includes top officials and shapes security policy.

The regular army operates under the Supreme Leader and was strengthened after the Iran-Iraq War.

A key institution is the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), also known as Sepah. It has been involved in regional conflicts and plays a major role in Iran’s defense and foreign policy.

The IRGC includes ground, air, naval forces, and the Quds Force, which handles international operations.

Another key component is the Basij, a volunteer civilian force drawn largely from marginalized populations. It serves both military and social functions and helps maintain state-society connections.

The Basij reflects the concept of the “oppressed,” which is central to Iran’s political narrative.

Next, the bonyads—large socio-economic foundations—control significant portions of Iran’s economy, estimated at around 20% of GDP.

The largest is the Mostazafin Foundation, which inherited wealth from the previous regime and operates across multiple sectors.

These organizations support social welfare but also hold significant economic and political power.

From this complex system, we can conclude that regime change through external means is highly unlikely. The state is deeply embedded in society.

Maintaining the status quo is one of the few points of agreement among these powerful actors.

Next slide, please.

To understand Iran’s political identity, we must examine the crises it has faced since 1979.

Iran has been one of the most sanctioned countries in the world. Sanctions began after the Islamic Revolution and intensified over time.

It also experienced an eight-year war with Iraq, with massive casualties and lasting impact.

Other events include tensions with the Taliban, being labeled part of the “Axis of Evil,” and observing the overthrow of leaders like Saddam Hussein and Muammar Gaddafi.

These events reinforce Iran’s distrust of international actors.

In 2015, Iran entered the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which led to economic opening. However, in 2018, the U.S. withdrew from the agreement, reinforcing distrust.

More recent crises include diplomatic rifts, assassinations, and ongoing conflict.

Finally, Iran’s religious identity plays a central role. It is one of the few countries with a Shia majority, which shapes its political ideology and foreign policy.

It is quite distinct from Sunni theology, history, and tradition, as it heavily incorporates into its collective memory sentiments of sacrifice, suffering for what is just, and both historical and contemporary oppression. Remember the concept of Mostazafin—the oppressed—which is deeply embedded not only in collective memory but also in Iran’s formal and informal institutions.

This sense of injustice can be traced back to 661 AD, when Caliph Ali ibn Abi Talib was assassinated. I won’t go into detail, as this is an entire discussion on its own, but I am happy to answer questions later.

Another important related event is the killing of his son, Husayn ibn Ali, in the Battle of Karbala in 680 AD. His death continues to be commemorated today through annual rituals of mourning that last about ten days. These include public religious gatherings, and in some cases, acts of self-flagellation—similar to certain penitential practices in the Philippines.

As mentioned earlier, the concept of Mostazafin can be traced back to these events and has evolved to include modern experiences of discrimination against Shia populations in predominantly Sunni countries.

Next slide, please.

This map is important in understanding the narrative of injustice and perceived oppression. As you can see, Iran is surrounded by areas with U.S. military presence. Until recently, Afghanistan also hosted U.S. forces. This contributes to the perception that Iran is encircled and under constant external pressure.

This reinforces the narrative that Iran has historically and contemporarily been oppressed—not only by neighboring states but also by major global powers. This perspective helps explain motivations behind its foreign policy.

Next slide.

So how do these crises and this overarching religious ideology shape Iran’s priorities?

As a result of the external pressures and crises discussed, combined with a religious identity centered on resistance and justice, Iran places high value on developing domestic technology. Despite decades of sanctions, Iran remains an industrially capable country, producing vehicles, equipment, and weapons.

Among these is its nuclear technology, which it views as a source of national pride. Regardless of its intended use, it symbolizes technological independence.

Iran also places strong emphasis on foreign policy independence. Given limited cooperation with neighboring states and Western powers, it seeks strategic partnerships with non-Western actors such as Russia and China—not necessarily ideological alliances, but pragmatic ones.

Another major driver is economic growth. For ordinary Iranians, the economy is the top concern.

President Pezeshkian was quoted in 2020 saying that if someone could fix the economy, they should go ahead—because he had run out of solutions. This reflects the severity of economic challenges, including inflation, unemployment, energy shortages, and the impact of prolonged sanctions and conflict.

For political elites, economic growth is also crucial—not just for development, but for maintaining political stability and the status quo.

This helps explain Iran’s position on issues such as the Strait of Hormuz. Any resolution that does not allow for economic recovery or growth is unlikely to be acceptable.

Iran is likely to continue leveraging control over strategic routes like the Strait of Hormuz to generate revenue, especially given the damage it has suffered from recent conflicts.

To put things into perspective, Iran’s GNI per capita is approximately 5,130 USD, compared to around 4,470 USD for the Philippines. This indicates that Iran remains an economically significant regional player despite its challenges.

It remains to be seen how negotiations and the fragile ceasefire will unfold. What is important is understanding Iran’s priorities and the key drivers of its foreign policy.

I will stop here due to time constraints. I am happy to take questions later. Thank you very much.

Thank you so much, Dr. Cordly. You will be joining us again for the roundtable discussion.

As I understand, you mentioned that there are multiple key actors influencing decision-making in Iran. We also know that the previous Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, passed away during the recent conflict, and that leadership has transitioned to his successor.

There are also reports of close ties between Mojtaba Khamenei and the Revolutionary Guards. Given the influence of various actors, including the bonyads and religious institutions, the question is: does Iran speak with one unified voice?

We seem to be experiencing some technical difficulties.

Can we return to Dr. Cordly? Were you able to catch the question?

The question relates to leadership transitions and whether there is a unified decision-making structure. Also, who is currently leading Iran?

If I understood correctly, there are two questions: whether Iran operates with a unified voice, and who is currently leading the country.

That is an excellent question, and the answer is still evolving. The country is currently operating in what can be described as a state of emergency.

There have been multiple high-level changes and significant events, including leadership transitions. While Mojtaba Khamenei has been named as successor, discussions about succession have been ongoing for years, given the age of the previous Supreme Leader.

This means that the transition, while sudden, was not entirely unexpected. The system is structured in such a way that continuity is maintained even when leadership changes occur.

Iran’s political system is deeply institutionalized and embedded in society. Even if one or two individuals are removed, the broader system continues to function.

Other institutions—such as parliament and the judiciary—remain operational. The system is complex, layered, and resilient.

At present, the country is functioning under emergency conditions, but the overall structure remains intact. It will take time to determine whether there will be significant long-term changes.

Thank you.

Thank you very much, Dr. Cordly.

We will now proceed to the next speaker.

We are experiencing some technical issues, so we will proceed with the program.

Thank you so much, Dr. Cordly. We will return to you later for further discussion.

We will now proceed to our next speaker, Professor Herman Joseph Kraft.

He is a professor at the Department of Political Science at the University of the Philippines Diliman, Quezon City, and a former president of the Philippine Political Science Association.

He is also a former convener of the Strategic Studies Program at the Center for Integrative and Development Studies at the University of the Philippines.

He has published extensively on international relations and security, particularly on ASEAN, regional security in Southeast Asia, security sector reform, and interstate conflict in the Philippines.

He has delivered lectures at the Foreign Service Institute, the National Defense College of the Philippines, and various institutions under the Department of Foreign Affairs and Department of National Defense.

Please welcome Professor Herman Kraft for his discussion on the political implications of the U.S.–Iran war.

Professor Kraft, you may now begin.

Hi, Liz, am I coming in clear?

Yes, sir, we can hear you.

I’m sharing my screen right now. Are you able to see it?

Yes, your slides are visible.

All right. Thank you.

I’ll just test the slides if they’re moving, right? Is that okay? Yes, sir. Thank you.

Well, first of all, thank you very much for the very kind introduction. And I’d like to thank both Dr. Sevilla and Dr. Cordly for their presentations because they provide really good context for what I’d like to say.

In the interest of time, I’ve limited my talk. I was asked to discuss scenarios, but I don’t have a crystal ball. So what I’d like to do instead is discuss where we are at this point in time and what possibilities we might be facing, and what those imply for the Philippines.

Going back to what Dr. Sevilla and Dr. Cordly mentioned, as of March 5, this map shows the extent of strikes in Iran. You can see how extensive the attacks have been. But Iran has not been helpless.

What is interesting is that while there are fears about Iran’s nuclear capability, the more immediate concern is its ability to close the Strait of Hormuz and the spillover effects this would have on the global economy.

That is where we are right now. The central issue revolves around whether the Strait of Hormuz can be kept open.

Negotiations, such as those taking place in Islamabad, are primarily focused on this question. This is fundamentally a geopolitical issue.

As mentioned earlier, it’s not just the Strait of Hormuz—we must also consider the Bab el-Mandeb as another choke point, given Iran’s influence through its alliance with the Houthis in Yemen.

All of this affects global trade, particularly tanker movement across the Indian Ocean into the South China Sea.

To put things into perspective, China—the driver of the East Asian economy—depends significantly on oil imports. While only about 20% of its oil comes from Iran, around 90% of Iran’s oil exports go to China. Additionally, oil from other Gulf states like Saudi Arabia and the UAE also flows to Japan, South Korea, and Southeast Asia.

This shows how critical the situation is for the region.

For the Philippines, the implications are serious. Around 95% to 98% of our oil products come from this region, and as much as 90% of our liquid petroleum supply depends on it. This demonstrates how vulnerable we are to this conflict.

Now, what is the current state of play?

Negotiations are ongoing in Islamabad. Earlier, it was mentioned that Iran had not expressed interest in participating. However, developments suggest that Iran may reconsider, especially if key U.S. figures such as J.D. Vance are included in the negotiations.

This reflects Iran’s concern about the continuity of agreements beyond the current U.S. administration, especially given past experiences like the withdrawal from the JCPOA.

There is now a prospect for continued negotiations. President Trump has indicated that the ceasefire may be extended indefinitely, although conditions—particularly the opening of the Strait of Hormuz—remain central.

Iran has proposed a 10-point peace plan, which it sees as preconditions for negotiation, while the U.S. treats them as starting points.

Despite this, the Strait of Hormuz remains closed, and its effects continue to impact the Philippines.

Deployment bans remain in place, affecting around 40,000 OFWs and travelers. About 5,000 Filipino seafarers are stranded in vessels in the Persian Gulf, although some have already been repatriated.

Meanwhile, conflicts in other areas, such as Lebanon, continue to escalate.

Now, looking at Iran’s 10-point peace plan:

One demand is a complete halt to all aggression, including attacks on allied groups such as Hezbollah.

Another is the withdrawal of U.S. forces from the region—something that is highly unlikely to be accepted.

Iran also seeks recognition of its right to nuclear enrichment, lifting of sanctions, and removal of UN resolutions against it. Some of these demands may be negotiable, while others are more difficult.

Other demands include non-aggression guarantees, control over the Strait of Hormuz, and reparations for damages.

On the other hand, U.S. demands include dismantling Iran’s nuclear capabilities, strict monitoring by the IAEA, and limits on Iran’s missile program.

There are also demands to end support for groups like Hezbollah, the Houthis, and Hamas, and to recognize Israel.

Some areas of overlap exist, particularly in sanctions relief, but major gaps remain.

At the center of all this is the Strait of Hormuz.

If Iran gives in, it remains open. If the U.S. gives in, it remains open under Iranian terms. But neither extreme is likely.

So negotiations will focus on middle-ground solutions.

Key negotiables include keeping the Strait open, maintaining ceasefire conditions, and easing sanctions.

However, hard issues remain—particularly Iran’s nuclear program and missile capabilities.

Another wildcard is Israel. Even if the U.S. and Iran reach an agreement, Israel’s actions may complicate or undermine it.

Now, what does this mean for the Philippines?

First, strategically, the U.S. is distracted. It is focused on the Middle East, which raises questions about how much attention it can give to other regions, including Southeast Asia.

Second, our partners are also affected. Energy constraints impact their capacity to support regional security.

Third, ASEAN’s role becomes important. As chair, the Philippines may need to consider how it can help coordinate regional responses or mitigate impacts.

So I’ll stop there. Thank you.

Thank you very much, Professor Kraft.

Given the situation and the possibility of escalation, what would you say is the most pressing concern for countries not directly involved in the conflict, including the Philippines?

Obviously, ensuring that the Strait of Hormuz remains open—not just now, but consistently—is critical.

The problem is unpredictability. Statements from leaders can quickly shift conditions, causing volatility.

What we need is stability—an agreement to keep the Strait open first, before negotiating more complex issues.

Thank you.

We now proceed to the next segment on economic implications.

The Philippines is highly exposed to external shocks due to its dependence on imported fuel and limited reserves. Disruptions affect inflation, livelihoods, and the broader economy.

To discuss this, we invite Dr. Marites Tiongco.

Good afternoon.

Thank you for the introduction, and thank you to the previous speakers for setting the context.

Today, I will discuss how the oil crisis affects the Philippine economy and what policy responses are needed.

Our key point is simple: when global oil prices rise due to conflict, the economy is affected through multiple channels—slower growth, higher inflation, reduced household welfare, and strained public finances.

Importantly, the burden is uneven. Poor households are less affected by direct fuel costs but more affected by rising food, transport, and electricity prices.

So the issue is not whether government should respond, but how.

The crisis originates from disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz, which caused oil prices to spike—from around $65–$72 per barrel to nearly $150.

Because 98% of Philippine oil imports pass through this route, the effects are immediate.

This is not just an energy shock—it affects transport, food systems, and the cost of living.

Higher oil prices raise shipping costs, fertilizer prices, and food production costs.

Simulations show that GDP could decline by up to 4.49%, with government revenues falling significantly.

Wages and returns to production also decline, meaning the economy weakens even as prices rise.

Sectorally, energy-intensive industries are hit first, followed by broader sectors like transport, trade, and food.

The shock spreads through higher costs and reduced demand.

Through economic transmission channels, a rise in oil prices leads to cascading effects—fuel, transport, food, and electricity all increase.

On the supply side, a one-peso drop in petroleum supply can reduce total output by 4.68 pesos.

This shows how deeply interconnected the economy is.

So these are actually the options, the scenarios that I’m trying to monitor from time to time, and we hope that ceasefire and diplomacy will prevail over other outcomes.

This is the impact of the GCC and the Strait of Hormuz crisis on the global economy, particularly the Asian economy. Asian countries, including the Philippines, are structurally vulnerable to this conflict because we are highly dependent on crude oil.

Our domestic energy sources have not been fully developed. This is also the case for countries like Thailand, which are similarly dependent on gas and oil imports from the GCC region. This will deepen the structural vulnerabilities of these countries, limit their ability to diversify, and affect their fiscal and policy options.

Governments across Asia—from Bangladesh to Pakistan to India—have adopted responses such as limited mobility, hybrid working arrangements, fuel subsidies, rationing, and exploring alternative energy sources.

So the question I would like to pose is: what would be the role of ASEAN in this conflict? Can ASEAN play a crucial or pivotal role in bringing these warring parties to negotiation and helping them arrive at an acceptable solution?

So this is my final slide—an analysis of what I have discussed. The conflict that started on February 28 and continues until today has created implications in geopolitics, in the economies of different countries, and within the GCC or Middle East region. It has also affected norms and institutional management, particularly in how the Strait of Hormuz is governed and what frameworks can be agreed upon by both parties.

Geopolitically, we have seen that the war has exposed vulnerabilities in the United States, particularly in response to Iran’s retaliatory actions. There is also a developing alliance system involving Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Turkey, and Egypt. This alliance is strategic rather than natural, as these countries may not share the same views, but are brought together by necessity.

We also know that NATO, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, has expressed reluctance to participate in the U.S.-led war on Iran. France and other European countries are instead pursuing direct negotiations with the Iranian government.

Another possible development is a stronger alliance between Iran, China, Russia, and North Korea. This is concerning, and I hope this scenario does not materialize.

Meanwhile, GCC countries are beginning to prioritize regional stability and promote diplomacy over conflict. Some have already expressed that they do not want their territories to be used by the United States in launching attacks against Iran, as they also want to protect their own economies.

Economically, there have been reports that vessels passing through the Strait of Hormuz are being required by Iran to pay fees. This raises questions about the future of the petrodollar system—are we witnessing a shift toward alternative systems, possibly even a “petro-Iran” framework? This is something that economists in this forum can explore further.

We are also seeing increasing economic ties between GCC countries and China, including discussions on using alternative currencies for oil and gas transactions.

In terms of norms and institutional management, the relevance of UNCLOS and other legal mechanisms becomes critical. There must be agreement on how the Strait of Hormuz is governed to ensure stability in global energy supply.

GCC countries are also beginning to exercise what can be described as strategic autonomy—engaging with Iran independently of the United States and diversifying alliances to secure their economic and security interests.

So, I think I will stop there. If there are questions about my presentation, I would be very willing to respond. Thank you.

Thank you very much.

Thank you very much for your very insightful presentation. We have received many questions from our attendees this afternoon, including those sent through Zoom.

But before we proceed, may we ask everyone to hold on to your questions and thoughts, as we will have a roundtable discussion later after all the presentations.

For now, I just have one question. Based on history and your analysis of the current situation between the U.S., Israel, and Iran, earlier it was mentioned that this conflict might end in two weeks. However, two weeks ago, President Trump also mentioned that there would be a ceasefire within two weeks.

As of today—Wednesday in the Philippines—it was supposed to be the deadline in the U.S., but it has already been extended. We are still waiting for Iran’s response to U.S. demands.

Based on your analysis, are we looking at a prolonged conflict? Because this has already been ongoing for more than 50 days. And this is not only affecting the Philippines but also the GCC countries, which are actively trying to avoid further escalation.

What scenario are we looking at? Will this conflict continue for a long time, or is a resolution near? And regarding the proposed ceasefire, is it possible that it may not hold?

I don’t want to give a conclusive answer, but I would like to raise a question instead: are both parties willing to compromise?

Iran wants to retain its right to a nuclear program, control over the Strait of Hormuz, and the release of its frozen assets. Are these demands acceptable to the United States?

There are sensitive issues here that the Trump administration may not easily concede. I believe that even if a ceasefire is reached, underlying tensions—security, economic, and legal—will persist for months or even years.

In my earlier interviews, I mentioned that this is not a conflict that will end in two weeks or even a month. It may last for a year or more. If we look at historical cases, such as the Iran-Iraq war, that conflict lasted eight years.

This current war is broader, involving multiple countries beyond the U.S., Israel, and Iran, including those in the GCC. The question then becomes: what legal and counter-legal measures will be pursued alongside diplomatic negotiations?

Ultimately, the key question is whether both sides are willing to compromise to achieve peace and restore global economic stability.

Thank you.

Okay, maraming salamat po, Dr. Sevilla. We will return to you later for the roundtable discussion.

For now, we move on to our next speaker, Dr. Susan Cordly of De La Salle University, who will share her insights on this broader issue.

Dr. Susan Cordly is a Professor of Political Science and Development Studies at De La Salle University, Manila. She earned her PhD in Political Science from Nanyang Technological University in Singapore. Her research focuses on comparative and international political economy and international relations, particularly in the Middle East, North America, and Southeast Asia.

She has received awards and scholarships from several institutions, including the United States Department of State, Qatar University, NTU Singapore, and Global Affairs Canada.

Before pursuing her postgraduate studies, Dr. Cordly worked in economic diplomacy and provided consultation to governments and companies on trade policy and business development. Her co-authored book, The Philippines 2050: Wishes and Reality on Economic Development in the Philippines, will be released this year.

We now call on Dr. Cordly to share her thoughts.

Good afternoon.

Good afternoon, everyone.

Thank you very much, Ms. Velarde, for the introduction. Thank you as well to Professor Sevilla for a very insightful talk earlier, and to the organizers and attendees for your time and participation.

In preparing for today’s talk, I decided to focus on the “context” aspect of the panel—Middle East conflict, geopolitical developments, scenarios, and global implications.

While there has been extensive analysis of military capabilities and economic impacts, there has been less discussion on less tangible factors that still significantly shape the trajectory of this war.

Earlier, I noticed questions about whether the war will continue or lead to regime change. My goal is to provide insight into these questions by examining Iran’s political identity.

I focus on its dominant political identity, shaped by domestic actors, historical events, ideologies—particularly religious ideologies—and its relations with regional and international players.

Understanding this identity helps explain that Iran’s foreign policy is driven by economic growth and policy independence, rather than an inherent inclination toward terrorism, as often claimed.

To begin, I will outline key political, social, and economic actors in Iran. Then, I will discuss major historical events that continue to shape Iran’s decision-making. Finally, I will examine its religious identity and foreign policy priorities.

Next slide, please.

Iran’s political system is unique and complex. At the top is the Supreme Leader, who is responsible for setting the general policies of the Islamic Republic, including foreign, economic, and social policy.

The Supreme Leader controls the armed forces, intelligence services, judiciary appointments, media, and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). He also vets presidential candidates.

Iran has a form of electoral democracy, but candidates must first be approved by the Supreme Leader.

The President is publicly elected for a four-year term, with a maximum of two consecutive terms. The President manages economic policy and works with a cabinet, which must be approved by parliament.

There are also unique political institutions. The Assembly of Experts, composed of 86 clerics, is elected and responsible for selecting the Supreme Leader.

The Council of Guardians, composed of 12 clerics, reviews legislation and vets candidates.

The Expediency Council mediates between institutions and advises the Supreme Leader.

Next slide, please.

Moving to national security, Iran has several key institutions. The Supreme National Security Council includes top officials and shapes security policy.

The regular army operates under the Supreme Leader and was strengthened after the Iran-Iraq War.

A key institution is the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), also known as Sepah. It has been involved in regional conflicts and plays a major role in Iran’s defense and foreign policy.

The IRGC includes ground, air, naval forces, and the Quds Force, which handles international operations.

Another key component is the Basij, a volunteer civilian force drawn largely from marginalized populations. It serves both military and social functions and helps maintain state-society connections.

The Basij reflects the concept of the “oppressed,” which is central to Iran’s political narrative.

Next, the bonyads—large socio-economic foundations—control significant portions of Iran’s economy, estimated at around 20% of GDP.

The largest is the Mostazafin Foundation, which inherited wealth from the previous regime and operates across multiple sectors.

These organizations support social welfare but also hold significant economic and political power.

From this complex system, we can conclude that regime change through external means is highly unlikely. The state is deeply embedded in society.

Maintaining the status quo is one of the few points of agreement among these powerful actors.

Next slide, please.

To understand Iran’s political identity, we must examine the crises it has faced since 1979.

Iran has been one of the most sanctioned countries in the world. Sanctions began after the Islamic Revolution and intensified over time.

It also experienced an eight-year war with Iraq, with massive casualties and lasting impact.

Other events include tensions with the Taliban, being labeled part of the “Axis of Evil,” and observing the overthrow of leaders like Saddam Hussein and Muammar Gaddafi.

These events reinforce Iran’s distrust of international actors.

In 2015, Iran entered the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which led to economic opening. However, in 2018, the U.S. withdrew from the agreement, reinforcing distrust.

More recent crises include diplomatic rifts, assassinations, and ongoing conflict.

Finally, Iran’s religious identity plays a central role. It is one of the few countries with a Shia majority, which shapes its political ideology and foreign policy.

This is why the poor are especially vulnerable. Lower-income households may not spend much on fuel directly, but they are highly exposed through indirect channels such as food prices, transport fares, and electricity. So the most relevant policy question is not how to lower gasoline prices for everyone, but how to protect households and sectors through which oil shocks translate into welfare losses.

Now, we’ve heard about policy debates—whether to go for broad suppression or targeted relief.

On one side, there is broad price suppression. This includes ideas such as reviving the Oil Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF), suspending fuel excise taxes, or using broad price controls.

On the other hand, there is targeted, time-bound relief. This includes programs like UPLIFT, which is a unified package for livelihoods, industry, food, and transport, activated by Executive Order No. 110.

This means helping the groups that are most affected, such as public transport drivers, farmers, fishers, and low-income households.

We argue in our paper that broad suppression performs poorly for four reasons.

First, it is poorly targeted. Higher-income households consume more fuel and therefore capture a larger share of the benefits. The bottom 30% of households receive only a small portion of excise tax relief, while the top 30% receive most of it.

Second, it is fiscally costly. Government can lose a significant amount of revenue or spend heavily trying to hold prices down. Historical experience with OPSF shows that such schemes can become underfunded and require bailouts.

Third, it is difficult to administer and vulnerable to governance problems.

Fourth, it weakens normal price signals that encourage conservation, efficiency, and long-run adjustment.

By contrast, the targeted approach performs better because it provides direct support where the need is greatest—where the pain is strongest and the social need is highest.

Targeted relief under UPLIFT focuses on those who are more vulnerable: PUV drivers, farmers, fishers, and low-income households facing higher food, transport, and electricity costs.

We support UPLIFT, but with safeguards—clear eligibility rules, time-bound assistance, fiscal caps, and transparent monitoring.

As we’ve heard, the government has recently been shaping fuel prices through rollbacks over the past two weeks. This has a similar effect to OPSF, where the government absorbs part of the price increase as an emergency response.

This is allowed under Executive Order No. 110. Although the oil industry is deregulated, the DOE can intervene, but only temporarily for emergency purposes.

However, this creates implications for fuel businesses. If they purchased fuel at higher prices and are then required to lower prices quickly, they may earn less or even incur losses. Smaller firms may be hit harder because they have less capacity to absorb these losses.

Now, moving to the CGE results—fiscal cost versus welfare benefit:

This slide compares the fiscal cost and welfare outcomes of different policy scenarios. We conducted seven or eight simulations to compare policy options.

The key message is that broad tax cuts are expensive but do not deliver proportionate benefits to poor households.

For example, removing oil taxes can lead to large revenue losses. Without intervention (SIM-1), government revenue falls by about ₱190 billion. If oil taxes are removed, losses rise to about ₱231 billion. If multiple related taxes are removed, losses can reach nearly ₱589 billion.

These are very costly measures with limited welfare improvement for the poor.

In contrast, targeted support (SIM-7) achieves better welfare outcomes at much lower cost. This approach combines targeted subsidies for the poorest groups with a surtax on the richest 10%.

It results in a revenue loss of about ₱70 billion—significantly lower than blanket tax cuts—while improving welfare for the bottom four income deciles.

The lesson is simple: better targeting leads to better outcomes at lower cost.

Now, on poverty and distributional impacts:

Without intervention, poverty incidence could increase by 11.47%, equivalent to about 1.36 million additional Filipinos falling into poverty.

Broad tax cuts reduce poverty slightly, but at a high fiscal cost.

Targeted interventions achieve similar reductions at a much lower cost—around one-eighth of the cost of cumulative tax removal.

So the key question is not simply whether prices go down, but how much protection poor households receive per peso of public spending.

Lowering prices for everyone also benefits those who do not need as much support.

So the focus should be on effective targeting, and support must be time-bound.

Now, for the recommended policy response:

First, strengthen UPLIFT and avoid returning to OPSF. The better approach is targeted, temporary, and transparent support.

Second, target the transmission channels of the shock—not just pump prices. This includes transport, agriculture, fisheries, food logistics, and vulnerable households.

Third, avoid excise tax suspension as a default response, as it is costly, poorly targeted, and weakens long-term adjustment incentives.

Fourth, improve supply resilience through diversification, stronger reserves, and better market monitoring.

Finally, use this crisis to accelerate energy transition—invest in renewables, improve public transport, and reduce dependence on imported oil.

The message is clear: protect people now, but reduce future vulnerability.

Thank you.

Thank you very much, Dr. Tiongco.

When the war broke out between the U.S., Israel, and Iran, it was expected to last only two weeks. However, within that period, oil prices in the Philippines rose rapidly, and other costs followed.

Now, more than 50 days into the conflict, we are experiencing not just an oil shock, but an economic shock.

Given this, what can we expect? Will prices continue to decline, or is reversal possible?

Thank you very much for the question.

If further disruptions occur, the situation could worsen. However, if supply remains stable and alternative sources are available—as mentioned earlier—then we may avoid severe outcomes.

We reached a point in 1975 where rationing was necessary, but we are not at that stage yet. As long as ceasefire conditions hold and supply is not disrupted, the situation remains manageable.

Thank you.

We still have time and many questions, which we will address during the roundtable.

For now, let us return to the opening remarks of Dr. Alfredo Mahar Francisco Lagmay, Executive Director of the UP Resilience Institute, which were not shown earlier.

Good afternoon to all of us.

I would like to begin by welcoming you to this timely PASCDR forum and thanking our distinguished speakers for sharing their expertise. I also acknowledge our partner institutions—PASCDR, UPRI, PSSC, and KBP—for bringing this important conversation into a broader public space.

Today’s forum examines the ongoing conflict involving the United States, Israel, and Iran and what it means for the Philippines.

While this may appear as a distant geopolitical issue, its effects are far from remote. Tensions in key areas such as the Strait of Hormuz disrupt global oil flows, which translate directly into higher fuel prices, strained supply chains, and added pressure on an already import-dependent energy system.

These are realities that quickly affect everyday life in the country.

Let me frame this from a disaster risk reduction perspective, which is core to our work at the UP Resilience Institute. This U.S.–Israel–Iran war is an anthropogenic hazard. It is human-induced, systemic, and capable of triggering cascading impacts across sectors and borders.

Like natural hazards, it exposes underlying vulnerabilities and amplifies risk, particularly for countries with existing structural constraints such as limited energy security. This raises an important question for us: what gaps exist in how we currently assess and prepare for risk when we exclude conflict from DRR thinking?

Our experts today will help us unpack this by first situating the current condition within its broader geopolitical context—looking at how recent developments are unfolding, what scenarios are emerging, and how these connect to wider global systems and risks.

From there, we will move closer to home, examining how these shifts may translate into different outcomes for the Philippines, particularly in terms of exposure and vulnerability across key systems such as energy, logistics, and supply chains.

We will also look at the economic dimensions of these disruptions—how changes in global oil flows, trade routes, and market uncertainty shape inflation, production costs, and overall economic stability in the Philippine context.

We hope that this forum will help us move beyond viewing these developments as isolated foreign policy issues and instead understand them as interconnected risks that already shape our national systems and everyday realities.

Through these layers of discussion, we aim to translate global dynamics into clearer implications for policy planning and practice in the Philippine context. Ultimately, may this exchange strengthen how we think about risk, encouraging more integrated, forward-looking approaches that bridge geopolitical analysis, disaster risk reduction, and development planning.

Maraming salamat po at magandang hapon sa inyong lahat.

Maraming salamat din po. Thank you, Dr. Tiongco, and maraming salamat din po sa inyong message, Dr. Alfredo Mahar Francisco Lagmay, Executive Director of the UP Resilience Institute.

And now, let’s move on to our roundtable discussion, where we bring together the various insights shared this afternoon and open the conversation further for reflection and exchange.

This part of the program allows us to connect the geopolitical, national, and economic dimensions of the issue with a broader public conversation that we hope to advance.

At this point, we would like to call once again the attention of our resource speakers—Dr. Genelito Sevilla, Jr., Dr. Susan Cordly, Professor Herman Kraft, and Dr. Marites Tiongco—to join us in this Q&A.

We also ask our attendees to please send your questions through Zoom or via Facebook. You may also share your comments.

All our resource speakers are now present.

We have received many questions, so we will begin with those already submitted and then proceed to additional questions as they come in.

First question: how does the ongoing U.S.–Iran conflict reshape global power dynamics and energy security?

As mentioned earlier, how do global powers impact this situation? We have heard that GCC countries do not want to be directly involved or used in this war. We also know that the U.S. has expressed frustration over the lack of support from the United Nations.

So where are we now? How does this conflict reshape global power dynamics?

Anyone from our resource persons may respond.

I can probably start.

I think one unintended consequence is that this conflict is undermining U.S. influence, particularly among its key partners.

In the Philippines, for example, perceptions of the U.S.—as a partner or a liability—are being reconsidered, leading to renewed discussions on military and security partnerships.

In the GCC region, historically strong allies of the U.S. in economic, military, and security terms are now reassessing these relationships.

The U.S. has long been an umbrella security provider, but this role is now being questioned.

We are seeing discussions about emerging blocs, increased cooperation with countries such as China and Russia, and the growing influence of regional players like Turkey and Pakistan.

There are also talks of reviving institutions such as the Gulf Cooperation Council.

Whether this leads to fragmentation or stronger regional unity remains to be seen, but overall, it suggests a weakening of U.S. influence.

In terms of energy, I will defer to my colleagues.

Thank you.

If I may add, the war is not only undermining alliances but also the sustainability of international norms and institutions.

There have been numerous violations of international law and humanitarian law, including civilian casualties, which raise questions about the effectiveness of global institutions.

For example, the UN Security Council has struggled to reach consensus due to veto powers.

This raises concerns about the future of global governance.

We are also seeing moves toward strategic autonomy among GCC countries and the potential strengthening of alternative geopolitical blocs such as BRICS.

There are even discussions about shifts away from the petrodollar system toward alternative or diversified currencies.

The long-term implications remain uncertain and will depend on how negotiations evolve.

Thank you.

Before we continue, we would like to note that we invited the Department of Economy, Planning, and Development (formerly NEDA) to join this discussion. However, we did not receive confirmation.

We wanted to hear their perspective on how the government is responding to this crisis, which affects not only the Middle East but also the Philippines.

Now, moving on.

What is one policy decision that the Philippine government must get right in the next six to twelve months? And where do you disagree with common narratives about the conflict?

Let me weigh in on this.

One key issue is reducing our vulnerability to external energy shocks.

We cannot assume that supply routes will always remain secure.

Given recent developments, we must ask: how do we reduce this vulnerability?

This leads to discussions on alternative energy sources, including nuclear power, although this remains politically sensitive in the Philippines.

If I were advising the administration, I would push for greater energy independence—diversifying sources and reducing reliance on Middle East oil.

This is not simply about renewable versus non-renewable energy—it is about securing our energy future.

We cannot remain vulnerable to external disruptions beyond our control.

I agree.

If this situation persists or recurs, we need to rethink our long-term strategy.

The Philippines is not just facing a temporary oil price spike—it is facing a deeper structural vulnerability: heavy dependence on imported oil, fuel-intensive transport systems, and limited alternatives.

Even if the conflict ends, similar shocks will occur unless these structural issues are addressed.

Now, another question:

Given that no party wants to appear defeated, how likely is a resolution?

This is a difficult question because both sides have firm positions and are not easily willing to compromise.

While proposals have been put forward, there are key issues that neither side is willing to concede.

The challenge is whether external actors can facilitate meaningful dialogue.

However, each country is acting based on its perceived national interests.

At the same time, the consequences of the war extend beyond the main actors—affecting economies, labor markets, and humanitarian conditions globally.

If I may add, it is overly simplistic to say that all parties are focused solely on appearing victorious.

Their motivations differ.

For leaders like Netanyahu and Trump, domestic political pressures and legal challenges may influence their decisions.

For Iran, economic concerns are central.

Any viable resolution must address economic grievances, including sanctions and access to resources.

Iran’s energy strategy also plays a role, as it seeks to balance domestic consumption and exports.

Historically, Iran has not initiated wars in the region, and its actions are largely framed in terms of defense and economic survival.

So any solution that ignores these factors is unlikely to succeed.

Now, moving to another question:

How would you assess local media coverage of the war’s effects on the Philippines?

There is room for improvement.

Local reporting often focuses on domestic impacts, which is important, but there is also a need to better contextualize these developments within broader international dynamics.

Expanding this perspective can lead to more informed public understanding.

Now, another question:

What can the government do to support the middle class, which is often excluded from targeted assistance?

Support measures could include transport relief and temporary tax measures.

While assistance to vulnerable sectors is essential, the middle class also faces significant pressure, especially in transport and cost of living.

Policies such as temporary subsidies, fare stabilization, and tax relief can help address this gap.

Additionally, removing excise taxes on LPG and kerosene can provide direct relief to households, including those who may not qualify for cash assistance.

Finally, regarding regime change in Iran:

Externally driven regime change is highly unlikely.

Iran’s political system is deeply institutionalized, and past efforts have shown that such interventions are complex and unlikely to produce the intended outcomes.

As a matter of fact, if you look at the history of Iran, we see that crisis after crisis has strengthened the government, strengthened right-wing conservative voices, and reinforced the legitimacy of the state—even enabling repression—because it presents itself as the voice of the oppressed resisting international injustice.

So any external crisis, as mentioned earlier, tends to strengthen the government rather than weaken or change it. It is difficult to determine exactly what is happening in Iran at this moment.

However, what can be observed is that calls for relaxing civil freedoms are often put on hold during crises, as people tend to rally behind what they perceive as their protector.

At the same time, actions by the U.S. and Israel—especially when framed in terms of human rights but accompanied by civilian-targeting incidents—undermine their credibility and narrative.

So at present, the situation appears to be consolidating support for the existing government and strengthening conservative elements, as it provides justification for continuing current policies.

Thank you very much.

Last question for Dr. Sevilla and Dr. Cordly:

It is in the interest of most countries to keep the Strait of Hormuz open. Is there a scenario where the Strait can be opened without resolving key negotiation issues?

There are two important points.

First, before the war, the Strait of Hormuz was open, with no issues regarding free or innocent passage of vessels.

Second, when the U.S. and Israel attacked Iran on February 28, Iran’s national security was threatened. As a result, parts of the Strait were selectively closed for security reasons.

So, is keeping it open in the global interest? Yes. But it would be very difficult for Iran to open it unconditionally while its security is under threat.

Thank you.

I agree with that assessment.

Unless we are looking at a prolonged stalemate—perhaps lasting many years—where parties eventually concede certain demands, it is unlikely that the Strait will remain open without addressing key security and economic concerns.

But hopefully, that scenario does not materialize.

Thank you.

We have many more questions, but unfortunately, we are running out of time.

We now invite our speakers to give their parting messages.

The crisis has impacted both the economy and the geopolitical landscape of the Middle East. It has also affected our lives as ordinary citizens—not just here, but globally.

We hope that diplomacy will prevail and that all parties will act with reason and consider not only their own interests but those of the global community.

Thank you.

Briefly, I would say that this is a time for the Philippine government to be more active and independent in its foreign policy—reassessing alliances and diversifying economic and security partnerships.

This is also a moment for middle powers to assert themselves more strongly.

Domestically, there is a need for a more active government role in protecting vulnerable populations.

Thank you.

Thank you again for including me in this forum.

The issue we are facing is structural. It goes beyond the immediate conflict.

We must prepare not only for similar crises but for broader shifts in global power and international relations.

At present, we are not fully prepared, and we need to rethink how we approach these challenges.

Thank you.

This forum is not only about oil shocks—it is about economic resilience.

The lesson is clear: we need smarter short-term protection and stronger long-term energy security.

Protect the vulnerable today, and secure supply for tomorrow.

Do not spend scarce public funds trying to make fuel cheaper for everyone. Instead, use resources to protect those most affected and reduce long-term dependence on imported oil.

Thank you.

Thank you very much to our speakers for a very engaging discussion.

We heard insights from the media, government, civil society, and the academe, covering multiple dimensions of this issue.

To synthesize the discussion, we now call on Professor Christian Ray Raimondo.

Good afternoon.

As someone who is not an expert in international relations, I approached this forum with many questions. In many ways, this felt like a crash course in global politics—parang isang semester na pinagsama sa isang hapon.

And that is what made this forum valuable.

It deepened our understanding of the causes, scenarios, and implications of the conflict.

One key takeaway is that this war is not distant from us.

Even if it is geographically far, its effects are felt locally.

This is captured in the forum title: Bato-Bato sa Langit, Ang Tamaan ay Nagalit.

What is thrown into the global arena eventually affects others—including us.

The discussions provided critical geopolitical context, helping us move beyond headlines and understand deeper historical and political dynamics.

They also reminded us to be cautious of misinformation and to rely on credible sources.

Professor Kraft highlighted how disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz affect oil supply, trade, and ultimately prices in the Philippines.

Dr. Tiongco explained how these disruptions translate into higher costs for food, transport, and electricity.

The result is a double burden: rising expenses and weakening incomes.

This shows that even distant conflicts directly impact Filipino households and the national economy.

Overall, the discussions demonstrated that in an interconnected world, no conflict remains isolated.

We are called not only to stay informed, but to think critically and understand context.

Thank you.

We now proceed to the awarding of certificates of appreciation to our speakers.

We also ask participants to complete the evaluation form via the QR code to receive their certificates of participation.

Finally, we call on Dr. Emmanuel M. Luna for the closing remarks.

Thank you to our moderator and all participants.

This forum highlights the importance of creating spaces for discussion and reflection.

We hope that these conversations create ripple effects that reach decision-makers and contribute to meaningful change.

We thank our speakers, organizers, and partners.

We look forward to seeing you again in future activities.

Thank you.

And that concludes our forum.

On behalf of PASCDR, UPRI, PSSC, and KBP, thank you for joining us.

We hope today’s discussion deepened understanding, raised awareness, and encouraged continued dialogue.

Maraming salamat po at magandang hapon sa inyong lahat.