

# Political Economy in a Democratizing Philippines: A People's Perspective

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## Introduction

**INSPIRED BY THE** continuing surge of global democratization, this paper attempts a political economic reading of the Philippines using the perspective of the Filipino public. Although democratization logically involves a heightened concern for the people's views regarding governance and the economy, political economy readings seldom take account of public opinion. Analysts have been rather slow in democratizing the data base for exploring a country's political economy.

In the Philippines, democratized political economy assessments are facilitated by repeated surveys of public sentiments on political and economic issues in the last decade. The general views of the citizenry, as reflected in these national surveys, have been analyzed only recently (Miranda, 1993; Mangahas, Miranda and Rood, 1993) but other Filipino social scientists still have to follow these leads.

The main findings of these studies are cited in this paper. In addition, in line with analyzing Philippine political economy using a democratized perspective, the present paper offers a tentative explanation as to why the Philippines has remained politically intact despite stressful political and economic conditions. From 1986 to the present, public opinion surveys indicate that there has been sufficient support for the regime, the government and its authorities. This is the stabilizing political fact

even among the demonstrably disadvantaged and distressed Filipinos. However, how a suffering people sustain their optimism and why they continue to keep faith with their political authorities cannot be explained by the currently available data.

### Democratization and Political Economic Perspectives

Democratization has become a major theme of our times, with many repressive regimes breaking down, authoritarian governments inching towards liberalization, and people worldwide moving towards greater political involvement, at times outright empowerment. The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) in its 1993 Human Development Report puts it simply, in language even lay people understand: "People today have an urge—an impatient urge—to participate in the events and processes that shape their lives. And that impatience brings many dangers and opportunities (UNDP, 1993: 1)."

Economic development of course continues to be a compelling concern, but there is much realization that sustainable economic growth ("shared growth" in the language of a recent World Bank report, or, more pointedly, growth with "social justice," as Malaysia's regional braintrust—the eighteen-member Commission for a New Asia—puts it) depends on the conjoined energies of the citizenry and their leaders and therefore must fundamentally be a political proposition (World Bank, 1993: 13, 157-88; *Asiaweek*, March 2, 1994: 25). The democratized, political basis of economic as well as other changes associated with human development is still primarily explored within the traditional boundaries of the nation-state. Nevertheless, the pressure is there to think beyond. Some parties already call for "new pillars of a people-centred world order" and explicitly argue for "[n]ew patterns of national and global governance [which] are needed to accommodate the rise of people's aspirations and the steady decline of the nation state (UNDP, 1993: 5)."

This politicized perspective is reflected not only in the rhetoric of political leaders, but in the publications of social scientists, government technocrats and international civil servants. For sometime now, it has become *de rigueur* for economic analysts to explicitly address the political foundations and prerequisites of economic structural reforms (De Dios *et al.*, 1993; Broad and Cavanaugh, 1991; Van Arkadie, 1990; Nelson *et al.*, 1989; Srinivasan, 1985). State ministers have often addressed academic audiences and probed the relationship between the state and economic development (Boeninger, 1992; Aspe and Gurria, 1993). Even traditionally conservative international agencies like the United Nations Development Program and the World Bank now release reports which more directly treat the political dimensions of economic and human development.

The UNDP, for instance, designs measures of development with clear political components, as in the case of the focused, volatile Political Freedom Index (PFI) (with an earlier version, the Human Freedom Index of 1991) or the more general, socio-economically-oriented and relatively more stable Human Development Index (HDI) (UNDP, 1991; 1992; 1993). It is politically noteworthy that the UNDP in its 1992 Human Development Report does not shirk from examining the observable correlation between these two measures. The indices do correlate well specially at the high end, with high HDI countries on the average having almost twice as high a PFI rating relative to low HDI countries (UNDP, 1992:32). Prudence, however, might have inspired the UNDP to publish its political freedom ratings only in aggregate form (e.g. high, medium, low HDI countries; high, middle, low income countries, etc.) and not for each one of the 104 countries included in the study. After all, national governments could be extremely sensitive to rating exercises with politically sensitive components.

Recent World Bank regional economic assessments and country reports also increasingly underscore the crucial linkage between political factors, e.g. a government's strategic and tac-

tical initiatives or policy interventions and subsequent economic outcomes (World Bank, 1993; World Bank, 1985). The observed linkages could be cautiously formulated, as in the case of the World Bank's most recent appraisal of "The East Asian Miracle" (World Bank, 1993: 5-7, 157-88). In assessing the role of policy interventions in this impressive cluster of high performing Asian economies (HPAE), the report (1993: 6) notes:

Because the HPAEs differed from less successful economies both in their closer adherence to policy fundamentals and in the manner in which they implemented interventions, it is virtually impossible to measure the relative impact of fundamentals and interventions on HPAE growth. Thus, in attempting to distinguish interventions that contributed to growth from those that were either growth-neutral or harmful to growth, we cannot offer a rigorous counterfactual scenario. Instead we have had to be content with what Keynes called "an essay in persuasion," based on analytical and empirical judgments.

At the national level, however, the tone effected by the Bank may not always be confined to low-key diagnostic notes; it could actually be shrilly prescriptive. The urgency of decisive policy intervention, for instance, is stridently sounded in a World Bank analysis (1988: iv) of Philippine poverty:

The past fifteen years show that poverty needs to be attacked in its structural basis and that an outward-looking growth strategy is a critical component of a sustainable program to reduce poverty. The government must redistribute land, provide an effective program of family planning, and facilitate the development of human capital among the poor. Any strategy that ignores these elements will fail to get to the core of the poverty problem in the Philippines. The Government (sic) can also take steps that have an immediate impact on the poor through expanding expenditures on poverty-oriented social sectors, reforming the tax system to become less regressive and to generate more resources, and promoting an employment-oriented, more productive pattern of growth.

However, given a relatively weak Philippine state in the midst of established, well-organized and, historically, aggressive oligarchic groups (Miranda *et al.*, 1994; McCoy *ed.*, 1993; Gutierrez *et al.*, 1992; Rivera, 1991; Manapat, 1991; Hutchcroft, 1989; Sta. Romana, 1989), the World Bank advice might be pragmatically entertained only where the authorities are able to align themselves with the broadest national priorities and, subsequently, mobilize their citizenry towards state capacity build-up and simultaneous regime democratization, a radical series of developments indeed in most Third World countries. The World Bank, its urgent tone notwithstanding, is quiet on how to effect the critical developments. Even in the 1993 East Asian assessment where the World Bank acknowledges the political underpinning of sustained economic growth, there is only tangential mention of the probable need to democratize if countries are to sustain their economic growth.

The UNDP, on the other hand, appears to be more daring in explicitly noting that there could really be situations where, in the course of empowering the people, "[c]hanging the power equation requires the organization of a countervailing force, or even a revolution (UNDP, 1993: 29)." There is hardly any equivocation in this observation. Indeed, if its pronouncements in the recent Human Development Reports are to be trusted, the UNDP in the 1990s has become a much less vacillating and a more active advocate of democratization than in the past decades.

In the 1990s, the prevailing political economic perspectives thus appear to be more increasingly attuned to a democratizing world. Internationally and within states, there is a more explicitly acknowledged conjunction of political and economic phenomena as well as a shared perspective that that conjunction must increasingly benefit the greater number of people everywhere. When even the language of traditionally conservative agencies finally aligns itself in the 1990s to the sentiments of liberal thinkers in the 1960s, one acknowledges that democrati-

zation must have also found a place in the paradigms of political economy.

## Democratizing the Database of Political Economy

Still, one could be uneasy as regards contemporary treatments of political economy particularly in developing countries. There is little direct participation of the *demos* in these often learned treatises. The structures, institutions and processes which traditionally have concerned political economists are rarely examined from the vantage point of public perceptions and sentiments. Political stability and economic strength, and their obverse, are readily related to the relative strength, willfulness and effectiveness of key political and economic actors, influential institutions and sectoral groups dynamically interacting within the nation as well as beyond. The people themselves, often politically and economically marginalized, are easily missed and, at times, might even have been willfully ignored in studies of developing societies and their political economy.<sup>1</sup>

Several reasons could account for this neglect. First, tradition has a way of perpetuating itself. Academics who have gotten used to certain modes of analysis (e.g. legal-institutional, historical) become comfortable with them and it takes much effort for them to accommodate to others, particularly those which could involve extensive quantitative analysis and interaction with the public. Political scientists and economists in developing countries, specially the Western-trained, rarely have a tradition of survey research or extensive fieldwork and most rely on readily available data furnished by government agencies and some private institutions.

Second, public opinion surveys could be high-risk propositions in many developing countries. The political sensibilities of

authorities, specially those without much public support, are overly developed and academics who attempt monitoring the public pulse on political and economic issues could easily get into trouble. In the ASEAN region during much of the 1980s, regular, open public opinion surveys were conducted only in the Philippines.<sup>2</sup>

Third, public opinion surveys could also be prohibitively costly for academics without substantial institutional support. In the Philippines, for instance, national surveys involving samples of 1200 to 1500 respondents currently require about \$25,000 per round. Except for the Social Weather Stations,<sup>3</sup> no Philippine institution, whether government or private, academic or otherwise, has been willing to sustain a survey capability demanding this kind of financial outlay at least four times a year. Neither Marcos' Philippine Center for Advanced Studies of the 1970s and its successor, the President's Center for Special Studies in the early 1980s, nor the various government and private sector think tanks in the later Aquino and Ramos administrations have invested in in-house capabilities for systematic and regular public opinion surveys.

The academic institutions could certainly invest more in monitoring public sentiments regularly. The country's best endowed institution, the University of the Philippines with a state budget of almost P2 billion (\$73 million) in 1994, has no institutional capability for regular public pulse monitoring. The Ateneo University, a Jesuit run enterprise, does much better, sometime sustaining annual surveys on political, economic and social issues since 1987. The Philippine Social Science Council (PSSC), the national consortium of social science disciplines, activated a quick-response survey probe into sensitive national concerns in 1985. Although conceptualized as a series of probes, the PSSC 1985 Measuring the Public Pulse has not been followed by another PSSC survey.

## Philippine Political Economy: Mainstream Probes and Findings

Foreign specialists working on the Philippines mostly share a common reading of Philippine political economy, one which underscores the successful penetration of the state machinery by aggressive, rent-seeking oligarchies and their appropriation, even outright plunder in the case of Marcos and his cronies, of accumulated resources extracted from a politically marginalized public (Wurfel, 1988; Hutchcroft, 1991; Yoshihara, 1988; Hawes, 1987). The central role of the state in these analyses is to serve as a legitimizing instrument for the predatory activities of oligarchic groups.

Like their foreign colleagues, Filipino academics looking into national concerns adopt analytical frames and orienting concepts which situate the central role of the state and government in economic development, or more precisely its lack in the Philippines. The economic deterioration of the country under Marcos was documented in the 1980s by economists from the University of the Philippines who scored the political domination of the economy by the late dictator and his cronies (De Dios ed., 1984). The administration of President Corazon Aquino has not been spared a similar critique, although its political sins have been identified more with those of omission rather than commission, of lost opportunities rather than outright graft and corruption in areas like poverty alleviation, agrarian reform, energy security, fiscal policy and foreign debt management (Hutchcroft, 1991; De Dios *et al.*, 1993). President Fidel Ramos, much advantaged in taking over from a predecessor perceived to have temporized and bequeathed him continuing problems in land reform, energy adequacy, fiscal management and debt repayment, and graft and corruption, among others, has not been as severely appraised by critics to date. The recent rollback of oil prices, forced by an indignant public on the Ramos



administration, may inspire a more open criticism of presidential policies.

It may be considered an indicator of expanded democratic space that critical assessments of the government's economic performance come even from those who are closely associated with it. The Philippine Institute for Development Studies (PIDS) is in fact the primary think-tank of the National Economic and Development Authority, the government's premier agency for planning national development in the Philippines. The recent *PIDS Review and Outlook of the Philippine Economy for 1993-1994*, after examining the systemic deterioration of the economy in detail, points out:

Beyond the oft-repeated, seemingly prosaic call [by public officials] for increased vigilance, however, lies the fundamental task of rebuilding the government's and [the] nation's *credibility*. The economy's record of roller-coaster performance, sometimes induced or exacerbated by ill-intentioned or incompetent management over the past three decades, has bred an attitude of unresponsiveness, uncertainty and—at worst—cynicism. This attitude will clearly require a determined and disciplined effort to overcome. *At the moment, what is required from the national leadership is consistency between vision, oratory and action* (PIDS, 1993: 89. Underscoring in the original).

Even within government and among those who are its sincere supporters, it is clear that there is already much impatience with the apparent inability of the authorities to initiate and sustain economic development in the country.

### Elements of Contemporary Philippine Political Economy

The singularly critical evaluation of three successive administrations' economic management are grounded on several observations which political scientists, economists and others studying the Philippines generally agree on. As these points have much

validating research behind them, it is not inappropriate to report them as the main findings of mainstream probes into the nature of Philippine political economy.

1) *A weak state, as delineated by Migdal (1988), obtains in the Philippines. The Philippine state, unable to penetrate society, regulate relationships, extract and use resources, is itself often readily penetrated and made use of by strong social groups with highly oligarchic structures* (McCoy, ed., 1993; Gutierrez *et al.*, 1992; Hutchcroft, 1991). This weakness of the state could be the single most salient characteristic of Philippine political economy. In Southeast Asia where economic progress and political stability have been much associated with the presence of strong states (Crone, 1988: 252-68), the Philippines stands out with its almost unique political handicap. It is instructive to delve into the particulars of this condition.

The capacity of the state to penetrate Philippine society has not been well developed. The informal economy, estimated in 1993 to have produced about \$21.6 billion of goods and services, about 40 percent of the national economy (*Manila Bulletin*, March 1, 1994: B-1), largely ignores and often outrightly defies the formal rules of the government in its operations. State presence in the normal lives of the citizenry is largely nominal. Required social security registration for those who are employed and residence certificates for the adult citizenry are but a fraction of what they could be. State educational programs, albeit required constitutionally up to the secondary level, are unable to reach the majority of their target population.

Strong states regulate social relationships effectively. They are able to devise and enforce rules to govern behavior and maintain societal conflict within manageable levels. The Philippines is not able to do much in this area of state capacity. Its weakness is indicated in some cases by the inability or unwillingness of government to: a) clearly define the rules of involvement by some social groups in political affairs and/or b) reduce

state vulnerability to the aggressive manipulation of established business and economic interests.

As regards the first point, although there is a constitutional provision recognizing the separation of church and state in the Philippines, powerful religious groups have found it relatively easy to involve themselves in political concerns either publicly or behind the scenes. One could note the willful involvement of religious denominations and personalities in endorsing specific politicians during elections. On such crucial issues as population growth, the political authorities have not been particularly keen to undertake policies which might antagonize powerful religious sects.

As for the second point, historically, economic policy-making has shown the marked permeability of the state to various oligarchic interests (Boyce, 1993; Manapat, 1991; Hutchcraft, 1991; De Dios, 1990; Yoshihara, 1988; Hawes, 1987). In a study of the country's agricultural exports and the Marcos administration, it is persuasively argued that the Philippine state was unable to develop its own coherent corporate identity but was used by influential groups primarily for private gain (Hawes, 1987). An earlier study on elites in the martial law period provides empirical evidence of the resourceful use of state power by a select number of people without governmental positions but with close connections to the Presidential Palace (Doherty, 1979).

A more recent study of monopolies and oligopolies in four Philippine industries (Velasco *et al.*, 1994) reveals more of the same structural weakness. While state permeability has been true for all administrations, a 1990 study of Philippine economic policy-making shows the state to be probably at its weakest in the last Aquino administration (De Dios, 1990: 117-26).

The persistence of armed movements such as the leftist Communist Party of the Philippines-New People's Army, the Muslim National Liberation Front (MNLF) and, since 1986, the various rebel military groups is another indicator of the state's weakness in regulating social conflict and social relations within

Philippine society. In areas where the communists and the Muslim secessionists actually had control, taxation as well as legal administration ceased to be monopolies of the state and its legitimate agencies. The dramatic eruption of violent conflict in the form of rebel military coups is a clear demonstration of state weakness even where the government succeeds in neutralizing these challenges. A strong state would not have had six to seven attempted coups occurring in five years. Its perceived capabilities would have intimidated coup plotters (Miranda and Ciron, 1988). Although the Ramos administration has dampened much of the danger from armed movements by reaching out to them and involving them in peacetalks, the rebel groups to date have not formally disbanded and much stress still attends the current negotiations between them and the government.

The Philippine state is also much wanting in its capacity for resource extraction. Its ability to raise revenues through taxation has been much behind its ASEAN counterparts in the last decade. Furthermore, the ability of influential groups to evade taxes as well as to impose their own resource extraction systems on many sectors of society points to much impotence of the state in this area.

A final test of state strength is its ability to appropriate and use resources in ways determined by the state itself. The diversion of public funds from officially designated public-interest projects to private corporate or personal schemes has been much documented (Manapat, 1991; Hutchcroft, 1991; Hawes, 1987). The continuity of this practice well into the Aquino period has been explored by recent studies of several mining firms (Faustino, 1992). The extended public controversy over the selective repudiation/repayment of the Philippine foreign debt reflects the popular belief that much of the contracted debt has served primarily private groups and interests, not so much the debt programs' formally avowed public-interest objectives.

The relative autonomy of the state—its ability to act independently of or in opposition to the more powerful groups in society—is grossly undermined by these typical features of weak

states. A political leadership embedded in a weak-state, strong-society setting experiences greater demands on its resourcefulness simply to survive and eventually strengthen the state. In this frame, feckless administrations invariably become pliant instrumentalities of aggressive social interest groups.

2) *Obversely, the weakness of the Philippine state is reflected in the relative strength of Philippine civil society and its organized groups.* The latter compete for preeminence in the political and economic life of the nation. Political-economic clans, religious groups, domestic and foreign business interests, sectoral organizations, professional associations and other powerful aggroupments are active in the country. Together with these more traditional groups are more recent non-governmental and people's organizations as well as outrightly subversive organizations which pose armed challenges to the state.

The Philippines before Marcos' declaration of martial law and his New Society had been the preserve of oligarchs, with functional dyarchic relationships among those who are influential (Lande, 1965) and at best the magnanimous-patron-and-marginalized-client kind of political reality passing for a nominal democracy. Marcos vowed to destroy the influence of oligarchs in Philippine society but actually largely worked to emasculate traditional groups selectively and create yet others beholdened to him in their stead (Anderson, 1988: 22; Manapat, 1991).

Numerous findings indicate that a primarily oligarchic ethos continues to be sustained in Philippine society. A 1984 study seeking to design a framework for analyzing Philippine political stability reduces the number of politically influential groups to no more than 45 and, with further filtering, only 25, inclusive of the CPP-NPA and the MNLF (Druckman and Green, 1986: 15-29). Another study estimates the number of currently influential political families to be between 60 to 100, those who "dominate and influence the process of selection of the holders of the

rez *et al.*, 1992: 4). The authors of this 1992 study acknowledge that among the present notables are some "60 families inside and outside the Marcos government which controlled economic empires in the country (Gutierrez *et al.*, 1992: 16). The most recent "Historiography of State and Family in the Philippines" by McCoy (1993) traces some of these families to over a hundred years of national prominence. The current House of Representatives is primarily a domain of oligarchic political clan members (Gutierrez, 1994).

Thus, despite the restoration of formal democratic institutions in the Aquino administration, the oligarchic structure of Philippine politics persists. Intra-elite competition has resurfaced even more aggressively and the legislature as well as the executive serve as an arena for the various elite groups, the networked power centers of society, to compete in. The democratic facade of Philippine politics has been refurbished but, without taking into account the recent development of other social forces and groups in Philippine society, one is tempted to describe the present system as not significantly different from pre-martial law Philippines. At the time, most Filipinos were politically and economically marginalized.

3) *Yet one more major feature of Philippine political economy is the country's vulnerability to strong transnational influences.* Philippine historical dependence on American markets for many of its products, American foreign assistance, American military hardware and training programs for the Philippine military, as well as a sizeable pool of pro-American sentiments (Social Weather Stations surveys, 1986-1992) enable American policy-makers to easily penetrate a weak Philippine state. There is also a growing vulnerability to other countries' influence as the Philippines seeks desperately needed foreign markets, foreign investments and outright foreign assistance.<sup>4</sup> In early 1994, a Japanese government mission could impress on the Philippines the need to improve its tax collection and to implement a more effective land reform program as it accesses Official Develop-

ment Assistance (ODA) funds from its largest foreign donor.<sup>5</sup>

Transnational influence does not issue from the United States and Japan alone. Multilateral lending institutions, such as the World Bank and more particularly the International Monetary Fund, constitute another set of influential transnational actors. With the onset of the debt crisis in 1982, the influence of these international financial institutions grew considerably. The Philippines, saddled with an enormous foreign debt (\$26 billion in 1986 at the time of Marcos' fall, growing to over \$35 billion in 1993) and a recurring balance of payments crisis, has been under the close supervision of the IMF since the early 1980s. Macroeconomic programs and targets set annually by the national government's financial institutions are negotiated with and require approval from the International Monetary Fund (Malvar, 1993; De Dios, 1990: 128-30). The "conditionalities" set by these institutions represent the current vulnerability of the Philippines to international lending agencies.

Given these three primary characteristics, other attributes of the Philippine political economy can be anticipated. Low, at times even negative economic growth, much unemployment and underemployment, low per capita productivity, depressed and inequitably distributed incomes, regressive taxes, fiscal crises, increased public debt, high inflation, intensifying poverty, much graft and corruption, deteriorated public safety conditions, minimal foreign investment inflows and other negative characteristics are ultimately traceable to the persisting weakness of the Philippine state.

In practically all political economy readings currently available, the Philippine condition is not viewed as being tractable unless the state capacity to govern is enhanced and the political authorities, somehow learning to finally govern in the interest of the nation, mobilize both the elites and the citizenry towards political stability and economic growth and in short, move towards democratizing the country's political economy (Boyce, 1993; De Dios *et al.*, 1993; Broad and Cavanaugh, 1991; Balisacan, 1990). President Ramos himself validated this assessment in his

inaugural address (*Philippine Daily Inquirer*, July 1, 1992: 11) as he remarked:

... we must make politics serve—not the family, the faction or the party — but the nation . . . . And we must restructure the entire regime of regulation and control that rewards people who do not produce at the expense of those who do, a system that enables persons with political influence to extract wealth without effort from the economy.

The influential national security adviser, retired Brig. General Jose T. Almonte, favors a phrase which says essentially the same thing and which has become part of the presidential vocabulary, "level the playing field" (*Today*, February 21, 1994: 9), simply a less threatening way of saying democratize economic and political opportunities in the Philippines.

### **Political Willfulness in the Midst of Economic Diffidence: The Public View of Philippine Political Economy**

Mainstream readings by academics, government technocrats and public officials being accounted for, it is time to consider another alternative view of Philippine political economy, that of the public as might be gleaned from public opinion data on selected political and economic matters. A recent study by academics working with the Social Weather Stations (SWS)<sup>6</sup> attempts precisely this kind of presentation (Mangahas, Miranda and Rood, 1993).

Using survey data generated by nationally representative samples over the last decade,<sup>7</sup> the SWS analysts documented the following public opinion findings, many of which are consonant with those made by mainstream political economic readings:

1) *A high incidence rate of poverty among the people.* Using a self-rating approach, anywhere between 43 percent (March 1987) to 74 percent (July 1985) of respondents nationwide ac-



knowledge being poor. In the post-Marcos period, the national average has been 64 percent, with no distinction between being important as regards Aquino and Ramos times (see Chart 1). Regressing self-rated poverty against inflation, per capita income and unemployment for the period 1983-1992, Mangahas (1993: 127) shows that inflation is by far the most important of the three variables in explaining self-rated poverty and that, as is to be expected, hits the poorly-situated socioeconomic classes (D and E, approximately 90 percent of the population) more than the better-off (ABC). Unemployment had only half the effect of inflation on worsening poverty and, remarkably, per capita GNP appears to have had no alleviating influence over the extent of self-rated poverty. Mangahas concludes that the poor did not benefit from whatever increase in GNP might have occurred between 1983 and 1992.

2) *An overall deterioration of quality of life for most people.* Except for two times (both during Aquino's administration, May 1986 and March 1987), there were more Filipinos from 1986 to 1995 whose quality of life at the time of the survey compared to the last 12 months worsened (the "losers") rather than improved (the "gainers"). For much of the Aquino tenure, net "loser" status (% gainers minus % losers) deepened, finally bottomed out in 1991 and started improving in Aquino's last year as President. Ramos' presidency to date also shows deterioration in this indicator. Metropolitan Manila or the national capital region (henceforth NCR), like the whole country (the Republic of the Philippines, henceforth RP) also reflects net loser status most of the time but its margin of losers would be generally less than that of the entire country (see Chart 2).

3) *Nevertheless, except for April 1984 under Marcos, more people anticipated that their quality of life in the next twelve months relative to the time of the survey would be better (the "optimists") rather than worse (the "pessimists").* Even before Marcos fell from power, Filipinos were already getting over their pessimism about the future. After Marcos left, optimism surged

and reached a peak in March 1987. Since then, optimism showed some recovery but gradually depreciated until about the last year of the Aquino administration. The public became more optimistic as Aquino's presidency drew to a close and came close to the peak of March 1987 as Ramos assumed office. A year and a half later, optimism has toned down a little, but remains at about the same level as when Aquino was midway through her term (see Chart 3).

4) *Hopeful public sentiments regarding the economy, after turning markedly positive in March 1987, could not be sustained and has shown much tentativeness since then*<sup>8</sup> This vacillation is reflected much in the Aquino period for the NCR as well as the whole nation and marginally improved as her term drew to a close in 1991-1992. Economic sentiments for the NCR had always been better relative to the country. To date, except soon after his assumption of office in June 1992, the Ramos presidency has not really been able to do much better in inspiring a sense of economic well-being or greater confidence among the public (see Chart 4). This is not to say that the national economy has not fared better under President Ramos, but that there has been much inability on the part of his administration to convince most of the public that national economic gains are being democratized and not, as historically has been the case, disproportionately enjoyed by a minority.

5) *Markedly positive political sentiments, so impressively high in March 1987, could not be sustained, drastically fell within the same year and, after initially improving with the new Ramos presidency, has reflected much public tentativeness even outright disillusionment, in its political sentiments*<sup>9</sup> Much of the Aquino presidency shows a growing difficulty in the public's ability to continue positively assessing the performance of its political personalities and institutions. The NCR and RP reflect basically the same pattern of political sentiments, with the former generally slightly more depressed than the latter (see Chart 5). Throughout the series, from the best of times in March 1987 to

the present, people appear to have a basic sense of apprehension as reflected in negative readings for context sentiments relating to the people's self-rated poverty, quality of life assessments, sense of public safety, political efficacy and faith in peaceful means of effecting democratic change (see Chart 6).

6) *People's economic and political sentiments appear to run together, with surprisingly greater volatility reflected by the economic rather than the political sentiments.* The SWS economic and political sentiment indices (ESI and PSI) have some common elements and logically could be expected to reflect some degree of association.<sup>10</sup> Still, the rather high correlation of the two indices ( $R^2 = .84$ ) suggests much conjunction in people's perceptions of political and economic matters in the Philippines (see Chart 7). What is perhaps even more interesting is the counter-intuitive greater range of economic sentiments (index value 51 to 100 or 49 points) compared to political sentiments (index value 75 to 100 or 25 points) from 1987 to 1995. This is immediately seen from the relatively lower values of the ESI relative to those of the PSI since 1987. A major political event (the August 1987 coup) appears to have impacted more on economic than on political sentiments, deflating the ESI by 22 points vs. 14 points for the PSI.

7) *Despite a depreciated sense of positive economic and political sentiments, there remains a sufficiently high level of public support for the political institutions, its authorities and their performance over a range of national concerns.* A selected group of survey indicators for Philippine democratization (see Table 1) tracks this public support through time, from 1986 to 1995.

The series of survey findings reported in this section suggest a political economic reading of Filipinos who, in the midst of persisting difficulties, somehow manage to maintain their composure. It is time to look more closely into those perceptions of the public which could weaken their historical resolve and conceivably result in a much more unstable political economy.

## **Down But Not Out: A Stress Analysis of Public Sentiments**

Stress sentiments are reflected by SWS surveys in many areas of concern. These sentiments appear to be at least temporarily contained by the public's willful support of their leaders and institutions. Two of the indicators included in the immediately previous table also show the character of the various stresses which operate on Filipinos. There is a low sense of political efficacy, as indicated by the net feeling that ordinary people cannot influence the way their society is run. Furthermore, over the last decade, there has persisted an apprehension that Filipinos may not be able to keep to peaceful means of promoting democratic change in their society. From seven to eight out of ten people surveyed say they are unable or unwilling to rule out the possibility that this faith in peaceful change could break down (see Chart 8).

These contexting sentiments are made more delicate by the nature of other stress-related perceptions. Poverty and deteriorated quality of life ("loser" and "pessimist") status are all significantly high among respondents and, moreover, inequitably distributed, being found more among those from rural areas and the lower socioeconomic classes (see Charts 9-12). The inequitable distribution of negative characteristics among the respondents does not appear to have changed much across three administrations, suggesting the possibility not simply of persisting but possibly also of intensifying negative status among essentially the same people. (In his studies of Philippine poverty, Balisacan [1993; 1992] argues precisely this thesis but without using supportive public opinion data).

Public safety perceptions are also contributory to stress build-up among Filipinos. The sense of insecurity across the years is markedly present, with generally at least 40 percent of the survey respondents afraid to walk the streets of their own neighborhood at night and generally at least 50 percent being appre-

hensive that robbers might break into their houses (see Chart 13). The survey respondents do not appear to be irrationally paranoid. When asked about actual crime victimization involving the respondent or an immediate family member in the last six months alone, the resulting high crime victimization rate translates into at least five to ten times the official police figures (see Table 2).

Stress readings might be multiplied beyond necessity using SWS probes across the years into man-made (e.g. seven attempted coups from 1986 to 1989, police and military criminality), woman-made (e.g. during the Aquino presidency, the successful emasculatation of the comprehensive agrarian reform law, the neglect of energy build-up from 1986 to 1992, etc.) and natural calamities (volcanic eruptions, earthquakes, typhoons, floods, droughts) which Filipinos have faced in the last nine years. Despite this remarkable concatenation of demoralizing conditions, the political system and the authorities have managed to remain in place, to stabilize as a matter of fact in the last four years.

The question must be asked: With sustained stressful conditions, has there been no build-up of a critical mass for political destabilization?

### **A More Intimate Look Into the Dissatisfied and Distressed (DnD) Filipinos: The Abortive Search for Political Destabilizers**

Among Filipinos, the focal point of public support is clearly the person rather than the office or institution one is identified with. Across the years, SWS probes for public satisfaction in official or institutional performance usually reflect a 10 to 20 percentage point difference favoring the person ahead of his simultaneously-rated institution or office. Nowhere is this positive effect more at work than in the case of the Philippine President. Whether it is Aquino or Ramos, the President has always done

better in satisfaction ratings than the Cabinet or the national administration (SWS Surveys, 1986-1995: Chart 14).

One may thus use the public satisfaction rating of presidential performance as a surrogate variable for overall public satisfaction with the political institutions and lesser public officials. For as long as the Philippine President enjoys some degree of public support, the probability that Filipinos would themselves undertake political destabilization, or abet it, would have to be so much less. On the other hand, losing that support, particularly within a milieu of concatenated stress conditions such as obtains in the Philippines, the likelihood of political destabilization must be considered as having improved.

At times, the dissatisfied and distressed (DnD) Filipinos in terms of some sensitive stress indicator (e.g. self-rated poverty, quality of life classification, performance issue rating, etc.) can be shown as largely undifferentiated in relation to their satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the President. This is precisely the case of self-rated poverty, where those who affirm their being "poor" are hardly distinguishable from those who are not or are borderline cases in their net satisfaction with Philippine Presidents (see Chart 15).

Much more often, however, there is a clear difference in the extent of net satisfaction for presidential performance between those who express positive and those who give negative responses to probes involving stress indicators. Thus, satisfaction for the President is noticeably lower among those who have "loser" and "pessimist" status in quality of life ratings (see Charts 16-17). This is also the case for those who are "dissatisfied" with national administration performance on a range of sociopolitical and economic issues.<sup>11</sup> Towards the end of the Aquino presidency, net negative assessments for her performance by DnD's appeared to bode ill for the country's political stability. President Ramos appears to be himself increasingly vulnerable to this phenomenon of depreciating popular satisfaction. The pace of depreciation seems to be even more accelerated in his presidency relative to that of Aquino's (see Charts 18 to 26).

However, as indicated by public sentiments between December 1994 and December 1995, even a concatenation of administration crises (e.g., the Maga-Contemplacion contract worker case, the Kuratong Baleleng alleged rub-out incident and the rice shortage in late 1995) does not wipe out public support to such an extent that a president and his administration are unable to recover public esteem. Close to one out of three remains satisfied with President Ramos among those dissatisfied with the national administration during these crises (see Tables 3 and 4; Chart 27).

Theoretically, one may anticipate the dynamics of critical political action beginning among the DnD's. In the last decade, however, no such development appears to have taken place in the Philippines. The explanation is fairly obvious once a closer, more intimate look into the nature of the DnD's is undertaken. *DnD's are simply not a critical mass; there are not enough DnD's who are really so dissatisfied that they are willing to give up on the President (read: the surrogate variable for the political system and its institutions).*

On all the stress indicators monitored in this paper, at least one in four DnD's remained satisfied with presidential performance. Most of the time in the case of President Aquino, between one-third to two-fifths of all DnD's kept faith with her. Since President Ramos took over from her, six to seven out of every ten DnD's have been satisfied with presidential performance (see Charts 18 to 26). DnD's, it can be safely asserted have not gone critical anytime in the last nine years.

### **The Political Economic Underpinnings of Filipino Optimism: Still An Open Question**

So Filipinos are politically willful even as they chart the persistently uncertain waters of their economy. What explains this willfulness? And continuing to use the President as a surrogate for the political system and its institutions, how are Filipinos

able to keep faith with their political leader in these times of continuing hardships?

After examining public sentiments reflected in SWS surveys over the last six years, this paper is unable to offer any definitive answer to these questions.

In an attempt to probe the nature of Filipino willfulness and support for the political system, the author tried to correlate the survey respondents' presidential satisfaction ratings with their satisfaction ratings of how the socioeconomic and political issues were handled by the national administration over the years 1987 to 1995. Several ordinary least squares (OLS) regression runs for twenty five survey periods were used to test the ability of issue satisfaction ratings to account for variances in presidential satisfaction ratings: 1) the country as a whole (RP), 2) the Metropolitan Manila Area or the National Capital Region (NCR) and 3) socioeconomic class ABC (the better-off respondents) who had invariably been more critical and more volatile in their ratings of the President and the national administration in relation to selected issues. Another OLS regression run limited the probe to the economic issues to explore the influence of public satisfaction with economic concerns on their presidential satisfaction ratings.

The results of these regression analyses were not very helpful. With one exception, models fitted to the President's satisfaction rating could not even explain half of the variance involved at any time in the last six and a half-years. The best one (linking presidential satisfaction rating with socioeconomic class position, Class ABC) had an adjusted  $R^2$  of 50 percent in testing for President Aquino's satisfaction rating in September 1989. Satisfaction with President Ramos is even more problematic, with the highest adjusted  $R^2$  at 30 percent, also fitting a class ABC model for the April 1994 set of issues. The more focused set of purely economic issues fared worst, with no regression run accounting for an adjusted  $R^2$  higher than 19 percent, recorded for President Aquino in September 1989, barely three



months before the coup which almost toppled her government (see Table 5).

### **Beyond Regression, the Political Economy of a Prayerful People**

Since objective reason appears to encounter some difficulty in clarifying why Filipinos, given their current conditions, continue to be politically supportive and optimistic, one might turn to another, perhaps a more desperately imaginative reasoning as a final resort. It could be that Filipino positiveness is a matter of irreversible cultural/genetic programming. There are some survey indicators which allow for this line of speculation. In a series of thirty-one surveys stretching from 1984 to 1995 (see Chart 28), Filipinos have acknowledged improvement in their quality of life (i.e. "gainer" status) and normally associated optimism only twice (both during Aquino's presidency); there is also just one time (in April 1984, under Marcos) when they suffered deterioration in their quality of life (i.e. "loser" status) and were understandably pessimistic about the future. The rest of the time, twenty eight times out of thirty one, Filipinos were simply willfully optimistic despite persistent "loser" status across the years.

When Filipinos are down, they refuse to stay down and be counted out. When their political and economic conditions deteriorate, they insist that things would be better. Everytime they hit bottom, they, possibly out of compulsive optimism, believe they have hit rock bottom. Across the years, the reality of false bottoms does not appear to have much impressed Filipinos. They remain steadfastly supportive of their political institutions and their leaders and refuse to support extraconstitutional measures to affect change, even change that could wipe out popularly-acknowledged iniquities in Phillipine society (Miranda, 1988).

People who are mostly in the midst of economic doldrums, who suffer from a low sense of political efficacy and who nevertheless persist in hoping for the eventual development of their political economy are understandably prone to engage in prayer (see Table 6). Almost two years ago, in July 1991 when President Aquino was close to the end of her term, more than half (54 percent) of the adult Filipinos prayed at least once to several times a day. In December of 1993, one and a half years after President Ramos took over from President Aquino and after literally some of the darkest months in the history of the Republic, close to nine out of ten (86 percent) engaged themselves similarly in prayer. Since President Ramos came into office with 24 percent of the popular vote (with a voter turnout of 76 percent for an adult, voting population of 29 million), some 68 percent of those who either did not vote or voted against him must be praying with him, not necessarily for him. Former President Aquino, whose last unsolicited advice to the incoming President was that he must pray a lot (*Philippine Daily Inquirer*, June 30, 1992: 1), is definitely one of these prayerful people.

### Some Serious Concluding Remarks

Democratization clearly has infused political economy analysis with the concern for that crucial linchpin, the people, in the long acknowledged linkage between political and economic processes and, at any given point in time, their given, linked realities. Political economy discussions now go beyond traditional economic distribution and equity concerns; human rights, sexual discrimination and ecological conservation have become staple items of the political economist. A democratization of the subject matter of political economy has indeed taken place.

Democratizing the methods of political economic analysis has not kept pace with subject matter democratization. More

could be done to explore methodologies where the public and their perceptions become crucial to an understanding of a society's political economy. As this paper has tried to demonstrate, there could be quite a consensus reflected by findings yielded by public opinion surveys and those gained in the traditional, expert-oriented way. Where there is a difference, it could be an exciting challenge to try and reconcile them if possible, as in the case of the traditional idea that political phenomena inherently are more volatile than economic ones. In the Philippine case, there is some evidence suggesting precisely the opposite.

Democratized political economic analyses do not necessarily end up with more positive knowledge. At the very least, however, it allows us to more sharply define our areas of ignorance. In the present paper, the author has tried to demonstrate that the dynamics of popular political support and the underpinnings of regime legitimacy in the Philippines remain mysterious and merit further exploration.

Finally, where the analyst is himself part of the reality he studies, it requires tremendous efforts for him to keep his personal biases from intruding and becoming an integral part of his analysis. And he is not always successful, even when he tries.

## Endnotes

1. This point of course cannot be pressed as strongly in countries where democratization has already made much headway. In his engaging analysis of "The State in Political Science: How We Become What We Study," the American political scientist, Theodore J. Lowi, a former president of the American Political Science Association, speaks of public opinion research as one of three "hegemonic subdisciplines of our times," one of American political science's currently "hot topics," precisely because of its functional compatibility with a bureaucratized American state and traces the beginnings of the capability to undertake public opinion research in the United States to as early as the late nineteenth century (Lowi, 1993: 2-5).

However, even in authoritarian states like China where economic liberalization is not confounded with political democratization, the pragmatic need by the authorities to keep their economic policies in pace with what the people can accept and support has provided impetus for public opinion polling. The Chinese official who heads the survey operations in his country is quoted as saying: "Recently the Government has paid a lot of attention to surveys. During China's reforms, the economic system has changed a lot. The Government wants to know if the mass of people will go along with it. If the policy proceeds too rapidly, or the methods aren't right and the people are opposed to it, it will fail (Crespi, 1989: 4)."

2. The author tried in the early 1980s to interest other ASEAN scholars to consider doing public opinion surveys on some political items in their respective countries. He was met with little enthusiasm for this kind of work at the time. Even now, only in Thailand and the Philippines are there regular attempts to monitor the public pulse on political concerns.

3. The Social Weather Stations (SWS), a private, non-stock, non-profit research institution, was founded in 1985 by seven Filipino academics (including this author) who felt as early as 1981 that there was a vital need to monitor public opinion even as Marcos' "constitutional authoritarianism" operated in the Philippines. Its funding comes from various sources: local and foreign government agencies, private sector corporations, and private individuals, all of whom enjoy no proprietary rights over data generated with their financial support in regular or special SWS surveys. SWS survey data, findings and reports are treated as academic materials. While temporary embargo (usually for a year) might be requested for by survey sponsors for sensitive items, public access to and disclosure of both data and reports are effected not longer than three years from the time of any survey. In 1990, the SWS became a member of the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP), a consortium of twenty-three national survey organizations. To date, SWS is the only ISSP member from the Third World.

4. Foreign markets are critical particularly for Filipino overseas contract workers and professionals, now numbering well over a million. The finance minister recently estimated that overseas workers together with three million more Filipino immigrants annually remit as much as \$10B, a full fifth of GDP (*Manila Bulletin*, January 31, 1994: B-1).

5. From 1988 to 1992, Japan had given the Philippines \$3.08 billion in ODA and accounted for more than half of the total ODA for the Philippines in 1992 (*Philippine Daily Inquirer*, February 2, 1994: 17).

6. See earlier note 3 regarding the SWS.

7. In the present paper, the relevant data base is comprised by 31 SWS surveys from 1986 to 1995 and three (3) non-SWS surveys which are comparable in design and sample size to the standard SWS surveys. The latter are all statistically representative of Philippine adult, voting-age population and conform to internationally accepted standards for sampling and questionnaire design as well as field administration.

8. The SWS uses an Economic Sentiment Index or ESI to plot these sentiments. It is an average of positive economic sentiments in response to the three indicators noted above (self-rated poverty, past and future quality of life assessment) and two indicators relating to past and future household spending on a major item costing P1,000 or more.

9. This author designed the SWS Political Sentiment Index or PSI to summarily project the public's sentiments regarding 1) the performance of their political leaders and institutions, 2) the national administration's performance over a range of socioeconomic and political issues, and 3) the general context or environment within which the respondents make the more clearly political evaluations of public officials, governmental institutions and national issues. Each of these three components of the index has specific areas of concern within which indicators are finally operationally tested for.

Margins for positive and negative sentiments are calculated for each of the indicators comprehended in the index so that the full range of the political sentiment index is +100 (the ideal state of affairs) and -100 (the worst state of affairs). The three index components are equally weighted, as are the areas within a component. A mean value is calculated for all the indicators within an area of concern, as well as for the areas of concern in each of the three index components, and, finally, for all of the three index components. The final figure is the overall political sentiment index for a specific point in time.

A complete listing of these indicators and when they run in the SWS survey series (1987-1995) is found in Table 7.

The SWS political and economic sentiment indices could be reduced to a common scale, with a base value of 100 starting with the SWS March 1987 survey (see Chart 7).

10. There are three ESI indicators (self-rated poverty, past and future quality of life assessments) which are also included in the thirty-five to forty final indicators used in the PSI. These three ESI indicators are all in the PSI's *context* component, which has a total of six final indicators, see

11. From March 1987 to December 1995, a total of fifty six (56) issues were tested for respondent's satisfaction with national administration performance.

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
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Chart 1. Overall Self-Rated Poverty (Philippines, 1983 - 1995)




Overall Self Rated Poverty (Philippines, 1983-1995)

	Not Poor	On the Line	Poor		Not Poor	On the Line	Poor
<b>MARCOS</b>				<b>RAMOS</b>			
Apr83	23%	16%	55%	Sep92	19%	16%	65%
Jul85	13	13	74	Dec92	16	26	58
<b>AQUINO</b>				Apr93	12	23	65
May86	18	16	66	Jul93	22	19	59
Oct86	20	13	67	Sep93	14	19	68
Mar87	18	39	43	Dec93	17	15	68
Oct87	9	41	51	Apr94	13	18	70
Sep88	12	22	66	Aug94	9	24	67
Feb89	23	14	63	Nov94	14	17	68
Sep89	13	27	60	Dec94	15	18	68
Apr90	14	20	66	Mar-Apr95	14	23	63
Nov90	16	14	70	Jun95	14	21	66
Jul91	7	21	71	Oct95	13	25	62
Nov91	12	26	62	Dec95	12	26	61
Feb92	16	12	72				
Apr92	10	22	68				

**Question:** Where would you place your family in this showcard?  
(Not poor, On the line (Between not poor and poor), Poor)

Chart 2. Margin of Gainers over Losers (Philippines/NCR, 1984 - 1995)




Margin of Gainers over Losers (Philippines/NCR, 1984-1995)

		Philippines	NCR			Philippines	NCR
MARCOS	APR 84	-39	-36	RAMOS	SEP 92	-13	+11
	JUL 85	-47	-37		DEC 92	-13	-2
AQUINO	MAY 86	+2	+6	APR 93	-17	-11	
	OCT 86	-9	-7	JUL 93	-20	-2	
	MAR 87	+11	+9	SEP 93	-24	-11	
	OCT 87	-14	-10	DEC 93	-15	+1	
	MAR 88		-3	APR 94	-13	+2	
	SEP 88	-8	+8	AUG 94	-15	-5	
	FEB 89	-8	+14	NOV 94	-11	+6	
	JUL 89		-10	DEC 94	-8	+10	
	SEP 89	-18	0	MAR-APR 95	-9	+5	
	APR 90	-18	-4	JUN 95	-13	+9	
	AUG 90		-21	OCT 95	-33	-26	
	NOV 90	-38	-23	DEC 95	-21	-10	
	MAR 91		-33				
	JUL 91	-39	-31				
SEP 91		-24					
NOV 91	-27	-25					
FEB 92	-22	-4					
APR 92	-17	0					

Question : Comparing your quality of life these days to how it was 12 months ago, would you say that your quality of life is ... (Better now, Same as before, Worse now)

Gainers : "Better now"      Losers : "Worse now"

Chart 3 . Margin of Optimists over Pessimists (Philippines, 1984-1995)



Margin of Optimists over Pessimists (Philippines/NCR, 1984-1995)


		Philippines		NCR				Philippines		NCR	
MARCOS	APR 84	- 4	+ 12	RAMOS	SEP 92	+ 33	+ 55				
	JUL 85	+ 10	+ 29		DEC 92	+ 25	+ 35				
AQUINO	MAY 86	+ 31	+ 42	APR 93	+ 17	+ 32					
	OCT 86	+ 29	+ 48	JUL 93	+ 26	+ 44					
	MAR 87	+ 35	+ 50	SEP 93	+ 18	+ 32					
	OCT 87	+ 7	+ 27	DEC 93	+ 22	+ 42					
	MAR 88		+ 42	APR 94	+ 27	+ 43					
	SEP 88	+ 25	+ 40	AUG 94	+ 19	+ 39					
	FEB 89	+ 25	+ 45	NOV 94	+ 24	+ 41					
	JUL 89		+ 25	DEC 94	+ 27	+ 48					
	SEP 89	+ 18	+ 33	MAR-APR 95	+ 26	+ 40					
	APR 90	+ 23	+ 34	JUN 95	+ 21	+ 47					
	AUG 90		+ 18	OCT 95	+ 6	+ 20					
	NOV 90	+ 9	+ 16	DEC 95	+ 14	+ 25					
	MAR 91		+ 9								
	JUL 91	+ 6	+ 19								
SEP 91		+ 22									
NOV 91	+ 17	+ 20									
FEB 92	+ 19	+ 40									
APR 92	+ 22	+ 39									

Question : *In your opinion, what will be the quality of your life in the coming 12 months? Would you say that it ... (Will be better, Same, Will be worse)*

Optimists : *"Will be better"*


Pessimists : *"Will be worse"*

Chart 4. SWS Economic Sentiment Index (Philippines/NCR, 1986 - 1995)

SWS Economic Sentiment Index  
(Philippines/NCR, 1986-1995)

		Philippines		NCR				Philippines		NCR		
AQUINO	OCT 86	100	142									
	MAR 87	150	163									
	OCT 87	117	142									
	MAR 88		142									
	SEP 88	96	142									
	FEB 89	100	142									
	JUL 89		124									
	SEP 89	100	138									
	APR 90	96	133									
RAMOS												
						SEP 92	102	151				
						DEC 92	105	130				
						APR 93	88	113				
						JUL 93	100	123				
						SEP 93	86	127				
						DEC 93	96	133				
						APR 94	88	126				
						AUG 94	88	117				
						NOV 94	92	127				
						DEC 94	96	138				
						MAR-APR 95	98	135				
						JUN 95	90	141				
						OCT 95	84	107				
						DEC 95	85	117				

Chart 5. SWS Political Sentiment Index (Philippines/NCR, 1987 - 1995)


SWS Political Sentiment Index  
(Philippines/NCR, 1987-1995)

		RP	NCR			RPNCR	
AQUINO	MAR 87	+ 41	+ 41	RAMOS	SEP 92	+ 16	+ 18
	OCT 87	+ 11	+ 5		DEC 92	+ 14	+ 3
	MAR 88		+ 11		APR 93	+ 6	- 2
	SEP 88	+ 12	+ 6		JUL 93	+ 11	0
	FEB 89	+ 10	+ 2		SEP 93	+ 3	- 3
	JUL 89		- 6		DEC 93	+ 12	+ 8
	SEP 89	+ 4	+ 1		APR 94	+ 9	+ 6
	APR 90	+ 8	- 2		AUG 94	+ 7	+ 3
	AUG 90		- 12		NOV 94	+ 5	- 2
	NOV 90	- 4	- 15		DEC 94	+ 7	+ 4
	MAR 91		- 20		MAR-APR 95	0	- 3
	JUL 91	- 6	- 15		JUN 95*	0	0
	SEP 91		- 27		OCT 95	- 9	- 15
	NOV 91	- 1	- 8		DEC 95	- 3	- 9
	FEB 92	0	- 5				
	APR 92	0	- 4				
AVERAGE	+ 7	- 3	AVERAGE	+ 6	+ 1		

\* Average last 4 quarter values for 3 context indicators (Faith in democracy, Public Safety in the Streets, Public Safety at Home)



Chart 6. SWS Political Sentiment Index by Components




SWS Political Sentiment Index by Components (Philippines 1987-1995)

AQUINO				RAMOS					
	Context	Institution	Issue		Context	Institution	Issue		
AQUINO	MAR 87	- 1	+61	+62	RAMOS	SEP 92	- 9	+37	+19
	OCT 87	-22	+34	+22		DEC 92	-10	+32	+20
	SEP 88	-13	+36	+14		APR 93	-17	+28	+7
	FEB 89	- 9	+20	+18		JUL 93	-12	+34	+11
	SEP 89	-16	+20	+10		SEP 93	-20	+28	+2
	APR 90	-12	+19	+17		DEC 93	-15	+34	+15
	NOV 90	-25	+ 9	+ 3		APR 94	-10	+32	+ 4
	JUL 91	-29	+11	- 1		AUG 94	-13	+28	+ 8
	NOV 91	-15	+ 9	+ 4		NOV 94	-13	+24	+ 3
	FEB 92	-17	+15	+ 2		DEC 94	- 5	+22	+ 4
	APR 92	-15	+14	+ 1		MAR-APR 95	- 9	+17	- 7
AVERAGE	-16	+22	+14			JUN 95*	-11	+16	- 5
						OCT 95	-20	+ 7	-14
						DEC 95	-14	+16	- 9
					AVERAGE	-13	+25	+ 4	

\* Average last 4 quarter values for 3 context indicators (Faith in democracy, Public Safety in the Streets, Public Safety at Home)

**Chart 7. SWS Economic and Political Sentiment Indices: A Comparison (Philippines, 1987 - 1995)**




**SWS Economic and Political Sentiment Indices: A Comparison (Philippines, 1987-1995)**

		PSI*	PSI**	ESI			PSI*	PSI**	ESI
AQUINO	MAR 87	+41	100	100	RAMOS	SEP 92	+16	88	68
	OCT 87	+11	85	78		DEC 92	+14	86	70
	SEP 88	+12	86	64		APR 93	+ 6	82	59
	FEB 89	+10	84	67		JUL 93	+11	85	67
	SEP 89	+ 4	82	67		SEP 93	+ 3	81	57
	APR 90	+ 8	84	64		DEC 93	+12	86	64
	NOV 90	- 4	78	59		APR 94	+ 9	84	59
	JUL 91	- 6	76	51		AUG 94	+ 7	83	59
	NOV 91	- 1	79	61		NOV 94	+ 5	82	61
	FEB 92	0	80	59		DEC 94	+ 7	83	64
APR 92	0	80	62	MAR 95	0	80	65		
				JUN 95	0	80	60		
				OCT 95	- 9	75	56		
				DEC 95	- 3	78	57		

\* Original PSI \*\* Adjusted PSI

N.B. To be comparable with the ESI, the PSI was adjusted using the following formula (with March 1987 as base year):  $PSI_{new} = 100 + (PSI_{original} - PSI_{1987}) / 2$

Chart 8. Possibility of Losing Faith in Peaceful Means of Promoting Democracy (Philippines, 1984-1995)




Possibility of Losing Faith in Peaceful Means of Promoting Democracy (Philippines, 1984-1995)

		Possible/ Undecided	Not Possible			Possible/ Undecided	Not Possible
MARCOS	APR 84	76%	22%	RAMOS	SEP 92	78	21
	JUL 85	81	17		DEC 92	81	18
AQUINO	MAY 86	73	22	APR 93	80	19	
	MAR 87	68	29	JUL 93	77	22	
	OCT 87	72	18	SEP 93	76	22	
	SEP 88	73	26	DEC 93	76	23	
	FEB 89	69	25	APR 94	70	27	
	SEP 89	79	20	AUG 94	75	22	
	APR 90	72	25	NOV 94	74	24	
	NOV 90	84	13	DEC 94	60	39	
	JUL 91	81	15	MAR-APR 95	74	25	
	NOV 91	83	15	OCT 95	74	23	
	FEB 92	83	16	DEC 95	71	26	
APR 92	79	19					

Question : What is the possibility that the Filipino people will completely lose faith in peaceful means of promoting democracy? (Definitely possible, Possible, Maybe possible/maybe not, Not possible, Definitely not possible)

Chart 9. Self-Rated Poverty: Percentage of "Poor" Respondents  
(Philippines/NCR, 1981 - 1995)




Self Rated Poverty: Percentage of "Poor" Respondents  
(Philippines/NCR, 1981-1995)

		Philippines	NCR			Philippines	NCR
MARCOS	APR 81		34%	RAMOS	SEP 92	65%	37%
	NOV 81		36		DEC 92	58	35
	JUL 82		41		APR 93	65	46
	APR 83	55%	31		JUL 93	59	45
	JUL 85	74	50		SEP 93	68	41
AQUINO	MAY 86	66	47		DEC 93	68	47
	OCT 86	67	39		APR 94	70	49
	MAR 87	43	30		AUG 94	67	50
	OCT 87	51	32		NOV 94	68	48
	MAR 88		40		DEC 94	68	47
	SEP 88	66	37		MAR-APR 95	63	41
	FEB 89	63	38		JUN 95	66	39
	JUL 89		36		OCT 95	62	45
	SEP 89	60	33		DEC 95	61	39
	APR 90	66	39				
	AUG 90		36				
	NOV 90	70	42				
	MAR 91		39				
	JUL 91	71	50				
	SEP 91		31				
NOV 91	62	33					
FEB 92	72	42					
APR 92	68	50					

Question: Where would you place your family in this showcard? (Not poor, On the line [Between not poor and poor], Poor)

Chart 10. Self-Rated Poverty by Locale: Percentage of "Poor" Respondents (Philippines, 1985 - 1995)




Self Rated Poverty by Locale: Percentage of "Poor" Respondents (Philippines, 1985-1995)

			RP	Urban	Rural			RP	Urban	Rural
MARCOS	JUL 85		74%	62%	82%	RAMOS	SEP 92	65%	52%	79%
AQUINO	MAY 86		66	55	73		DEC 92	58	49	68
	OCT 86		67	51	78		APR 93	65	57	74
	MAR 87		43	34	49		JUL 93	59	50	68
	OCT 87		51	34	61		SEP 93	68	56	80
	SEP 88		66	51	75		DEC 93	68	56	80
	FEB 89		63	50	71		APR 94	70	57	81
	SEP 89		60	49	67		AUG 94	67	56	78
	APR 90		66	52	75		NOV 94	68	56	80
	NOV 90		70	56	78		DEC 94	68	55	80
	JUL 91		71	58	80		MAR-APR 95	63	51	75
	NOV 91		62	47	72		JUN 95	66	54	77
	FEB 92		72	54	83		OCT 95	62	51	72
	APR 92		68	58	78		DEC 95	61	51	71

Question: Where would you place your family in this showcard?  
(Not poor, On the line [Between not poor and poor], Poor)

Chart 11. Net Gainers\* by Socio-economic Class  
(Philippines 1985 - 1995)



Net Gainers by Socio-Economic Class  
(Philippines, 1985-1995)


		ABC			D			E		
MARCOS	JUL 85	-33	-50	-48						
AQUINO	MAY 86	+ 3	- 1	+ 6						
	OCT 86	- 3	- 9	- 12						
	OCT 87	- 6	- 12	- 21						
	SEP 88	+ 14	- 13	- 5						
	FEB 89	+ 13	- 7	- 18						
	SEP 89	- 9	- 15	- 28						
	APR 90	- 12	- 13	- 33						
	NOV 90	- 29	- 38	- 41						
	JUL 91	- 26	- 38	- 43						
	NOV 91	- 27	- 26	- 32						
	FEB 92	- 7	- 21	- 32						
	APR 92	- 5	- 16	- 29						
RAMOS	SEP 92	+ 9	- 15	- 22						
	DEC 92	- 4	- 15	- 11						
	APR 93	- 3	- 18	- 22						
	JUL 93	- 6	- 22	- 19						
	SEP 93	- 4	- 24	- 31						
	DEC 93	+ 4	- 15	- 25						
	APR 94	- 5	- 12	- 25						
	AUG 94	- 5	- 16	- 18						
	NOV 94	+ 10	- 11	- 20						
	DEC 94	+ 14	- 7	- 17						
	MAR 95	+ 10	- 8	- 18						
	JUN 95	+ 8	- 12	- 28						
	OCT 95	- 22	- 33	- 42						
	DEC 95	- 7	- 20	- 28						

Question : Comparing your quality of life these days to how it was 12 months ago, would you say that your quality of life is ... (Better now, Same as before, Worse now)

Gainers : "Better now"

Losers : "Worse now"

Chart 12. Net Optimists\* by Socio-economic Class  
(Philippines, 1985 - 1995)



Net Optimists by Socio-economic Class  
(Philippines, 1984-1995)


					ABC	D	E								
					ABC	D	E	ABC	D	E					
MARCOS	JUL	85	+ 14	+ 9	+ 10			RAMOS	SEP	92	+ 46	+ 33	+ 22		
									DEC	92	+ 36	+ 25	+ 20		
AQUINO	MAY	86	+ 42	+ 31	+ 28				APR	93	+ 29	+ 18	+ 4		
	OCT	86	+ 37	+ 27	+ 28				JUL	93	+ 47	+ 25	+ 22		
	OCT	87	+ 16	+ 8	- 1				SEP	93	+ 31	+ 19	+ 11		
	SEP	88	+ 29	+ 27	+ 22				DEC	93	+ 35	+ 23	+ 12		
	FEB	89	+ 41	+ 28	+ 11				APR	94	+ 38	+ 25	+ 25		
	SEP	89	+ 32	+ 21	+ 8				AUG	94	+ 21	+ 21	+ 13		
	APR	90	+ 30	+ 24	+ 19				NOV	94	+ 45	+ 24	+ 15		
	NOV	90	+ 7	+ 8	+ 12				DEC	94	+ 50	+ 27	+ 17		
	JUL	91	+ 19	+ 7	- 1				MAR	95	+ 42	+ 25	+ 17		
	NOV	91	+ 15	+ 17	+ 8				JUN	95	+ 38	+ 22	+ 8		
	FEB	92	+ 35	+ 18	+ 18				OCT	95	+ 15	+ 8	- 5		
	APR	92	+ 30	+ 27	+ 6				DEC	95	+ 22	+ 15	+ 9		

Question : In your opinion, what will be the quality of your life in the coming 12 months?  
Would you say that it ... (Will be better, Same, Will be worse)

Optimists : "Will be better"

Pessimists : "Will be worse"

Chart 13. People's Fear for Their Safety (Philippines, 1985 - 1995)



People's Fear for their Safety (Philippines 1985-1995)

		AT HOME	IN THE STREETS			AT HOME	IN THE STREETS
MARCOS	JUL 85	54%	48%	RAMOS	SEP 92	49%	39%
AQUINO	MAY 86	52	46		DEC 92	47	40
	OCT 86	59	52		APR 93	49	42
	MAR 87	54	50		JUL 93	55	47
	OCT 87	70	54		SEP 93	58	49
	SEP 88	58	47		DEC 93	55	42
	FEB 89	50	38		APR 94	49	39
	SEP 89	52	46		AUG 94	50	40
	APR 90	49	39		NOV 94	52	42
	NOV 90	45	42		DEC 94	48	41
	JUL 91	54	43		MAR-APR 95	48	40
	NOV 91	44	35		OCT 95	49	42
	FEB 92	48	42		DEC 95	49	40
	APR 92	46	40				

Question :


Please tell me if you agree or disagree with these statements:

\*In this neighborhood, people are usually afraid that robbers might break into their houses.

\*\*In this neighborhood, people are usually afraid to walk in the street at night because it is not safe.



Chart 14. Net\* Presidential and National Administration Performance Rating: A Comparison (Philippines, 1986 - 1995)



Net Presidential and National Administration Performance Ratings: A Comparison (Philippines, 1986-1995)


	President	Nat'l Admin.		President	Nat'l Admin.
AQUINO	MAY 86	+53	RAMOS	SEP 92	+66
	OCT 86	+72		DEC 92	+60
	MAR 87	+69		APR 93	+66
	OCT 87	+35		JUL 93	+69
	SEP 88	+50		SEP 93	+62
	FEB 89	+37		DEC 93	+65
	SEP 89	+29		APR 94	+67
	APR 90	+37		AUG 94	+55
	NOV 90	+7		NOV 94	+49
	JUL 91	+10		DEC 94	+50
	NOV 91	+10		MAR 95	+24
	FEB 92	+13		JUN 95	+26
	APR 92	+7		OCT 95	+1
				DEC 95	+2

Question: How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the performance of Corazon Aquino (for survey dates May 1986-Apr. 1992)/Fidel Ramos (for survey dates Sept. 1992- Dec. 1995) as president?

On the overall how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the present national administration?

(Very satisfied, Satisfied, Maybe satisfied/maybe not, Not satisfied or Not at all satisfied)?

Chart 15 . Net Satisfaction Rating\* of Philippine Presidents, By Self-Rated Poverty (Philippines, 1985 - 1995)




Margins of Presidential Satisfaction by Self Rated Poverty (Philippines, 1985-1995)

			NOT POOR	ON THE LINE	POOR				NOT POOR	ON THE LINE	POOR
MARCOS	JUL	85	+24	+28	+17	RAMOS	SEP	92	+69	+62	+66
							DEC	92	+61	+59	+60
AQUINO	MAY	86	+59	+49	+52		APR	93	+55	+68	+68
	OCT	86	+72	+71	+72		JUL	93	+67	+72	+70
	MAR	87	+83	+61	+70		SEP	93	+57	+56	+65
	SEP	88	+35	+45	+54		DEC	93	+62	+58	+67
	FEB	89	+33	+49	+36		APR	94	+65	+65	+67
	SEP	89	+27	+19	+34		AUG	94	+61	+44	+58
	APR	90	+30	+43	+38		NOV	94	+49	+43	+48
	NOV	90	- 2	+ 8	+10		DEC	94	+46	+53	+50
	JUL	91	+11	+ 2	+11		MAR	95	+11	+16	+25
	NOV	91	+ 3	+11	+12		JUN	95	+29	+20	+26
	FEB	92	+ 4	+19	+14		OCT	95	+15	0	+ 5
	APR	92	+ 2	+13	+ 6		DEC	95	+11	+15	+ 2

Question : Where would you place your family in this showcard? (Not poor, On the Line [Between poor and not poor], Poor)

Charts 16 . Net Satisfaction Rating\* of Philippine Presidents,  
By Gainers and Losers Status (Philippines, 1985 - 1995)




Among Gainers and Losers the Net Rating of the President is ...  
(Philippines, 1985-1995)

			GAINERS	LOSERS			GAINERS	LOSERS
MARCOS	JUL 85	+28	+10		RAMOS	SEP 92	+69	+65
						DEC 92	+64	+57
AQUINO	MAY 86	+64	+48			APR 93	+67	+62
	OCT 86	+87	+62			JUL 93	+75	+62
	MAR 87	+81	+51			SEP 93	+72	+57
	SEP 88	+53	+43			DEC 93	+70	+59
	FEB 89	+48	+17			APR 94	+72	+61
	SEP 89	+38	+16			AUG 94	+57	+47
	APR 90	+55	+26			NOV 94	+57	+40
	NOV 90	+23	- 8			DEC 94	+56	+38
	JUL 91	+21	+ 3					
	NOV 91	+21	+ 1					
	FEB 92	+22	-17					
	APR 92	+21	-11					

Question : Comparing your quality of life these days to what it was 12 months ago, would you say your quality of life is ... (Better now, Same as before, Worse now)

Charts 17. Net Satisfaction Rating\* of Philippine Presidents, By Optimists and Pessimists Status (Philippines, 1985 - 1995)




Among Optimists and Pessimists the Net Rating of the President is ...  
(Philippines, 1985-1995)

		OPTIMISTS	PESSIMISTS			OPTIMISTS	PESSIMISTS
MARCOS	JUL 85	+30	- 2	RAMOS	SEP 92	+67	+61
					DEC 92	+63	+57
AQUINO	MAY 86	+64	+15		APR 93	+65	+68
	OCT 86	+79	+38		JUL 93	+71	+63
	MAR 87	+76	+39		SEP 93	+61	+56
	SEP 88	+51	+44		DEC 93	+74	+56
	FEB 89	+43	+16		APR 94	+69	+49
	SEP 89	+35	+11		AUG 94	+59	+37
	APR 90	+48	+ 8		NOV 94	+48	+36
	NOV 90	+15	-10		DEC 94	+51	+42
	JUL 91	+13	- 1		MAR 95	+30	+10
	NOV 91	+12	+ 2		JUN 95	+35	+ 2
	FEB 92	+12	-19		OCT 95	+16	- 6
	APR 92	+14	-18		DEC 95	+10	- 4

Question : In your opinion what will be the quality of your life in the coming 12 months?  
Would you say that it ... (Will be better, Same, Will be worse)

**Chart 18 . Presidential Performance Ratings Among R's Dissatisfied with the Administration's Performance: Fighting Inflation (Philippines, 1991 - 1995)**




**Among those Dissatisfied with the Issue of Fighting Inflation, the Proportion of R's who are ... with Presidential Performance (Philippines, 1991-1995)**

			SATISFIED	UNDECIDED	DISSATISFIED
AQUINO	NOV 91		35%	27%	35%
	FEB 92		33	29	38
	APR 92		34	28	37
RAMOS	SEP 92		64	27	8
	DEC 92		68	23	9
	APR 93		68	21	10
	JUL 93		69	22	9
	SEP 93		66	20	13
	DEC 93		68	20	11
	APR 94		72	17	12
	AUG 94		61	24	14
	NOV 94		57	22	21
	DEC 94		60	19	20
	MAR 95		41	24	35
	JUN 95		45	26	28
OCT 95		36	22	42	
DEC 95		35	20	45	

*Question: How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with regard to the present administration's performance in fighting inflation? Would you say that you are ... (Very satisfied, Satisfied, Maybe satisfied/maybe not, Not satisfied or Not at all satisfied)?*

Chart 19. Presidential Performance Ratings Among R's Dissatisfied with the Administration's Performance re: Developing Livelihood Opportunities for Ordinary Citizens (Philippines, 1987 - 1995)




Among those Dissatisfied with the Issue of Developing Livelihood Opportunities for Ordinary Citizens the Proportion of R's who are ... with Presidential

AQUINO			RAMOS				
	SATISFIED	NDECIDED	DISSATISFIED		SATISFIED	UNDECIDED	DISSATISFIED
MAR 87	64%	12%	24%	SEP 92	63%	22%	12%
FEB 89	33	31	36	DEC 92	58	30	12
SEP 89	30	33	37	APR 93	64	20	14
APR 90	35	31	34	JUL 93	63	24	13
NOV 90	23	30	45	SEP 93	55	24	21
JUL 91	32	30	37	DEC 93	58	25	16
NOV 91	31	25	43	APR 94	58	23	18
FEB 92	31	30	38	AUG 94	54	25	21
APR 92	27	27	46	NOV 94	47	26	27
				DEC 94	48	22	30
				MAR 95	38	22	40
				JUN 95	38	27	35
				OCT 95	31	20	49
				DEC 95	28	19	52

Question: How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with regard to the present administration's performance in developing livelihood opportunities for ordinary citizens? Would you say that you are ... (Very satisfied, Satisfied, Maybe satisfied/maybe not, Not satisfied or Not at all satisfied)?

**Chart 20 . Presidential Performance Ratings Among R's Dissatisfied with the Administration's Performance : Collecting Taxes (Philippines, 1989 - 1994)**




Among those Dissatisfied with the Issue of Collecting Taxes the Proportion of R's who are ... with Presidential Performance (Philippines, 1989-1994)

			SATISFIED	UNDECIDED	DISSATISFIED
AQUINO	FEB 89		39%	32%	28%
	SEP 89		37	33	30
	APR 90		36	30	34
	NOV 90		26	32	41
	JUL 91		33	30	36
	NOV 91		36	25	38
	FEB 92		32	31	37
	APR 92		26	30	44
RAMOS	SEP 92		65	24	10
	DEC 92		63	25	11
	APR 93		64	21	14
	JUL 93		65	22	13
	AUG 94		60	24	16
	NOV 94		53	24	23

Question: How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with regard to the present administration's performance in collecting taxes? Would you say that you are ... (Very satisfied, Satisfied, Maybe satisfied/maybe not, Not satisfied or Not at all satisfied)?

**Chart 21 . Presidential Performance Ratings Among R's Dissatisfied with the Administration's Performance : Land Reform (Philippines, 1987 - 1995)**




**Among those Dissatisfied with the Issue of Land Reform the Proportion of R's who are ... with Presidential Performance (Philippines, 1987-1995)**

			<u>SATISFIED</u>	<u>UNDECIDED</u>	<u>DISSATISFIED</u>
<b>AQUINO</b>	MAR	87	52%	23%	24%
	SEP	88	42	36	22
	FEB	89	37	25	38
	SEP	89	35	30	35
	APR	90	39	24	37
	NOV	90	28	28	43
	JUL	91	35	26	39
	NOV	91	38	25	36
	FEB	92	28	32	40
APR	92	27	23	50	
<b>RAMOS</b>	SEP	92	64	24	9
	DEC	92	64	24	11
	APR	93	63	23	13
	JUL	93	64	23	13
	SEP	93	56	25	18
	DEC	93	63	22	14
	APR	94	63	22	15
	AUG	94	57	26	17
	NOV	94	48	26	25
	OCT	95	25	20	55
	DEC	95	29	16	55

**Question:** *How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with regard to the present administration's performance on land reform? Would you say that you are ... (Very satisfied, Satisfied, Maybe satisfied/maybe not, Not satisfied or Not at all satisfied)?*



Chart 22. Presidential Performance Ratings Among R's Dissatisfied with the Administration's Performance : Promoting the Interests of the Filipino Businessmen (Philippines, 1991 - 1993)




Among those Dissatisfied with the Issue of Promoting the Interests of the Filipino Businessmen, the Proportion of R's who are ... with Presidential Performance (Philippines, 1991-1993)

		SATISFIED	UNDECIDED	DISSATISFIED
AQUINO	NOV 91	35%	27%	37%
	FEB 92	34	25	41
	APR 92	31	27	42
RAMOS	SEP 92	59	29	11
	DEC 92	66	21	12
	APR 93	64	24	12
	JUL 93	60	28	11
	SEP 93	60	22	17
	DEC 93	67	20	13

Question: How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with regard to the present administration's performance in promoting the interests of the Filipino businessmen? Would you say that you are ... (Very satisfied, Satisfied, Maybe satisfied/maybe not, Not satisfied or Not at all satisfied)?

**Chart 23 . Presidential Performance Ratings Among R's Dissatisfied with the Administration's Performance : Helping Workers (Philippines, 1989 - 1994)**




Among those Dissatisfied with the Issue of Helping Workers the Proportion of R's who are ... with Presidential Performance (Philippines, 1989-1994)

			<u>SATISFIED</u>	<u>UNDECIDED</u>	<u>DISSATISFIED</u>
AQUINO	FEB	89	44%	28%	28%
	SEP	89	32	35	33
	APR	90	40	28	32
	NOV	90	26	30	44
	JUL	91	33	28	38
	NOV	91	31	28	40
	FEB	92	31	28	41
RAMOS	SEP	92	61	30	8
	DEC	92	59	29	12
	APR	93	64	21	14
	JUL	93	63	27	10
	SEP	93	56	24	19
	DEC	93	57	21	21
	APR	94	62	23	15

Question: How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with regard to the present administration's performance in responding to the complaints and needs of workers? Would you say that you are ... (Very satisfied, Satisfied, Maybe satisfied/maybe not, Not, satisfied or Not at all satisfied)?

**Chart 24 .Presidential Performance Ratings Among R's Dissatisfied with the Administration's Performance : Helping Farmers (Philippines, 1990 - 1994)**




**Among those Dissatisfied with the Issue of Helping Farmers the Proportion of R's who are ... with Presidential Performance (Philippines, 1990-1994)**

		<u>SATISFIED</u>	<u>UNDECIDED</u>	<u>DISSATISFIED</u>
AQUINO	APR 90	40%	28%	33%
	NOV 90	24	31	43
	JUL 91	32	28	39
	NOV 91	34	28	37
	FEB 92	27	30	43
RAMOS	SEP 92	56	32	10
	DEC 92	62	28	10
	APR 93	64	21	14
	JUL 93	64	25	11
	SEP 93	57	26	17

**Question:** *How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with regard to the present administration's performance in responding to the complaints and needs of farmers? Would you say that you are ... (Very satisfied, Satisfied, Maybe satisfied/maybe not, Not satisfied or Not at all satisfied)?*

Chart 25. Presidential Performance Ratings Among R's Dissatisfied with the Administration's Performance: Promoting Foreign Investment (Philippines, 1991-1994)




Among those Dissatisfied with the Issue of Promoting Foreign Investment, the Proportion of R's who are ... with Presidential Performance (Philippines, 1991-1994)

			SATISFIED	UNDECIDED	DISSATISFIED
AQUINO	NOV 91		34%	29%	36%
	FEB 92		35	29	36
	APR 92		31	27	42
RAMOS	SEP 92		60	27	10
	DEC 92		66	23	10
	APR 93		67	20	13
	JUL 93		67	23	10
	NOV 94		51	23	25

Question: How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with regard to the present administration's performance in promoting foreign investments? Would you say that you are ... (Very satisfied, Satisfied, Maybe satisfied/maybe not, Not satisfied or Not at all satisfied)?

Chart 26 . Presidential Performance Ratings Among R's Dissatisfied with the Administration's Performance : Solving the Problem of Very Large Foreign Debt (Philippines, 1988 - 1992)




Among those Dissatisfied with the Issue of Solving the Problem of Very Large Foreign Debt the Proportion of R's who are ... with Presidential Performance (Philippines, 1988-1992)

			SATISFIED	UNDECIDED	DISSATISFIED
AQUINO	SEP	88	50%	31%	19%
	FEB	89	44	28	28
	SEP	89	36	38	26
	APR	90	44	29	27
	NOV	90	29	28	42
	JUL	91	36	29	35
	NOV	91	33	28	38
	FEB	92	32	28	39
	APR	92	31	28	41
RAMOS	SEP	92	64	26	8
	DEC	92	65	25	10

Question: How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with regard to the present administration's performance in solving the problem of very large foreign debt? Would you say that you are ... (Very satisfied, Satisfied, Maybe satisfied/maybe not, Not satisfied or Not at all satisfied?)

**Chart 27. Presidential Performance Ratings Among R's Dissatisfied with the Administration's Performance : Decreasing Crimes that Victimize Ordinary Citizens (Philippines, 1990 - 1995)**




Among those Dissatisfied with the Issue of Decreasing Crimes that Victimize Ordinary Citizens the Proportion of R's who are ... with Presidential Performance (Philippines, 1990-1995)

AQUINO				RAMOS			
	SATISFIED	UNDECIDED	DISSATISFIED		SATISFIED	UNDECIDED	DISSATISFIED
NOV 90	28%	29%	42%	SEP 92	62%	27%	10%
JUL 91	31	26	43	DEC 92	63	24	13
NOV 91	33	26	41	APR 93	69	18	12
FEB 92	36	29	35	JUL 93	67	23	9
APR 92	31	30	38	SEP 93	60	21	18
				DEC 93	68	21	11
				APR 94	65	21	14
				AUG 94	58	26	16
				NOV 94	56	22	22
				DEC 94	59	19	22
				MAR 95	39	23	38
				JUN 95	43	28	29
				OCT 95	33	22	45
				DEC 95	33	22	44

*Question: How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with regard to the present administration's performance in decreasing crimes that victimize ordinary citizens, like killings, holdups, robberies, physical violence? Would you say that you are ... (Very satisfied, Satisfied, Maybe satisfied/maybe not, Not satisfied or Not at all satisfied)?*

Chart 28. PAST/FUTURE QUALITY OF LIFE: NET ASSESSMENTS  
Philippines, April 1984 - December 1995



\*Net optimists/pessimists : Proportion of Rs who expect their QOL to improve minus the proportion of those who expect their QOL to worsen in the next 12 months

\*\*Net gainers/losers : Proportion of Rs whose QOL improved minus the proportion of those whose QOL worsened in the last 12 months.

Source: Bishop Businessmen Conference (1984-1995) and Social Weather Stations

Table 1. Survey Indicators of Philippine Democratization, 1986 - 1995\*

SURVEY PERIOD	POLITICAL SENTIMENT INDEX	NET SATISFIED WITH THE PRESIDENT	INDEX OF NET SATISFACTION WITH PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS	INDEX OF NET SATISFACTION W/ GOVERNMENT-PERFORMANCE ON SPECIFIC ISSUES	RESPONDENTS FEELING THAT ORDINARY PEOPLE CAN INFLUENCE THE WAY THE SOCIETY IS RUN	RESPONDENTS WITH FAITH IN PEACEFUL MEANS OF PROMOTING DEMOCRACY
May86		+53			33%	22%
Oct 86		+72				
Mar87	+41	+69	+61	+60		29
Oct 87	+11	+35	+34	+21	34	18
Sep 88	+12	+50	+36	+18	39	26
Feb 89	+10	+37	+20	+18	34	25
Sep 89	+ 4	+29	+20	+10	25	20
Apr 90	+ 8	+37	+19	+18	25	25
Nov 90	- 4	+ 7	+ 7	0		13
Jul 91	- 6	+10	+ 8	- 1		15
Nov 91	- 1	+10	+ 8	+ 6	29	15
Feb 92	0	+13	+11	+ 5	31	16
Apr 92	0	+ 7	+11	+ 4		19
Sep 92	+16	+66	+24	+24	38	21
Dec 92	+14	+60	+19	+24		18

Source of Survey Data: Social Weather Stations (1986-1995)



Table 1 (cont'd) ...

SURVEY PERIOD	POLITICAL SENTIMENT INDEX	NET SATISFIED WITH THE PRESIDENT	INDEX OF NET SATISFACTION WITH PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS	INDEX OF NET SATISFACTION W/ GOVERNMENT-PERFORMANCE ON SPECIFIC ISSUES	RESPONDENTS FEELING THAT ORDINARY PEOPLE CAN INFLUENCE THE WAY THE SOCIETY IS RUN	RESPONDENTS WITH FAITH IN PEACEFUL MEANS OF PROMOTING DEMOCRACY
Apr93	+ 6	+66	+17	+ 1		19
Jul93	+11	+69	+20	+19		22
Sep93	+ 3	+62	+17	+10		22
Dec93	+12	+65	+21	+22		23
Apr94	+ 9	+67	+32	+ 4		27
Aug94	+ 7	+55	+28	+ 8		22
Nov94	+ 5	+49	+24	+ 3		24
Dec94	+ 7	+50	+22	+ 4		39
Mar95	0	+24	+17	- 7		25
Jun95	0	+26	+16	- 5		
Oct95	- 9	+ 1	+ 7	-14		23
Dec95	- 3	+ 2	+16	- 9		26

Source of Survey Data: Social Weather Stations (1986-1995)

- \* Modified and updated from Mangahas, Mahar, "Democracy and Economic Progress in the Philippines, 1996-1992," in Mangahas, Mahar, Felipe Miranda and Steven Rood, *Democratization and Economic Progress in the Philippines, 1996-1992*. Social Weather Stations, 1993.

Table 2. Conversion of SWS Crime Victimization Rate (CVR) to Average Monthly Crime Rate (AMCR) (Philippines, 1989-1995)

DATE	CVR				AMCR = (CVR/6)*(1,000/5)			
	THEFT	BREAK-IN	CARNAP	VIOLENCE	THEFT	BREAK-IN	CARNAP	VIOLENCE
Feb 89	18	9		5	600	300		167
Sep 89	14	5		3	467	167		100
Apr 90	14	7		4	467	233		133
Nov90	14	7		7	467	233		233
Jul 91	18	10	12	9	600	333	400	300
Nov91	14	9	9	11	467	300	300	367
Feb 92	19	8	18	10	633	267	600	333
Apr 92	17	8	19	7	567	267	633	233
Sep 92	9	4	2	2	300	133	67	67
Dec92	10	5	4	4	333	167	133	133
Apr 93	9	4	2	2	300	133	67	67
Jul 93	14	6	10	7	467	200	333	233
Sep 93	12	6	7	6	400	200	233	200
Dec93	12	4	6	4	400	133	200	133
Apr 94	12	6	10	7	400	200	333	233
Aug94	11	5	4	4	367	167	133	133
Nov94	12	7	5	5	400	233	167	167
Dec94	10	6	4	5	333	200	133	167
Mar95	14	6	6	7	467	200	200	233
Oct 95	10	4	3	4	333	133	100	133
Dec95	13	6	8	4	433	200	267	133

Notes to Table 2:

CVR	=	per 100 households over 6 months
AMCR	=	per 100,000 population per month

Question: *In the past six months, have you or any member of your family been a victim of ...*

- ...Pick-pocketing/robbery of personal property*
- ...Break-in at your residence*
- ...Carnapping*
- ...Physical violence*

*Source of Survey Data: Social Weather Stations (1989-1995)*

**Table 3. Presidential Performance Ratings Among R's Dissatisfied with the Administration's Performance on Protecting the Rights of Filipino Workers Abroad (Philippines, 1994-1995)**

	<u>SATISFIED</u>	<u>UNDECIDED</u>	<u>DISSATISFIED</u>
DEC 94	47%	26%	26%
MAR 95	44	25	30
JUN 95	39	27	34
OCT 95	32	22	46
DEC 95	29	23	48

**Table 4. Presidential Performance Ratings Among R's Dissatisfied with the Administration's Performance on Ensuring Adequate Food Supply in the Country (Philippines, December 1995)**

	<u>SATISFIED</u>	<u>UNDECIDED</u>	<u>DISSATISFIED</u>
DEC 95	30%	20%	49%

Table 5. Adjusted R<sup>2</sup> of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) Models Fitted to the President's Satisfaction Rating (Philippines, 1987-1995)

President	Survey Period	Presidential Satisfaction Rating Regressed by Issue Variables				... By Economic Variables	
		Total No. of Variables	Adjusted R <sup>2</sup> (%)			No. of Variables	Adjusted R <sup>2</sup> (%)
			RP <sup>a</sup>	Class ABC <sup>b</sup>	NCR <sup>c</sup>		
Pres. Aquino	Mar. 1987	8	38.28	43.46	44.45	5	16.25
	Oct. 1987	14	8.26	9.42	20.37	7	6.24
	Sep. 1988	12	20.58	40.55	22.96	6	10.98
	Feb. 1989	17	18.68	33.82	24.52	7	13.35
	Sep. 1989	17	25.09	50.07	30.85	8	18.52
	Apr. 1990	18	22.63	34.23	34.10	9	17.35
	Nov. 1990	22	15.98	18.98	12.57	9	12.13
	Jul. 1991	20	21.51	19.91	20.37	9	13.10
	Nov. 1991	26	14.88	26.57	12.93	12	11.11
	Feb. 1992	28	16.67	13.63	20.25	12	12.62
Apr. 1992	16	13.31	20.47	12.31	10	11.91	
<b>AQUINO AVERAGE:</b>		<b>18</b>	<b>19.62</b>	<b>28.28</b>	<b>23.24</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>13.05</b>

Legend <sup>a</sup> - Republic of the Philippines

<sup>b</sup> - The highest socioeconomic classes comprising approximately 10% of the Philippine population, following a general system of classification used by private market research firms in the Philippines

<sup>c</sup> - National Capital Region or Metro Manila

Table 5 (cont'd) ...

President	Survey Period	Presidential Satisfaction Rating Regressed by Issue Variables				... By Economic Variables	
		Total No. of Variables	Adjusted R <sup>2</sup> (%)			No. of Variables	Adjusted R <sup>2</sup> (%)
			RP <sup>a</sup>	Class ABC <sup>b</sup>	NCR <sup>c</sup>		
Pres. Ramos	Sep. 1992	25	11.76	15.11	10.62	12	8.76
	Nov. 1992	26	11.25	11.77	20.22	12	7.77
	Apr. 1993	21	8.83	9.54	7.86	10	6.59
	Jul. 1993	23	16.30	24.96	21.86	12	13.03
	Sep. 1993	20	20.21	15.84	23.08	10	13.34
	Dec. 1993	20	10.94	26.20	17.50	10	9.82
	Apr. 1994	18	10.90	30.12	21.99	9	10.92
	Aug. 1994	18	11.89	15.82	10.50	8	11.94
	Nov. 1994	18	13.78	13.96	8.10	8	13.69
	Dec. 1994	17	15.42	21.79	15.41	5	15.75
	Mar. 1995	12	16.31	24.46	11.52	5	16.78
	Jun. 1995	17	11.11	20.32	17.04	5	12.86
	Oct. 1995	16	13.21	14.98	16.94	5	13.69
Dec. 1995	20	16.85	19.78	16.07	7	16.87	
<b>RAMOS AVERAGE:</b>		<b>19</b>	<b>13.48</b>	<b>18.90</b>	<b>15.62</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>12.27</b>

Source of Basic Data: Social Weather Stations Surveys, 1987-1995

Table 6. Frequency of Prayer (Philippines)

	<u>JULY 1991</u>	<u>DECEMBER 1993</u>
Never	0%	0%
Less than once to several times a year	2	1
About once to three times a month	3	2
Nearly every week to several times a week	22	11
Once to several times a day	54	86

Source of Basic Data: Social Weather Stations Surveys, July 1991 and December 1993

Question: How often do you pray? [Never, Less than once a year, About once or twice a year, Several times a year, About once a month, 2-3 times a month, nearly every week, Every week, Several times a week, Once a day, Several times a day]

Table 7. Indicators for an Index of Political Sentiment (Philippines, 1987 - 1995)

INDICATOR	SURVEY DATES												
	MAR 1987	OCT 1987	SEP 1988	FEB 1989	SEP 1989	APR 1990	NOV 1990	JUL 1991	NOV 1991	FEB 1992	APR 1992	SEP 1992	DEC 1992
<b>A. CONTEXT INDICATORS</b>													
POVERTY SELF-RATING	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
QUALITY OF LIFE: PAST	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
QUALITY OF LIFE: FUTURE	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
FAITH IN DEMOCRACY	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
SAFETY: STREETS	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
SAFETY: HOME	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
<b>B. INSTITUTIONAL INDICATORS</b>													
PRESIDENTIAL RATING	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
NATIONAL ADMINISTRATION			x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES			x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	
SENATE			x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
SUPREME COURT							x	x	x	x	x	x	x
MILITARY		x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
POLICE			x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION			x	x	x								
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS				x	x	x	x	x	x				

x = indicator ran

Source of Basic Data: Social Weather Stations Surveys, 1987-1995



Table 7 (cont'd).....

INDICATOR	SURVEY DATES											
	APR 1993	JUL 1993	SEP 1993	DEC 1993	APR 1994	AUG 1994	NOV 1994	DEC 1994	MAR 1995	JUN 1995	OCT 1995	DEC 1995
<b>A. CONTEXT INDICATORS</b>												
POVERTY SELF-RATING	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
QUALITY OF LIFE: PAST	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
QUALITY OF LIFE: FUTURE	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
FAITH IN DEMOCRACY	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
SAFETY: STREETS	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
SAFETY: HOME	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
<b>B. INSTITUTIONAL INDICATORS</b>												
PRESIDENTIAL RATING	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
NATIONAL ADMINISTRATION	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
SENATE	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
SUPREME COURT	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
MILITARY	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
POLICE	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION												
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS												

x = indicator ran

Source of Basic Data: Social Weather Stations Surveys, 1987-1995

Table 7 (cont'd).....

INDICATOR	SURVEY DATES												
	MAR 1987	OCT 1987	SEP 1988	FEB 1989	SEP 1989	APR 1990	NOV 1990	JUL 1991	NOV 1991	FEB 1992	APR 1992	SEP 1992	DEC 1992
<b>C. ISSUE INDICATORS</b>													
<b>POL. ADMIN/GOVERNANCE ISSUES</b>													
RESPONSIVENESS:PEOPLE	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
TELLING THE TRUTH	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
KEEPING PROMISES				x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
QUICK DECISION-MAKING		x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x		
DECREASING GRAFT AND CORRUPTION	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
<b>PUBLIC SAFETY ISSUES</b>													
PEACEFUL SOCIETY	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
DECREASING CRIMES							x	x	x	x	x	x	x
MILITARY DISCIPLINE		x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x		x	
WEAKENING INSURGENCY	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x		x	x	
<b>ECONOMIC ISSUES</b>													
MANAGING INFLATION									x	x	x	x	x
PROMOTING FOREIGN INVESTMENTS									x	x	x	x	x
LIVELIHOOD	x	x		x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
LAND REFORM	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
TAX COLLECTION				x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
RESPONSIVENESS:FARMERS						x	x	x	x	x		x	
RESPONSIVENESS:WORKERS			x	x	x	x	x	x	x		x	x	
FOREIGN DEBT MANAGEMENT	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	

x = indicator ran

Source of Basic Data: Social Weather Stations Surveys, 1987-1995

Table 7 (cont'd).....

INDICATOR	SURVEY DATES											
	APR 1993	JUL 1993	SEP 1993	DEC 1993	APR 1994	AUG 1994	NOV 1994	DEC 1994	MAR 1995	JUN 1995	OCT 1995	DEC 1995
<b>C. ISSUE INDICATORS</b>												
<i>POL. ADMIN/GOVERNANCE ISSUES</i>												
RESPONSIVENESS:PEOPLE		x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
TELLING THE TRUTH	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
KEEPING PROMISES	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
QUICK DECISION-MAKING	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
DECREASING GRAFT AND CORRUPTION	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
<i>PUBLIC SAFETY ISSUES</i>												
PEACEFUL SOCIETY		x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
DECREASING CRIMES	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
MILITARY DISCIPLINE												
WEAKENING INSURGENCY	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
<i>ECONOMIC ISSUES</i>												
MANAGING INFLATION	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
PROMOTING FOREIGN INVESTMENTS	x	x					x					
LIVELIHOOD	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
LAND REFORM		x	x	x	x	x	x	x			x	x
TAX COLLECTION		x	x				x	x				
RESPONSIVENESS:FARMERS	x	x	x	x	x							
RESPONSIVENESS:WORKERS	x	x	x	x								
FOREIGN DEBT MANAGEMENT												

x = indicator ran

Source of Basic Data: Social Weather Stations Surveys, 1987-1995