

PHILIPPINE DEFENSE EXPENDITURES AND
THREAT PERCEPTIONS: SIGNIFICANCE
OF THE US ROLE

by

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1. Introduction

National development has been an imperative for all contemporary societies. In its grossest context, it has sustained a universalistic ring as even authoritarian regimes predicate development of all their constituency, without discriminating among their citizens except perhaps as to the rate with which national development might touch the lives of the poorer majority. No greater poverty of ethical thought or failure of political will by ruling authorities may be discerned than in this seductive theory of 'percolated' or trickled down welfare. (For a further exposition of this theme, see Sukhumband and Chai-Anan in Ayooob, 1986: 67-72.)

The core of development theory emphasizes an ethical stance to improve the quality of life of people who must be raised to the status of human beings. Thus, both material and non-material dimensions of life are addressed by developmentalists. Basic human needs are argued in terms of material, physical needs as well as those that pertain to the effective participation of citizens in their political and social milieus. It is ultimately claimed that societies and their various institutions have as a primary task the initiation and maintenance of conditions which make it possible for most citizens to meet these basic needs. (Miranda, 1983: 80 - 84)

Development even in the wealthiest of societies is both goal and process imbedded in a calculus of relative scarcity, where the human and natural resources available for developmental purposes are never enough at any given time. Thus, one of the most pressing inquiries among development-oriented analysts is the effectiveness with which such resources are allocated and utilized towards given objectives.

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This is the context within which discussions of military or defense expenditures often get to be conducted and either appreciated or depreciated. A strong liberal bias against military expenses becomes fortified as the scrutiny of military budgets and other expenditures raises the possibility that much of it might be considered anti-developmental, that is to say, facilitative of social and political conditions which effectively delay the successful confrontation with poverty, ignorance, diseases, and gross social injustice in a given society. In its simplest form, this critique builds on the non-convertibility of guns to butter, of armalites to rice and of bullets to dried, salted fish.

On the other hand, forceful defenses are set up to justify the necessity of military expenditures particularly in developing Third World societies. The main thesis developed here is that the processes of development presume a minimal level of security for such processes to be initiated and sustained. Where peace and order conditions have deteriorated such that economic investments become extremely risky, it would be impossible for a society to anticipate that either local or foreign capital could be enticed to make the appropriate investments. Where the political stability of regimes becomes problematic, it is doubtful that either economic or political resources could be efficiently used for national development programs. In such situations, it is argued, political stabilization and the ensuing improvements in the peace and order situation make it mandatory to assign a significant portion of one's budgetary resources to security ends. (Magno and James Gregor, 1986: *passim*)

It is the purpose of this paper to examine both liberal and conservative suspicions given the Philippines as a case in point for the last two decades. Furthermore, this paper seeks to explore Philippine military spending as it becomes dominated by internal developments (e.g. insurgency) which external actors like the United States increasingly identified as crucial in their own global optics.

The final objective of this paper is to identify a set of recommendations which might optimize military expenditures in a security-threatened society and minimize its vulnerability to external actors who may impose a calculus of security which has little meaning for Filipinos.

2. A Note on Data Bases

Two general sets of data are used for this paper. The first comes from local, Philippine sources, both from the military as well as civilian governmental agencies. This data set is used in an exposition of Philippine military expenditures within a primarily domestic context.

The other set of data comes primarily from standard references used in international monitoring of world military expenditures. The annual publications of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute's (SIPRI) World Armaments and Disarmaments: SIPRI Yearbook, the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency's (ACDA) World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, the International Institute for Strategic Studies' (IISS) The Military Balance and Ruth Sivard's World Military and Social Expenditures are the sources employed in this paper mainly to facilitate an international comparative perspective.

There is no presumption made as regards the greater reliability of one set of data relative to the other. The authors simply wish to emphasize the extreme caution which must attend the utilization of data relating to any military dimension. As a matter of fact, local Philippine sources and international sources of information on the Philippine military do not markedly differ. Or more precisely put, most of the standard international sources are align with most of the official Philippine sources. There is need for adjustment in local data compilations in some cases where some civilian and some military sources may have as much as 20% margins of difference in their figures. (Data provided by the Office of Budget Management and the National Economic and Development Agency on one hand and the Office of Assistant Secretary for Comptrollership, Ministry of National Defense need some reconciliation.)

Among the foreign compendia, the data magnitudes are mostly within relatively narrow ranges at least as far as data on the Philippine military are concerned. (In 1985, however, the ACDA and SIPRI data for Philippine miles in constant dollars are in gross opposition to each other with SIPRI reporting a decrease of 8% and ACDA an increase of 21% in 1979 miles over 1978.) The caveat that is indicated for the local data set is equally legitimate for the international set.

Perhaps this concern is best expressed by the team who labored on the classic work Military Spending: Facts and Figures, Worldwide Implications and Future Outlook in 1983. After noting "(t)he secrecy which surrounds every country's military activities (and) obviously made the data work for this study even more difficult than for the comparable civilian sector," the authors assessed their principal data sources, the SIPRI and ACDA yearbooks thus: "These data and *a fortiori* those that were derived from them must be considered very tentative because of both the disclosure issues surrounding the availability and accuracy of sensitive data and conceptual problems such as evaluating Soviet military purchases in U.S. dollars." (Leontieff, 1983: 13,16) Similar warnings regarding the tentative character of data on military expenditures are to be encountered

in all the major sources of military information publicly accessible. Another recent work, Third World Security Expenditures: A Statistical Compendium, looks exhaustively into the conceptual and technical measurement difficulties attending this area of research. Still, it underscores the problem of accurate and reliable military or security expenditure data as fundamentally a political one. "Governments do not want to provide information or to undertake meaningful negotiations to reduce military expenditures." (Ball, 1986: 26)

3. The Pattern of Philippine Military Expenditures

Between 1972 and 1985, military manpower in the Armed Forces of the Philippines increased 2.54 times, from 62715 to 159466. The ratio of military men to the national population practically doubled, from 1:61 to 2.92 per 1000. Appropriations for the military increased by almost a factor of 7, from P879.41 million to P6132.89 million or an annual average increase of about 54%. On the average, the military annually accounted for about 19% of the total national budget. (See table 1.)

Table 1. The Philippine Military: Manpower Strength, Appropriations, and Appropriations as % of the National Budget and of GNP, 1972-1985

Year	Manpower	Appropriations (Billion Pesos)	% of National Budget	% of GNP
1972	62715	0.9	21	1.7
1973	73500	1.2	23	1.7
1974	101105	2.1	24	2.1
1975	120139	2.9	20	2.5
1976	142450	6.9	25	5.2
1977	146587	5.4	23	3.7
1978	152561	5.8	20	3.2
1979	146068	5.6	17	2.6
1980	146400	5.7	15	2.2
1981	149065	7.1	14	2.3
1982	149107	8.3	15	2.5
1983	154773	8.8	14	2.6
1984	151051	8.4	16	1.6
1985	159466	7.9	14	1.3

Source: Office of the Minister of National Defense (OMND), "MOND Statistical Data: Appropriation: Defense," 1986, p. 3.

Military build-up was most marked between 1972 and 1978 when the defense portion of the national budget was at least 20% and the military manpower had already increased by 2.43 times. This period witnessed the declaration of martial law by President Marcos in 1972 and the subsequent rebellion by Muslim secessionists in the Southern Philippines, a challenge to the central government abetted by foreign powers. The 1976 Tripoli agreement between the secessionist Moro National Liberation Front and the Philippine government provided a brief respite in hostilities. Within a year of the agreement, however, mutual charges of bad faith led to the resumption of conflict and the MNLF since then has continued its struggle albeit at deescalating scale. (See table 2.)

Table 2. MNLF Personnel Strength and Firearms (1973-1985)

Year	Regulars	Firearms
1973	14,100	9,200
1974	14,000	9,100
1975	9,300	6,000
1976	6,900	4,300
1977	21,200	13,500
1978	20,000	13,000
1979	13,325	7,790
1980	16,000	12,000
1981	14,569	10,193
1982	13,149	7,500
1983	11,190	6,940
1984	9,179	5,739
1985	8,099	5,336

Sources: OMND, "MOND STATISTICAL DATA: ST/FA",
1986, p. 5.

During this period, the communist rebellion was largely militarily insignificant although successful communist organizational work in the latter half of the seventies increasingly made the left the more serious challenge to the Philippine authorities. The impact of communist insurgency was increasingly felt from 1978, reflected by the increasing number of reported encounters between the New People's Army, the military arm of the Communist Party of the Philippines, and units of the Philippine military. Most of these encounters were initiated by the insurgents employing initially team size groups

but later moving to company size formations. (See tables 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, and 2.4.) geographic scope of their operations also expanded to include practically all provinces of the country. By 1983, some estimates acknowledged their effective control in over 20% of the country's 40,000 barangays (the smallest politico-administrative unit equivalent to the barrio). (Miranda in May and Nemenzo, 1985: 95-97.)

Table 2.1 Incidence of CPF/NPA Armed Activities (1980 - 1985)

Year	Number	Year	Number
1973	278	1980	880
1974	406	1981	1195
1975	515	1982	1726
1976	425	1983	2430
1977	411	1984	3720
1978	548	1985	3877
1979	753		

Source: Office of the Minister of National Defense (OMND), "MOND Statistical Table: STS," p.6.

Military build-up was thus resumed by 1983, with an all-time record budget for the military matched by a comparable increase in military manpower. (See table 1.) From 1983 to the time of Marcos' fall in February 1986, although defense appropriations fell due largely to the recessionary economic conditions, military manpower levels had been largely maintained at record levels. There was a growing suspicion that such force levels were indicated not so much by the urgency of the communist threat as the deposed leader's recognition that popular disaffection with his rule had become so widespread. A large part of the military was not committed to fighting the communist guerrillas in the field but was deployed in Metro Manila and nearby areas where they could be availed of to neutralize elements presumably hostile to Marcos. (Ramos, 1986:4)

Table 2.2 Estimated CPF/NPA Strength and Armaments

Year	Regulars	Firearms
1969	250	300
1970	245	240
1971	500	700
1972	1,320	1,520
1973	1,900	1,515
1974	1,800	1,600
1975	1,800	1,620
1976	1,200	1,000
1977	2,300	1,700
1978	2,760	1,900
1979	4,908	1,960
1980	5,621	2,843
1981	6,013	2,546
1982	7,000	2,500
1983	8,900	4,620
1984	10,570	8,351
1985	15,978	10,125
May 1986	16,018	11,179

Source: OMND, "MOND Statistical Data: ST/FA", 1986, p. 4.

Table 2.3 Number of Incidents Reported by Source Document, Philippines, 1977-1982 (Annual Totals)

Year	Bulletin Today		Daily Express		Times Journal		WE Forum	New York Times		Economic Review		Total
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%			
1977	89	36.2	69	28.0	69	28.0	0	7	2.8	11	4.9	245
1978	69	27.5	63	25.1	112	44.6	1	.4	6	2.4	0	251
1979	120	44.8	57	21.3	83	31.0	2	.7	0	6	2.2	268
1980	169	44.8	68	18.0	128	34.0	5	1.3	2	.5	5	377
1981	330	47.9	117	17.0	225	32.8	3	.4	2	.3	11	688
1982	414	48.6	150	17.6	259	30.4	10	1.2	6	.7	13	852

Source: News reports from sources identified above

Table 2.4 Number of Reported Incidents by Initiation,
Philippines, 1977-1982 (Annual Totals)

Year	By Government		By Enemy		Chance Encounters		By Others		Total
		%		%		%		%	
1977	47	19.2	115	46.9	66	26.9	17	6.9	245
1978	38	15.1	140	55.8	57	22.7	16	6.4	251
1979	54	20.1	120	44.8	82	30.6	12	4.5	268
1980	78	20.7	188	49.9	74	19.6	37	9.8	377
1981	186	27.0	346	50.3	64	9.3	92	13.4	688
1982	208	24.4	442	51.9	145	17.0	57	6.7	852

Source: News reports from sources identified in table 2.3 (above)

3.1 A Closer Look into Philippine Military Expenditures

The Philippine military expanded greatly during the martial law period, particularly in comparison with the pre-martial law military of the 50's and the 60's. Yet, this expansion must not be overdramatized. There are indicators suggesting that in terms of budgeted expenditures, the military growth tended to stabilize, indeed even to minimize from 1977 to date. (See table 3, below.) In real terms, the military budget as a percentage of GNP decreased from a high of 3.09% in 1976 to 0.90% in 1985. Military expenditures per capita were a high P53 in 1976 and a low P15 in 1985. Average appropriation per soldier had a generally rising pattern up to 1977, but had precipitously declined in real terms since then. By 1985, appropriations per soldier had declined to less than 1/3 of 1977 and 2/5 of 1972. From 1972 to 1986, under Marcos, military pay shrunk in real terms by 38 to 45% of 1972 pay even as nominally the pay rose by over 300%. (See table 3.1) Behind these figures lies a lot of explanations as to why, despite a public misunderstanding of the military as having been pampered by Marcos through a series of well publicized salary increases, great disaffection among the ranks focus on military pay.

Table 3. Philippine GNP and Military Expenditures, Millex Per Soldier/Per capita (Constant 1972 Pesos) and % of GNP

Year	GNP (millions)	Millex (millions)	Per Soldier (thousands)	Per Capita (pesos)	% of GNP
1972	55526	801	12.8	20.6	1.44
1973	50881	942	12.8	23.5	1.53
1974	54739	1102	10.9	26.8	1.70
1975	68530	1591	13.2	37.8	2.32
1976	72718	2248	15.8	51.8	3.09
1977	77789	2346	16.0	52.6	3.01
1978	83070	2076	13.6	45.3	2.50
1979	88736	1860	12.7	39.5	2.09
1980	92629	1567	10.7	32.6	1.69
1981	96041	1532	10.3	31.0	1.58
1982	97539	1486	10.0	29.3	1.52
1983	98767	1522	9.8	29.3	1.54
1984	93584	1109	7.3	20.8	1.18
1985	89885	809	5.1	14.8	0.90

Sources: 1. NEDA, "Philippine Statistical Yearbook," 1985, pp. 24, 37, 184 and 185.
2. OMND, "OMND Statistical Data: Funds," 1986, p.2.

Table 3.1. Average Monthly Pay and Allowance of AFP Personnel, 1972/1986 (Constant 1972 Pesos)

Year	General Rank	Field Grade	Company Grade	NCO*	Lower Four**
1972	2929	1710	978	621	534
1986	1222	710	443	270	232
Change	-38%	-42%	-45%	-44%	-43%

Source: Computed from data provided by the OMND

*Staff sergeant to Master sergeant

**Private to sergeant

A critical examination of Philippine levels of military expenditures (milex) must also undertake a comparative survey of national milex by other countries. For this purpose, one may use the data conveniently provided by the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) in its 1985 yearbook. ACDA 1985 has comprehensive statistical information for 1973 to 1983 covering practically all the countries of the world and, where milex is provided, plots in constant 1982 dollars. Table 4 (below) summarizes the relevant information computed from this ACDA data.

Table 4. Military Expenditures/GNP/CGE/PerCapita/Armed Forces per 1000 People and GNP Per Capita (Average Annual Values, 1973-1983)

Unit	ME/GNP (%)	ME/CGE (%)	ME Per Capita (1982 \$\$\$\$)	Armed Forces Per 1000 People	GNP Per Capita (1982 \$\$\$\$)
World	5.8	18.9	155	5.6	2659
Developing	5.8	20.5	42	5.1	743
East Asia	3.8	19.0	37	5.5	973
ASEAN	3.8	17.4	74	7.0	1573
Indonesia	3.4	14.9	15	1.8	464
Malaysia	4.7	14.0	69	6.2	1441
Philippines	2.3	15.9	15	2.9	693
Singapore	5.4	21.1	250	19.0	4635
Thailand	3.4	19.9	22	3.2	633

Source: ACDA, 1985, pp. 47-88.

In terms of milex as a proportion of GNP, the Philippine average for 1973-1983 compares very favorably within its immediate area of ASEAN, its general region East Asia, its general grouping the Developing countries and the World as a whole. Its milex ratio of 2.3% of GNP is the lowest in ASEAN and only about 40% that of all developing countries taken as a group.

As a proportion of central government expenditures for the same period, the Philippine ratio of 15.9% is the third highest in ASEAN but is also below the ASEAN average (17.4%) due to the much higher ratios of Singapore (21.1%) and Thailand (19.9%). The ASEAN average is much lower than that of East Asia (19.0%), the Developing countries (20.5%), or the World (18.9%)

Milex per capita is another comparative index. With Indonesia, the Philippines again ranks as the lowest in ASEAN, its \$15 milex per capita being about a fifth of the ASEAN average, less than half East Asia's, slightly over a third of Developing countries' and less than a tenth of the World's average milex per capita from 1973 to 1983.

Finally, one may examine the ratio of military men to the total country population. Only Indonesia has a lower ratio (1.8 per 1000 people) than the Philippines (2.9). The ASEAN average (7.0) is more than double that of the Philippines. It bears noting that the ASEAN average is significantly higher than those of East Asia (5.5), the Developing countries (5.1) and the World (5.6).

Philippine Milex and Militarization

There has been a growing concern in the last two decades regarding the trend towards militarization of political regimes particularly in the Third World. It has been pointed out that the proportion of military or military controlled governments has increased tremendously. In 1960, 22 out of the 78 independent nation-states were controlled by the military; by 1985, 57 of the 114 countries surveyed by Ruth Sivard were "militarized governments." (Sivard, 1985: 25) The Philippines was listed as one of these 57 countries.

It is difficult to understand how the Philippines even under Marcos could pass for a military-controlled government. Sivard's criteria for this type of government are "(k)ey political leadership by military officers; existence of a state of martial law; extra-judicial authority exercised by security forces; lack of central political control over armed forces; (and) occupation by foreign military forces. (*Ibid.*, 24)

If the criteria must all be met for the operationalization to be acceptable, the first, fourth and fifth properties are questionable in the Philippine case. The second and the third attributes are either demanded formally or dynamically, regardless of whether formal declarations existed or not. Formally, martial law was lifted in the Philippines in 1981 and, as regards extra-judicial authority, this was grossly minimized by 1983, when most of the cases involving civilians handled by the military tribunals were turned over to civilian courts. Dynamically, martial law conditions, states of siege and national emergencies might exist without necessarily implying that the civilian political authority has lost control over the military. The Philippines is an excellent case illustrating this point.

The point might sound academic or even sophistic. Yet, it is necessary to be very clear regarding the operational meaning

of "military-controlled government." While the military became very influential during the Marcos years, largely as a result of Marcos' realization that it was useful as one of several political bases, the military did not rise to controller function level. Civilian politicians, Marcos being only the shrewdest and eventually the dominant politician courted and kept politicized military men but maintained their grip over effective political power. (Perhaps, political controller status would have been gained by some military men if Marcos had died in office or had been deposed without so much public or mass intervention. But while Marcos was around, the most politicized within the military continued to regard him as their patron.)

In exercises involving international comparisons, Philippine milex figures are difficult to use to demonstrate either military control or militarization as usually indicated through a cluster of milex-related indicators. The ACDA indicators of militarization is a case in point. Four militarization indicators are submitted: "the ratios of military expenditures to GNP, to central government expenditures, and per capita, and of armed forces per 1000 people." (ACDA: 1985, 16-17) Using this approach and relying on ACDA data for 1973 to 1983, the Philippines comes off well in comparison with developing country regions and ASEAN in particular. (See table 5.)

Table 5. Relative Militarization Indicators, By Selected Developing Regions and Countries, 1973-1983 (All value figures in constant 1982 dollars)

Region	Armed Forces per 1000 Population	M % of GNP	I % of Govt. Expenditures	L Dollars per Capita	E Per Military Member (x \$1000)	X
World	6.2	5.8	20.6	157.0	24.8	
Developing	5.1	6.3	20.5	38.4	8.5	
Africa	3.1	4.0	13.9	33.0	10.8	
Latin America	4.6	1.7	6.6	29.3	7.0	
Middle East	13.7	13.9	30.0	386.3	28.2	
South Asia	2.5	3.3	18.0	6.4	3.1	
East Asia	5.5	3.8	18.9	36.8	6.8	
ASEAN	7.2	3.8	17.1	74.4	7.3	
Indonesia	1.8	3.5	14.9	15.4	2.3	
Malaysia	6.2	4.7	14.0	69.0	11.0	
Philippines	2.9	2.2	15.8	15.3	5.5	
Singapore	19.0	5.3	21.0	250.0	13.7	
Thailand	5.2	3.4	19.9	21.8	4.2	

Source: Computed from regional and country data available in ACDA 1985, pp.47-88

In three out of four ACDA militarization indicators (armed forces per 1000 population, milex as a percentage of GNP and milex per capita), the Philippines emerges as among the lowest raters, with values that are far below regional averages. This is particularly notable since its own immediate region (ASEAN) rates fairly high (second with 7.2) in armed forces per 1000 population and (second with \$74.4) in milex per capita. Even the Philippines' 15.8 % annual average share of central government expenditures is below the ASEAN average which is pulled up by the relatively high investments made by Singapore and Thailand in strengthening their military.

Another milex statistic which might be used to analyze military build-up is milex per military member. Again the Philippine value (\$5.5 thousand) is below the ASEAN average for the period 1973-1983 as well as practically all the other regions of the developing world. The only exception is South Asia, with a lower regional value of \$3.1 thousand.

Of the militarization indicators, the acknowledged "most comprehensive gauge of a country's militarization" is share of GNP accounted for by the military sector. (ACDA, 1985: 17) In the years 1973-1983, the Philippine proportion of milex to GNP has not kept up with those of its ASEAN colleagues; its annual average (2.2% of GNP) is the lowest in the region, being less than 60% of the ASEAN value (3.6% of GNP) for the same period.

This review of the relationship between military expenditures and militarization reveals the inadequacy of an international comparative approach in monitoring the militarization of specific national societies. Specially in cases where the levels of military build-up started from historically low bases (e.g. in the Philippines), militarization is better indicated by case studies which explore intensively the military's role in the nation's political and economic developments. Such studies could probe into national milexes as well as manpower and hardware build-up through time too, but to demonstrate the increasing conjunction of political and military power other approaches would be more suitable.

In the Philippine case, militarization studies would do well to emphasize the dynamics of politicization of the military, the modes through which civilian political leaders access senior military officials and ensure their loyalties, the trend towards displacement of civilian officials by military men, the trend towards increasing human rights violations, and the growing tendency for the military sector to become more and more independent of civilian institutional control. While quantitative data and analysis are of great importance in such studies, the primary demand is a qualitative examination of structures, processes and even personalities. (Some of the recent efforts in this direction are the publications of Abinales (1982), Hernandez (1983), Miranda (1985), Niksch (1983) and Zwick (1982).)

4. Development and Defense

This review shows the relatively low levels of Philippine milex compared with other countries. It has also indicated how, within the Philippines, one may point to a decreasing level of milex in real terms as well as in per capita (general population) and per soldier appropriations. One may well ask, however, how this level of milex compares to other expenditures in the non-military sectors of the Philippines. This interest could be pursued guided by the premise that a trade-off largely obtains between military and non-military fund obligations, i.e. what is spent for the military sector is what other non-military sectors have to forego and vice-versa. This may be considered a simplistic assumption, but it still serves the purpose of liberal analysis which is essentially critical of overblown military budgets and unreasonable military expenditures.

In terms of budgetary allocation for several selected ministries (education, health, labor and employment and social services development) with distinct investments in human resources development and utilization, the ministry of national defense may be seen as having a bigger share of the national budget than all the other four combined. The annual average share of the national budget accounted for by national defense from 1975 to 1986 is 17.42%; education, health, labor and employment, and social services and development show 9.59%, 4.07%, 0.31% and 0.43% respectively, or a combined total of 14.40%. (See table 6.)

In terms of comparative growth rates, while the national budget for the same period 1975-86 grew at an annual average of 5%, national defense increased by 7%, education and culture by 2%, health also by 2%, labor and employment decreased by 6% and only social services at 9% did better than defense. (It bears noting that the base budget of social services in constant 1972 pesos was only 1/50 that of defense.) The biggest annual rates of increase for defense occurred in 1975 (119%) and in 1980 (65%); the increase in 1976 was at the height of the Muslim uprising in Southern Philippines and that for 1980 was at the time the CPP/NPA's increasing capability to engage the military in multiple encounters had become manifest.

The emerging image of a very active military budget is somewhat alleviated when one undertakes sectoral classification of government expenditures for the period 1975 to 1985.

Table 6. Comparative Budgets: National Government, Defense and Other Selected Ministries, 1975 - 1986 (Current Million Pesos)

Year	National Government		National Defense		Education & Culture		Health		Employment		Social Services Development	
		% of NGB		% of NGB		% of NGB		% of NGB		% of NGB		% of NGB
1975	14399	2900	20.00	1643	11.33	536	4.39	71	.49	59	.39	
1976	27919	6960	24.93	1563	5.59	926	3.22	140	.50	73	.26	
1977	23759	5380	22.65	1857	7.82	893	3.76	115	.48	78	.33	
1978	28781	5845	20.38	3407	11.88	1070	3.73	125	.43	105	.37	
1979	32226	5579	17.31	3652	11.33	1574	4.88	120	.37	111	.34	
1980	37984	5684	15.00	3414	9.01	1431	3.78	87	.22	123	.33	
1981	50319	7107	14.13	3827	7.61	1802	3.58	95	.19	149	.30	
1982	57091	8312	14.56	4387	7.68	2150	3.77	118	.21	175	.31	
1983	61837	8808	14.24	5472	8.85	2661	4.30	133	.22	415	.67	
1984	53450	8419	15.75	5513	10.50	2272	4.25	116	.22	349	.65	
1985	58329	7888	13.52	6146	10.54	2425	4.16	123	.21	359	.61	
1986	67409	11205	16.62	871	12.92	3391	5.03	153	.22	423	.63	
Average			17.42		9.89		4.07		.312		.43	

Source: OMND, "MOND Statistical Data: National Defense Budget," 1986, p.1.

*NGB: National Government Budget

Average annual share of the national budget accounted for by national defense was only 14% for the period cited. In comparison, the other sectors had much larger shares of the national budget: economic services, 36%; social services, 22%; and general public services, 27%. (See table 7.)

The national defense share peaked in 1977, suffered a drastic cut in 1978 and since then has declined to single-digit shares two years running, 1984 and 1985.

Table 7. National Government Expenditures, By Sector, 1975-1985 (In Current Million Pesos)

Year	National Government	National Defense	Economic Services		Social Services		General Public Services*		
			% Share	% Share	% Share	% Share			
1975	19049	3982	20.90	8672	45.52	3615	18.97	2790	14.59
1976	22332	3921	17.55	7921	35.46	4645	20.79	5845	26.17
1977	22597	5121	22.66	7803	34.53	4965	21.97	4708	20.83
1978	27597	3552	12.90	10616	38.57	6108	22.19	7242	26.31
1979	32884	4738	14.40	13370	40.65	6879	20.91	7897	24.01
1980	36935	4760	12.88	15721	42.56	7577	20.51	8877	24.03
1981	47072	5125	10.88	18353	38.96	9537	20.26	14057	29.86
1982	48792	3552	11.37	17699	36.27	10933	22.40	14608	29.93
1983	52123	6586	12.63	16040	30.77	13738	26.35	16279	31.23
1984	60403	5586	9.24	16160	26.75	16169	26.76	22488	37.22
1985	74101	6342	8.55	22145	29.88	17712	23.90	27902	37.65
Average (1975-1985)			13.99	36.35		22.27		27.43	

* Including debt service.

Source: Computed from data available in NEDA 1985 Statistical Yearbook, Phils., 1985, pp. 594-595.

Sectoral expenditures growth rates, in constant 1972 pesos, were negative for both national defense and economic services. Their annual average growth rates were -6% and -5% respectively, with the biggest single year depreciation being in 1984, -43% for defense and -31% for economic services. (See table 8.) 1984 was indeed an Orwellian year for Filipinos, with the economy turned recessionary after vast capital flight attended the assassination of former Senator Benigno Aquino, and massive protest rallies and demonstrations shook the Marcos regime to its foundations. (The Revolution of February 1986 was, in a manner of speaking, the major aftershock which tumbled down the already tottering Marcos government.)

4.1. The Calculus of Development and Security

The data presented so far provides a historical scenario where a significant proportion of national expenditures served military rather than directly civilian ends, or following our simplifying assumption, covered military rather than development objectives. Several points of observation are now in order.

A. Much of these military expenditures, even as they might have been induced by the need of Marcos to expand, strengthen and illegitimately politicized the military to serve his political ambitions were probably indicated for the 1970s and 1980s as some issues of Philippine society became more and more incapable of ordinary political management and increasingly demanded confrontational resolution. The declaration of martial law in 1972 indeed had as its operational setting the progressive organization of populist forces in various sectors of the Philippine economy as well as the increasing capability of political dissidents to challenge the regime and its authorities. The significant increase in union organization and their membership, together with their tendency towards more militant forms of worker struggle, has been amply documented. Similar

Table 8. Distribution of National Government Expenditures, 1975-1984 (In Constant 1972 Million Pesos)

Year	Economic Services	% Change	Social Services	% Change	National Defense	% Change	General Public Services*	% Ch.
1975	5203		2168		2388		1667	
1976	4340	-17	2545	17	2148	-10	3202	92
1977	3934	-9	2503	-2	2582	20	2374	-26
1978	4951	25	2848	14	1656	-35	2377	42
1979	5369	8	2762	-3	1902	15	3171	+6
1980	5493	2	4647	+4	1663	-13	3101	-2
1981	5804	5	3015	14	1620	-3	4445	43
1982	5146	-11	3179	5	1614	0	4274	-4
1983	4177	-19	3577	13	1715	6	4239	0
1984	2812	-31	2813	+1	972	-43	3913	8
	===	===	===	===	===	===	===	===
Average(1975-1984)	-5			-3		-6		13

* (Including debt service)

Source: Current figures taken from NEDA 1985 Statistical Yearbook, Phils., 1985, pp.594-595.

Constant 1972 figures computed based on Implicit Index Numbers for GNP, NEDA Statistical Yearbook, 1985, pp.180-181.

organizational activity characterized peasant and student sectors. And, one must not forget, the historical complaints of the many disadvantaged minority groups, foremost among them the Muslims, had recurred with greater and greater severity in Philippine history. This potent political brew would have eventually exploded.

B. The drive towards oligarchical supremacy by lead political actors in the Philippines, Marcos being *primus inter pares* and no more, required the firm management of the multiple, democratizing challenges to the political oligarchical regime. The military was a convenient and necessary instrument of the politically ambitious. With the declaration of martial law, the military was increasingly resorted to by civilian authorities to undertake local pacification campaigns. Workers had to be intimidated, peasants had to be cowed, students and other academics had to be stigmatized with subversion and other sectors of society which sympathized with these people increasingly found themselves harassed and even single-mindedly persecuted. The military under Marcos had become, in the words of the durable Minister of National Defense, Juan Ponce Enrile, "a private army of the political leadership ... (where) the loyalty of the military organization was to a person, in the person of President Marcos and the military clique that surrounded him" (Enrile, 1986: 2) These sentiments are echoed by the new Chief of Staff, General Fidel Ramos, who critically pointed out that "... in the past regime, military resources were used to protect the President; the Governor, the Mayor, (and) the cronies often to the neglect of the common people." (Ramos, 1986: 13)

C. The 1970s and the first half of the 1980s proved the permeability of the military to political manipulation. The resources that were plowed into military budgets over the past two decades unfortunately largely secured the interests of the regime authorities and not that of the nation's. The circle was a vicious one: historical circumstances which translated into so much social, economic and political inequities bred political authorities whose survival and dominance depended on a military built up to maintain conditions which led to greater inequities which fueled the threats against the political oligarchy, etc., etc.

D. In the course of maintaining national security narrowly and foolishly construed as the security of the regime authorities, military men found themselves increasingly alienated from the people. The necessity to build on the people, as even Machiavelli acknowledges in his classic, *The Prince*, has become a staple item in the speeches of lead military men nowadays. General Ramos acknowledges a vital change in military orientation regarding national security: "We have ... redefined security to mean the security of the people and not just the security of Metro Manila, not just the security of the families of high government officials, and the security of a general; as was previously practiced in the past (Marcos) regime." (Ramos, 1986: 4)

In assessing the military expenditures undertaken by the Philippine government in the last two decades, a conclusion is inevitable: that while their levels relative to other countries cannot be criticized too much, Philippine military expenditures could not have contributed much to developmental ends as long as political oligarchs like those of the overthrown regime appropriated, allocated, released and subsequently expropriated military funds for their personal and direct political interests. Filipinos appear to realize this only too well. In a recent public opinion poll conducted by the Social Weather Stations with Ateneo University, even as a majority (52%) affirms that a great improvement has taken place in the military in the quarter immediately after the February, 1986 revolution, a plurality (38%) still thinks it is a good idea to reduce the size and the budget of the military. The ground for this belief appears to be the plurality (36%) perception that there are high military officials who think of wresting away power from the present Aquino government and establishing themselves as the political controllers. (Miranda in Ateneo and Social Weather Stations, 1986: 28.)

5. The Philippines and the United States: Collaborative Security

A prominent security dimension has been characteristic of Philippine-American relations specially after the second World War. The experience of Filipinos during the Japanese occupation and later their participation in the Korean and Vietnam Wars have inclined them to look up to the United States as a natural ally, even a positively viewed, avuncular Uncle Sam.

The reservoir of goodwill reaches deeper yet, into political, economic and cultural institutions which indicate the closeness of Filipinos to Americans. The primary political institutions, including the military, are largely modeled after American institutions; the economic system depends for much of its growth on effective access to preferential American markets; the sociocultural institutions (as in the case of the educational, media and advertising networks) reflect much of their American background and sources, and generally speaking, as Americans feel least disoriented moving into the Philippines among other country possibilities, Filipinos feel much less culture shock relative to other Asians when entering the United States.

One cannot overestimate the extent of psychological closeness which Filipinos generally feel for their former colonial masters. As an astute observer, a Filipino political scientist, was moved to remark, Philippine - American relations have become much too close for comfort and much too special for self-respect. The inevitable result of such familiarity was not contempt but an increasing inability of many Filipinos to dissociate Filipino from American interests.

In many cases, this closeness with their former colonial masters raised suspicions about Filipinos and their 'Asianness'. On the other hand, some of the most influential Filipinos looked at their position vis-a-vis the Americans as a distinct advantage which permitted them to be bridgers of the presumed gaps between the West and those who were largely exploited by the western powers as the latter's colonies. Philippine foreign policy continues to have as one of its major challenges this resolution of the tension between its geographic position as an Asian nation and its historical tradition of close association with the West.

Philippine-American Security Network

The security network involving the Philippines and the United States embraces the Military Bases Agreement (MBA) and the Military Assistance Pact (MAP), both of 1947, the Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) of 1951 and the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Organization of 1954, better known as SEATO. The latter has lost its viability as a regional defense organization and for practical purposes, Philippine-American security relations are currently defined by the MBA with its various amendments, the MAP and the MDT.

The MAP, an adjunct to the MBA, committed the United States to provide the Philippine military with assistance and training, essential services, arms, equipment, supplies, naval vessels and aircraft most of which were initially to be furnished "gratuitously" but with later transfers subject to reimbursement by the Philippines on terms supposedly mutually agreeable to both parties. The MAP constrained the Philippines, without the agreement of the United States, from procuring military hardware and ammunition from other countries. Neither could the Philippines engage or accept the services of any personnel of any other government other than the United States for any kind of duty associated with the Philippine military. That Filipinos accepted this kind of infringement on their national sovereignty (with a host of other curtailments) in the early post-war years indicates not so much the difficulties of a people reconstructing one of the most devastated countries in the last war, as their great confidence in American intentions regarding the Philippines. (In 1986, thirty-seven years after the war, this reservoir of goodwill and perhaps even naive trust in the United States apparently continues. In the same nationwide survey referred to earlier, 56% of respondents affirmed that what the US government wants to happen in the Philippines is good for Filipinos.)

The MDT was a bilateral agreement for the parties concerned to help each other in case of an external armed attack on either one. No automatic retaliatory or defensive response was built into the treaty; common dangers were to be responded to in accordance with each party's "constitutional processes". The MDT may be summarily noted as one leg of Philippine - American security arrangements, the other one being the MBA.

The MBA, in its latest amended form, grants the United States the right to base American military facilities in several areas of the Philippines and to conduct unhampered military operations of US forces in these areas. The major US facilities are in Clark Air Base in Pampanga and Subic Naval Base in Zambales. These two bases are considered to be among the most important of those constituting the American overseas operations. Clark Air Base is the headquarters of the US Thirteenth Air Force, reputed to be a core component of the US Pacific Air Forces. It can operate and service practically any aircraft in the US air force, including those with known nuclear weapons capability. Subic Naval Base, on the other hand, services the US Seventh Fleet, providing it with administrative and logistic support. Subic's Ship Repair Facility, according to a recent American backgrounder on the bases, "has three floating drydocks and can accomplish almost any task performed at naval shipyards in the United States - work ranging from major structural repairs to complete overhaul of a ship's engine." (Jenista, ed., 1986:13)

In return for the use of the bases, the Americans provide economic and military assistance which in 1979-1984 would have amounted to \$500 million; an amendment in 1982 increased the American commitment to \$900 million for 1985-1989. The American "aid" (which Filipinos insist must be viewed as "rentals") are in the form of economic support funds (ESF), foreign military sales (FMS) credits and grants through the military assistance pact (MAP).

From 1950 to 1985, a sizeable amount of security support or assistance has been provided by the United States to the Philippines through the various security programs. Around 1.3 billion dollars had been given in the form of FMS, MAP and IMETP (International Military Education Training Program) awards during this period. (See table 9.)

Table 9. U.S. Security Assistance to the Philippines, 1950 - 1985. (All values in thousand dollars except number of IMETP students)

Item	1950-75	%	1976-85	%	1950-85
FMS	41,414	14.3	247,997	85.7	289,411
MAP	487,518	77.1	144,850	22.9	632,368
ESF*			340,000	100.0	340,000
IMETP	31,712	76.5	8,817	23.5	41,529
cost					
IMETP students	15,609	86.4	2,562	13.6	18,071

Source: Department of Defense Security Assistance Agency, "Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military Construction Sales and Military Assistance Factor," 1985, pp.2-3, 52-53, & 76-77.

Of total FMS from 1950 to 1985, 14% were given between 1950 and 1975; the other 86% was provided in 1976-1985. On the other hand, the outright grants in the form of MAP awards diminished, with 77% of MAP granted before 1976 and only 23% then or later. The highest allocations of MAP for the last ten years were made in 1980, 1981 and 1985, with each year accounting for about \$25 million each. A similar situation obtained as regards funds assigned to IMETP; the smaller share (23.5%) came in the last ten years. (The number of people training under IMETP auspices reflects this relative diminution of training funds available. Only 2562 students were taken in during 1976-1985, whereas 15609 were able to avail of IMETP funds from 1950 to 1975.)

Relative to other ASEAN countries, however, the security assistance which the Philippines was receiving belied the validity of "close and special" relations with the United States. The Philippines ranked only third among the recipients of American security assistance. Thailand, considered a frontline state in the context of Indochinese regional politics, had almost four times the aid or assistance the Philippines was getting. Singapore also rated higher than the Philippines, with its FMS credits making Singapore the second preferred object of American security assistance in the region. (See table 10.)

Table 10. U.S. Security Assistance to ASEAN, 1950 - 1985
(Thousand Dollars)

Country	FMS	MAP	IMETP	Total
Philippines	289,411	632,368	41,529	963,308
Indonesia	373,616	192,511	39,825	605,952
Malaysia	175,230	-	7,278	182,508
Singapore	1,131,926	-	202	1,132,128
Thailand	2,347,741	1,165,143	84,215	3,597,099

Source: Department of Defense Security Assistance Agency, "Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military Construction Sales and Military Assistance Facts" 1985, pp. 2-3, 52-53, and 76-77.

Threat Perceptions

The security network that has evolved over the years binding the United States and the Philippines ever closer was definitely facilitated by the factors discussed in the introductory part of section 5 (above). Yet, it is necessary to explore the historical context of threat perceptions which sustained this web of security arrangements. For purposes of analysis, one may discern three historical stages when specific threat perceptions influenced the collaborative tendencies of the two countries.

A. The First Stage (1946 - 1972): Cold War Threat Perception. This period represented the closest conjunction of perceptions by both countries as regards the nature of the threats to their respective securities. The communist threat as it was reflected in the Hukbalahap movement seeking to overthrow the Manila government, the rise of the communists to power in Eastern Europe and China, the Korean War, and the Indochinese conflict bound the United States and the Philippines into a common policy of communist containment. The unity of threat perception, as well as the reality of a war-devastated Philippines, led to American collaboration with, and at times, direction of the Philippine political and military responses to the Huks as well as external communist threats.

The apex of American dominance in this first stage was indicated by the activities of the Joint US Military Advisory Group (JUSMAG) in directing the effort at reorganizing the Philippine military to cope with the Huk insurgency. It may also be indicated by the kind of influence which an American military adviser wielded over both political and military affairs largely through President Magsaysay, the popular anti-Huk fighter.

With the consolidation of communist control over Eastern Europe and the hardening of spheres of influence in Korea, Taiwan and some parts of Indochina, American influence over Philippine political and military affairs decreased relative to the 40s, and the 50s although it remained quite high. An indicator of this relative decrease in American influence was the less than enthusiastic Philippine response in the early 60s for Philippine combatants to join the Americans in Vietnam. However, one should not make too much of this temporary diminution of American influence; by 1965, with the rise of Marcos to the Presidency, support for American intervention in Vietnam turned out to be much easier for them to negotiate and secure.

Towards the end of the 60s, the rise of the Communist Party of the Philippines and its eventual linkage with the New People's Army reactivated a strong Philippine concern with communist insurgency. The Americans who were at the height of their involvement in Vietnam increasingly found Philippine authorities more receptive as regards collaborative measures in the fight with the communists, in Vietnam as well as in the Philippines.

B. The Second Stage (1972 - 1978): Martial Law Period. The declaration of martial law in 1972 highlighted the significance of American influences in Philippine threat perception and response determination. The dramatic rise of insurgent activities and the attending deterioration of peace and order conditions, inviting firmer, authoritarian interventions by Filipino political leaders, partly led to the declaration of martial law, apparently with the blessings of the American authorities.

American ability to grossly influence the process of threat perception in the Philippines was markedly diminished during this period too. The Watergate charges against Nixon and his staff leading to a preoccupation with domestic politics, the fall of Vietnam and a strong isolationist backlash in the United States, as well as the rise of the oil cartel countries providing convenient alternative focuses of political and economic leverage --all of these conspired to at least temporarily reduce the American ability to influence Philippine threat perception.

On the other hand, the Philippines had to face a full pledged Muslim rebellion requiring so much military resources in a hurry. Unwilling to be drawn into this conflict, the Americans failed to provide the Philippine military with needed arms and logistics. The Philippines procured the necessary arms and supplies from other sources. This period taught Filipino authorities one clear lesson. The Americans would act only when it is fully consonant with their clearly perceived national interests. Against the communists, American help was largely reliable and forthcoming; against other forms of threats, it was possible for the Americans to be much less than enthusiastic about helping.

C. Third Stage (1979 to the Present): Repeating the Cold War. The most current among the three historical stages of threat perceptions involving the Philippines and the United States promises to re-unify what could have been slowly diverging perceptions of national security threats. Given the clarity of President Reagan's strategic vision; a hard line policy of communist containment (and even more, as indicated by his willingness to try recovering countries like Nicaragua from what he perceives to be communist domination) has become Washington's trademark. The Carter type of foreign policy, visionary, idealistic and liberal has been so thoroughly replaced. In places like the Philippines, American spokesmen from the State Department, Defense and the American Embassy in Manila refer repeatedly to Reagan's foreign policy as having "three organizing concepts ... (which are) that a foreign policy should be founded on a basis of realism; second, that it should be founded on the basis of strength; and third, that it should be dedicated and committed to progress and search for peaceful solutions." (Bosworth, 1984: 3)

"Realism" acknowledges that "as a country with global interests, (Americans) have no alternative but to be a country with a global foreign policy." (*Ibid.*) Furthermore, it also means recognizing that Americans are living in a world with so many gray areas; a world becoming more and more disorderly; a world where Americans do not have full control.

"Strength" has both economic and military components, but there is gross emphasis on the latter. The rebuilding of American military strength, reversing its deterioration

immediately after the Vietnam War, is supposed to be one of the greatest achievements of Reagan.

Realism and strength sum up the formula for peace, the third component of this foreign policy of hard-nosed anticommunism.

The Philippine counterpart formula is not yet so clear. Depending on who is articulating the policy, compatibility with the Reagan specifications may run as high as a hundred or perhaps as low as fifty per cent.

Precisely because President Aquino continues to support a generally reconciliatory position, criticism of the policy regarding the communists has not been as strident. There appears to be some signs of chafing though from both civilian and military officials who feel that the armed communists have shown bad faith in mounting ambushes of troopers during the earlier stages of negotiating a ceasefire. The Minister of Defense as well as the Chief of Staff have given assurances that, with or without a ceasefire, the military will be on guard. The Minister has assured, furthermore, that should the President give the order to clean up the CPP/NPA, the military would be able to do the job fairly efficiently.

The Minister of National Defense recently articulated the clearest endorsement to date of the Reagan optics. In his words,

First of all, we shall continue to support the security umbrella provided by the United States for our region in the interest of maintaining the balance of power and thereby, regional stability in this part of the world.

Secondly, we shall continue to support all efforts to contribute to regional stability by strengthening our own internal security posture against dissidence, subversion and rebellion for these are common problems that beset our respective nations.

Thirdly, we shall continue to explore developmental relationships like those in the fields of trade, commerce and technology exchange which would work to strengthen the internal economies and thereby, the individual and collective security, of Southeast Asian nations.

(Enrile, 1986: 13-14)

This speech the Minister of Defense gave before the diplomatic corps last May 30, 1986 is fully compatible with the views of President Reagan as articulated in the Philippines by the American ambassador. Threat perceptions, as noted earlier, could manifest greater and greater identity between the two countries.

Dynamics of Threat Perceptions

There are conceivably at least three contexts within which international political actors may consider the saliency of perceived threats. These are the global, the regional and the national. Depending on one's status within the international system, each political actor may define and react to any threat perception accordingly.

Superpowers and the most powerful nation-states are usually globally oriented. Precisely because of their economic, military and political interests, they are able to design grand strategies in their quest for preeminence in international affairs. At this level, the most comprehensive balance of power system involves all the political actors with global status.

Practically all the nation-states are able to consider regional contexts of perceived threats. The proliferation of regional groupings is an indicator of how most national political actors find a significant degree of political competence at this level of state interaction.

All states, it almost goes without saying, have at least national roles. Within their own national political systems, threats can be assessed and reacted to by the political authorities. These threats may largely have internal sources, but there may be occasions when purportedly internal threats show themselves to be primarily alien in inspiration as well as logistic support.

Global actors usually automatically scan regional settings for threats with clear implications for their global interests. American interest, for instance, in a strategy to deny communism any territorial or political ground world-wide automatically impels the United States to be sensitive to developments in a region like Southeast Asia. The loss of a sizeable part of Indochina to the communists after the fall of Vietnam makes regional development particularly salient to global containment strategies.

Global actors, however, often find national contexts for threats of great and at times vital importance. Given the condition of Indochina in the last decade, a superpower like the United States will pay particular attention to threats to the national integrity of a frontline state like Thailand and will act accordingly.

The non-global actors, on the other hand, may but do not necessarily have to be so impressed by global threats. Most developing countries, for instance, are not particularly sensitive to the threat of a general thermonuclear exchange, or even a generally recessionary world market for as long as they

are able to retain a degree of protection against unfavorable trade balances. A certain parochiality may attend the attitudes of nation-states which, for any reason, find themselves relatively insulated against either global or regional threats.

For any nation-state, however, there is no way of evading threats with primarily national contexts. This is the most basic, irreducible context of perceived threat for the most powerful as well as the weakest of political communities.

Applying these considerations to the historical interaction between the Philippines and the United States, one is impressed by the manner in which American cold war policies were embraced by Filipinos in the first stage of threat perception discussed earlier in this paper. During this period, the Philippines appeared to have no significantly distinct interest which could be marked off from global, regional, as well as national interests defined by the Americans for themselves.

In the second stage, American abilities to definitively define threats and threat situations at any level and load such conceptions on Filipinos significantly diminished.

The current stage, the third one, is the most interesting yet. The United States appears to have regained much of its abilities as regards threat perceptions with Philippine implications. The most vocal and articulate of Philippine political leaders, including those who have prudently left the country, echo practically every caveat that American spokesmen make regarding the radical left and the communist insurgency. Even as the national character of the threat is emphasized, American officials in public pronouncements underscore the need to have a global perspective in understanding the full danger of communist insurgencies. (See for example, Bosworth, 1984: 2, 10-12) The justification for continuing American use of military facilities in Philippine bases is similarly situated in a general argument for maintaining a balance of power, both in its regional as well as global context. Communism in Indochina, the Soviet build-up of its naval capabilities in the Pacific and the growth of insurgency in the Philippines, as well as other developments in Latin America, Africa and elsewhere, are woven so well in a most intricate pattern, a strategy for communist global hegemony.

While this cold warrior re-interpretation of national, regional and global politics may appeal to many Filipinos, the apparent conjunction of threat perceptions between American officials and many Filipino political influentials could indicate the rather fluid character of Philippine politics at present. It may well be that those who traditionally have looked to American support for their political careers have considered it prudent to publicly endorse American strategic security positions. If this is indeed the case, then nothing really new has risen beyond the Filipino political horizon. Threat perception might have been reduced, as so many other things in Philippine politics have been similarly reduced, to pragmatic political considerations.

The resolution then of some issues like insurgency and the American military facilities in the Philippines, as well as allied security issues, will be more readily comprehensible within the framework of Philippine domestic politics, rather than some elaborate framework for analyzing strategic security within the region or beyond.

As the current American ambassador to Manila acknowledged in October, 1985 regarding the multiple dangers confronting Filipinos, it is easy to overestimate the influence of Americans on the Philippine political process. Last May, 1986, in a historical critique by the CPP Politburo of its own Central Committee members, the same observation was made in explaining the communists' admitted error of boycotting the February 7, 1986 elections.

The dynamics of threat perceptions would do well to be explored beyond the traditional calculus of imperialistic controls. The weak after all are not completely powerless; they have to be ingenious and extra-resourceful if they are to survive.

Concluding Observations

This paper has traced the pattern of military expenditures in the Philippines in the last fifteen years, explored their magnitudes in relation to those of other countries with some emphasis on ASEAN, and pointed out how a critique of Philippine military expenditures as antidevelopmental may be sustained only if a thesis of civilian corruption of the military were also offered. Such a thesis, if correct, has a most serious implication for those people in the Philippine military who would like to sustain a constitutionalist orientation and develop their professional careers as military men.

In a new found rapport with a sizeable number of Filipinos the vast majority of the military will have to continue validating their guardian role for the people. Some of the measures which are in the process of implementation are geared precisely to keep the Philippine military closer to and respected by more Filipinos. General Fidel Ramos, the Chief of Staff of the New Armed Forces of the Philippines, has outlined some of these measures:

- A. streamlining the armed forces, keeping a much smaller, but better equipped, compensated and motivated military;
- B. reorientation and retraining of men towards becoming God-centered, people-oriented, human rights protective soldiers;

- C. retraining towards basic soldiery, with emphasis on field duty and maximized interaction with civilians in both urban and rural settings
- D. improvement of the material conditions of the soldier and his family
- E. enhancement of civilian-military relations programs; educational functions to include briefings of civilians regarding the character of dissident movements, their objectives and operations
- F. A reorganization of the military to enable men of capabilities to rise to their legitimate positions; the introduction of a systematic lateral program to ensure no stagnation in rank, retain better qualified officers; and enhance individual and organizational efficiency and effectivity

(Ramos[3], 1986:7-8)

A host of other suggestions and recommendations come from quite a few people, civilian as well as military. If some of these ideas appear to border on the simplistic and the naïve, it may well be that many Filipinos have become distrustful of grandiose plans and would now rather stick to recommendations they can immediately identify with or react to. This could be a good sign since then there would be a greater chance that the emerging military would be truly that of the people, not the military of the authorities, nor one for foreign service.

18 August 1986
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